ATLAS
OF
PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY
PART 1: PROACTIVE PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY
PART 2: PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY IN THE ASEAN CONTEXT



វិទ្យាស្ថានសភាកម្ពុជា
PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTE OF CAMBODIA
STRENGTHENING PARLIAMENTARY CAPACITY

PCAsia
PARLIAMENTARY CENTRE OF ASIA
STRENGTHENING PARLIAMENTARY CAPACITY

ATLAS
OF
PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY

PART 1: PROACTIVE PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY

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INTRODUCTION TO AN ATLAS OF PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY

Following the publication of *the Geopolitical Atlas of Cambodia in Asia and in the World* in 2017, *An Atlas of Parliamentary Diplomacy,* the latest in PIC's atlas series, is being offered in English and also in Khmer. This latest volume seeks to explore the increasingly important role of parliaments in international diplomacy by sharing a variety of perspectives on issues affecting the citizens of both Asia and Europe. It looks more specifically at mechanisms and tools that parliamentary diplomacy has to address these shared challenges, particularly in the ASEAN context.

Parliamentary diplomacy does not seek to replace the diplomatic work of the executive branch. On the contrary, it complements the sovereign diplomacy of the executive. Parliamentary diplomacy has the benefit of adding the voice of the legislative body, the representative of the people, which can influence decisions made by regional and multilateral bodies, and the application of those decisions.

This atlas has three main objectives. The first is to offer a pedagogical tool for the PIC Regional Fellowship Program on Parliamentary Diplomacy that began in 2019, was offered on-line in 2020, and which will continue to evolve in the forthcoming Parliamentary Centre of Asia (PCAsia) from 2021 and beyond. Next, it is intended as a reference document providing information on transnational issues to Parliamentarians and parliamentary staff, especially in the ASEAN region, providing perspectives that can be taken into account when considering legislation and how best to influence their respective governments. It will also help readers to understand the various approaches to multilateralism, which is much in need today, in the context of the COVID-19 crisis. Finally, this atlas is meant to offer perspectives on the frameworks and activities of national and regional Parliaments in addressing transnational issues and interacting with one another in a spirit of cooperation, as they attempt to work together to arrive at common solutions.

To reach these goals, the atlas has been organized into two sections. The first part of the Atlas offers a series of opinions and insights from experts and citizens from both Asia and Europe, providing various perspectives on some of the world's shared challenges: climate change and environment, natural disasters and the water-energy-food security nexus, gender, peace and security, economics and rules-based trade, shared prosperity and sustainable development. The second part is dedicated to the ASEAN context and the role of parliaments and regional associations (such as AIPA) in dealing with transnational issues at the national and regional levels.

This atlas explores issues from a European, an Asian and an ASEAN perspective, which leads us to a comparison between the European way – inclusive institutions with binding commitments, and the ASEAN way – more informal and based on forums and ad hoc groupings looking for consensus. The differences must be considered as ASEAN and the EU seek to increase their cooperation and build upon existing cultural and economic links.

Moving beyond the differences in approach, the present crisis of multilateralism is a wake-up call for both regions. Here, parliamentary diplomacy could play an important role by providing an additional pathway to finding a more multilateral approach to transnational issues, if leaders choose to take it.

Common rules are required, as is the hard work needed to promote them and to adapt and adopt new rules when necessary. The voice of the people, expressed by their respective Parliaments, is crucial to reach the right decisions.

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Entrance to the Louise Weiss building, the official seat of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France

PART 1

PROACTIVE PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY



INTRODUCTION

It is with great pleasure that we, the PIC and the AIPA Secretariat, introduce *Proactive Parliamentary Diplomacy,* the third volume in our atlas series. Originally focusing on Cambodia and its place in Southeast Asia and in the world, the series has since expanded its scope - first to cover the larger ASEAN region, and now, in this current edition, to link Asia and Europe.

This transition mirrors two major developments for both PIC and for the AIPA Secretariat. For PIC, this volume is the product of the institute's expanding activities and institutional evolution towards the Parliamentary Centre of Asia (PCAsia), which includes a greater role in capacity development and experience sharing throughout the ASEAN region. For the AIPA Secretariat, this latest edition echoes the organization's priorities of "Enhancement of the capacity of staff and officials of ASEAN parliaments…", by which AIPA can "continue to address the needs raised by its members, which are to build their capacity as effective, credible and accountable institutions". This volume is a manifestation of the convergent goals of these two institutions, created while pursuing those set forth in the resolution on cooperation between AIPA and PIC adopted by the 37th AIPA General Assembly, and later renewed at its 40th General Assembly on 29 August 2019 in Bangkok.

More specifically, *Proactive Parliamentary Diplomacy* has been produced to help support Parliamentarians and parliamentary staff engage in parliamentary diplomacy activities in the ASEAN region, and with their counterparts in Europe and elsewhere.

It is also a tool for the PIC Regional Fellowship Program on Parliamentary Diplomacy, helping to introduce participating parliamentary staff to the varied perspectives, policies and plans put forward by contributors, comprising practitioners and academics from a variety of Asian and European countries. On that note, we take the opportunity to express our sincere gratitude to all whose work is featured in this volume.

Indeed, for both the AIPA Secretariat and for PIC, the common aim is to contribute to the strengthening of parliamentary capacity and to share information and experience among Parliaments. Together, we are confident that this latest volume in our atlas series will contribute to the fulfillment of these aspirations.

Like our previous Atlas, this volume strives to be a living document, continually updated online and periodically in print, making it a valuable reference document and a vehicle for ongoing collaboration. Because accessing up-to-date information is not always an easy task, working together is the best approach. Accordingly, we kindly ask for the assistance of leaders, experts and informed readers to share relevant knowledge that will be included in future updates. To all those who contribute their time and expertise to the creation of this regularly updated, living document, we offer our sincere appreciation. Together we hope it will remain a useful resource for trainees, those working within AIPA Member Parliaments, and to anyone interested in the role of parliamentary diplomacy in Asia and Europe.

To help PIC and the AIPA Secretariat provide information that is always current and relevant, kindly send all comments and contributions to digital.atlas@pic.org.kh

Dararith KIM-YEAT
Executive Director
Parliamentary Institute of Cambodia



NGUYEN Tuong Van
Secretary General
ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA)

AIPA Secretary General (2013-2016) Otharam PERIOWSAMY and PIC Executive Director Dararith KIM-YEAT agreed to a memorandum of understanding between the two organizations on 4 April 2016, renewed during the 2nd plenary session of the AIPA General Assembly in Bangkok, Thailand on 29 August 2019. The partnership between PIC and the AIPA Secretariat continues to flourish under the leadership of the current AIPA Secretary General, Ms NGUYEN Tuong Van.

Sorany EM / Vanna LENG

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

This book, *Part 1 of An Atlas of Parliamentary Diplomacy,* is a collection of opinions and insights from experts and citizens, individuals from both Europe and Asia. The aim is to share these individual perspectives with Members of Parliament, so that they might reflect upon them when considering legislation and working to influence their respective governments on how best to address today's most pressing issues. At events where MPs come together, such as Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership (ASEP) meetings, these diverse citizen perspectives can help to facilitate conversations between nations and continents. As their representatives, Members of Parliament have a responsibility to take the people's voices into consideration. It would serve governments well to recognize these various points of view, as articulated through Parliaments, especially when those Parliaments join together, form a consensus and speak with a single voice. As an introduction, this opening text shares insights from a selection of contributions in an attempt to give a summary and a preview of the diverse perspectives presented in Part 1 of this Atlas.

THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS IN FACING TRANSNATIONAL CHALLENGES

In the 21st Century, many opportunities and challenges transcend national borders and require international cooperation. Today, more than ever before, this reality is being so clearly demonstrated by the global nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, and our need to work together as nations to address this unprecedented challenge. Multilateral organizations have proliferated since the end of the Second World War to help foster regional stability, manage conflicts and health crises, achieve shared goals and address other global challenges in a rules-based environment. The trouble is that most multilateral decisions are made outside the control of representative institutions, a weakness that can result in a lack of support from the average citizen. Parliamentary diplomacy, in particular multilateral parliamentary diplomacy, integrates the voice of the people into global affairs debates and negotiations and provides a vehicle to share their perspectives during times of crisis, as spoken through their respective Parliaments. This adds legitimacy, political weight and resilience to decisions, and helps make intergovernmental organizations more accountable and transparent while also promoting understanding between people and countries.

COVID-19: IMPACTS AND RESPONSES

The global spread of the COVID-19 virus has been an unprecedented challenge for the world's governments, people and Parliaments. In Asia, Europe and beyond, people have seen not only their health threatened, but also their livelihoods and day-to-day liberties. Here, many Parliaments, using updated tools and procedures, have played a significant role in working with governments to help limit the damage done to both health and economic security. In France, a series of laws, including the State of Health

Emergency declaration, was passed by both chambers of Parliament, where the priority has been to reach a national political consensus, aware that the efforts of government to limit citizen rights for the common interest should sometimes be constrained after due consideration. In Indonesia, on 21 April, 2020, the House of Representatives hosted a meeting by teleconference examining "The Role of Parliament for International Cooperation to Defeat COVID-19", providing an opportunity for participants to compare the work done in various countries and to discuss ways to increase collaboration to respond to the pandemic with increased effectiveness.

In contrast to the important work done by some Parliaments, numerous opportunities for international cooperation, including exchanging information and collaborating on treatment and research options, were completely missed due to a lack of political will. Here, the work of Parliaments, working both singularly and collectively to provide their essential functions, has shown us a way forward, demonstrating the benefits of having Parliaments that are empowered at not only the national level, but also within regional and international groupings.

PROACTIVE PARLIAMENTS FOR PEACE, SECURITY AND SHARED PROSPERITY

Unlike the European approach to multilateralism that emphasizes overarching and inclusive institutions with binding commitments, the "ASEAN Way" prefers informal procedures, regionalism involving the evolution of multiple grouping and forums, and non-binding decisions based on consensus. The biggest challenge for the ASEAN region, and perhaps the world, is conflicts between the major powers, and an inability to constrain their behaviors. The US and Chinese preference for bilateralism is putting a strain on multilateralism in general, and ASEAN centrality, its cohesion and its significance more specifically.

This challenge to multilateralism calls on Parliaments to be more proactive and to strengthen both their traditional and their emergent roles, including that of Parliamentary Diplomacy. Parliamentarians may communicate messages and promote more subtly the national interest of their respective States, while at the same time encouraging their respective executive branches to sometimes forgo their more immediate national concerns in favor of a collaborative approach to sustainably address longer-term global challenges. This work can include supporting multilateral efforts to combat climate change, economic and monetary measures to cope with the global impact of crises such as COVID-19, and social and health initiatives to better prepare our world for future emergencies. As part of this effort, Asia and ASEAN should endeavor to build a stronger partnership with the EU, who can together work to shape a new order of multilateralism that aims to address shared challenges and to avert the danger of conflicts and collisions among powerful states.

PROMOTING RULES-BASED MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEMS FOR INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

A central institution of multilateralism, the WTO, has made notable progress in achieving a near-free global trade regime, significantly reducing tariffs between nations, while emphasizing principles such as equality, cooperation and negotiation,

which contributes to peace. This rules-based multilateral trading system has materially benefitted developed and developing countries alike. It has enabled Asia to integrate into the vast global market, leading to a surge in exports, the creation of millions of jobs, and a steady climb up the development ladder. Consumers in Europe have benefitted from goods and services from Asia at much lower prices. But significant problems exist. The US, chief architect of the post 1945 international order, is turning towards bilateral negotiations and even tariff wars with trading partners. The WTO dispute settlement system in severely threatened, as the US blocks appointments to the Appellate Body due to concerns about its activist approach and how it diminishes national sovereignty.

In response, Asia is proceeding with cross regional initiatives like the CPTPP and RCEP-16, the latter of which would be the world's largest trade agreement by population and income covered. The EU is seeking WTO reform by strengthening enforcement, empowering committees to change rules incrementally, and trying to alleviate US concerns about the Appellate Body.

But more work is needed to address a fundamental tension within globalization – states want to be sovereign and citizens demand a voice in decisions that affect them, while global trade requires a rules-based multilateral system. The fact that this system often seems bureaucratic, distant and removed from the people can be seen in the failure of the US-EU TTIP negotiations. Thus, to build a stronger and more effective multilateral system to govern global trade and regulations, the voice of the people and their representative institutions should play a larger role.

CLIMATE CHANGE, RESOURCE SECURITY AND THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS

For insights into the nexus between resource security and climate change, this Atlas offers a view on energy security from Europe, and one on food security from Asia, along with a diversity of views on the various causes and impact of climate change.

While a steady supply of food and energy are essential to any modern population, the effects on the environment must also be considered. As part of this balancing act, the EU has fostered the growth of alternative energy sources in Europe. While positive in terms of climate, another result has been a reduction in the overall production of energy, as production levels for non-renewable sources have fallen. Today, more than half of the EU energy needs are supplied by countries outside of the EU, creating a complex and precarious geopolitical situation.

A major resource issue for Asia is the supply of food, as it is already the region with the greatest food needs and its population is growing fast. Alarmingly, studies suggest that rising temperatures could cause crop yields to fall significantly in the decades ahead. Singapore's Parliament has taken one important step to address this issue when it established the Singapore Food Agency. It is working on ways for cities, home to half the world's population, to contribute to global food production with sustainable urban farming methods while also shortening the food supply chain, which will help prevent food from wasting and also reduce food's carbon footprint.

But food security is not Asia's only major concern. Source of half of the world's greenhouse gas emissions, it is also the region most exposed to climate change. Making matters worse, the metropolises of Southeast Asia are located on soft ground in alluvial zones and deltas, where rapid urbanization and the associated pumping of ground water is causing the sinking of the ground's surface – subsidence, leading to increased flooding. A related challenge for Asia is deforestation, largely caused by land clearing for agriculture and timber. This has been fueled by the soaring global demand for agricultural products and increased investment from China, along with the difficulty in enacting effective laws and the sometimes weak enforcement of existing rules. This adds to the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere, which in turn contributes to global warming and rising seas.

At the same time, the European Union is facing its own challenges as it attempts to become a global leader in the fight against climate change. After successes including the Paris agreement and the UN Climate Change Conference in 2017, the EU has managed to decrease greenhouse gas emissions while still maintaining a healthy rate of economic growth, but current national climate targets still fall well short of Paris commitments. The newly proposed European Green Deal is a major next step. Its main objective is to achieve carbon neutrality within three decades, which will mean rethinking policies related to both resources and the environment. The burden of emissions reduction is likely to also fall on the EU's trading partners, and so is certain to face political obstacles.

To these issues at the national level, Parliaments can help by bringing forward thoughtful legislation, raising public awareness and helping to integrate the voices from civil society organizations, as well as monitoring and overseeing the effective implementation of laws by government, specialized multilateral agencies and institutions. This can also contribute to multilateral activities by bringing democratic legitimacy and accountability into adaptation and mitigation efforts. Inter-parliamentary meetings (such as ASEP, IPU, AIPA, etc.) are also crucial moments for exchange that can be used to advance inter-regional agreement and shared commitments.

CONCLUSION

Together with Parliamentary representatives from Asia and Europe, the Parliamentary Institute of Cambodia (PIC) and the forthcoming Parliamentary Centre of Asia (PCAsia) share a commitment to building our understanding of the issues that affect us all, from health security and crisis management, to economics and trade, to climate change and resource security. Just as Parliaments are proactively increasing their role in peacebuilding, this volume seeks also to play a role by giving voice to a variety of actors, integral to the process of dialogue and conflict resolution necessary to build a more peaceful and stable world. PIC hopes that the expert and citizen contributions in this volume can offer fresh perspectives for Parliamentarians as they work toward these ends, helping to build a peaceful, safe, clean, and prosperous future for us all.

Bridge crossing the Kama River near Perm, Russia, now part of the New Silk Road that links seaports on the Pacific with those in Europe.
Sergei Prokudin-Gorskii

CHAPTER

01

THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS IN FACING TRANSNATIONAL CHALLENGES

1.1 EUROPE AND ASIA: BUILDING A NEW MULTILATERALISM

ABOUT MULTILATERALISM

> *Multilateralism is an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct - that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence. [1, p. 571]*

Multilateralism implies a capacity to sacrifice short-term for longer-term interests for the sake of common and shared values. In that respect, the European Union has been inspired by this form from its inception since it is a multilateral organization where national interests are counterbalanced by the collective objectives of cooperation and regional integration. At the global level, European Union Member States have always supported a strong United Nations system for conflict resolution, peace keeping, and robust international bodies, from the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization, 1944) to the WTO (1995), UNESCO, the International Court of Justice, the World Food Program, the World Health Organization, UNDP or UNEP and the World Bank Group. To this end, EU members provide 40 percent of the current UN budget.

THE PRESENT CRISIS OF MULTILATERALISM

This cooperative behaviour is now under serious threat, and what constitutes the common good seems more difficult to identify. The present US administration is destroying much of the institutional underpinnings of globalization and has destroyed the confidence that international businesses used to enjoy from the predictable operations of a rules-based system.

The WTO mechanism of arbitration has been blocked since 10 December 2019 by the refusal of the American delegation to nominate new judges to the Appellate Body. In 2020, acting in similar fashion, the United States will remain outside the Paris Agreement on climate change. The current White House has supported Brexit and other efforts that weaken the cohesion of the European Union. For the first time since 1950, an American administration is not fully engaged in the process of the integration of its European allies.

Trade and tariff disputes between the United States and China, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, France, Germany, Japan and South Korea are disturbing, especially for strategic allies. The systematic dismantling of the post-1945 international order is underway, by its chief architect. As a result, “A mercantilist cat has been let out of the bag. The risk is that the world fragments into regional trading blocs, the most obvious ones being the US, the EU and China” [2].

Other factors are at play, causing a reduction in cooperation and leading to a more balance-of-power policy, notably

in Asia where, in contrast to the situation in Europe, there is no security matrix [1, p. 562] [B].

So, if multilateralism is not yet *"brain-dead"*, there is an urgency to establish new formats, spaces and horizons of international cooperation, which experts call *"pluri-lateralism"* [3]. The threats and challenges are pressing and a number of international issues cannot be fixed on a simple bilateral basis: environmental issues; rules-based new free trade agreements; the functioning of the international financial system; cyber-security; and terrorism.

On each of these matters, "pluri-lateralist" dialogues present a possible way forward. For example, the EU and China can work on issues related to the WTO, since China needs the stability offered by rules-based trade, provided that any agreement on the protection of foreign direct investment is engineered by China. The EU can also engage in dialogue with China on sustainable development, promoting a greener economy compatible with trade. The awareness of the risks inherent to the failure of established peaceful economic coexistence has led France and Germany to launch, on 26 September 2019 at the United Nations in New York, a new Alliance for Multilateralism, which now includes more than 60 countries worldwide, among them Canada, Mexico, Chile, Singapore and Ghana.

THE ALLIANCE FOR MULTILATERALISM

The "Alliance for Multilateralism" launched by the French and German Foreign Ministers is an informal network of countries united in their conviction that a rules-based multilateral order is the only way to reliably ensure international peace and stability, and that our common challenges can be overcome only through cooperation.

At a time when key principles of the rules-based international order and essential instruments of international cooperation are being challenged, the Alliance for Multilateralism aims to bring together those who believe in strong and effective multilateral cooperation. Those who join hands to act towards this end believe that the purposes and principles of international law, justice and the Charter of the United Nations are indispensable foundations to secure peace, stability and prosperity.

The Alliance aims to renew the global commitment to a rules-based international order, to uphold its principles and adapt it, where necessary. Its objectives are:

- to protect and preserve international norms, agreements and institutions that are under pressure or in peril;
- to pursue a more proactive agenda in policy areas that lack effective governance and to confront new challenges that require collective action; and
- to advance reforms, without compromising on key principles and values, in order to make multilateral institutions and the global political and economic order more inclusive and effective in delivering tangible results to citizens around the world.

The Alliance will advance a multilateral agenda that fully respects the vital role of the United Nations, and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. Partners in the Alliance are committed to acting as driving forces to protect, develop and adapt an international order based on the rule of law.

In the field of foreign policy, multilateralism means that states cooperate with each other in order to promote common objectives, and balance and regulate

competing interests. They do this because they know that, ultimately, all States reap the greatest gains if they work together and agree on rules. Such cooperation relies on certain principles and values being shared by all parties. In the age of globalization, almost all countries on earth are interconnected. Conflicts raging in one region may have a direct impact on people's lives thousands of miles away. Phenomena such as climate change cause problems that do not stop at borders, which is why multilateral cooperation is more important today than ever.

Among the initiatives already agreed upon by the Alliance for Multilateralism is a call for action to strengthen respect for international humanitarian law and principled humanitarian action with regard to: trust and security in cyberspace; an international partnership for information and democracy; a joint position on climate change and security; future technologies, disarmament and arms control; global public goods and strengthening international institutions; and gender equality.

M. Sovann Ke during a plenary meeting on multilateralism[4].

For Mr. Sovann Ke (Permanent Representative of Cambodia to the UN), the United Nations is the representative body most capable of defending the virtues of multilateralism, and one of the most suitable means of meeting the challenges of the 21st century. It is by working together that the international community can achieve crucial results. The representative offered as proof the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda, which highlight the "transcendental" power of diplomacy. At the same time, he spoke out against unilateralism which harms the prosperity of the whole community. He pointed to the example of Cambodia, which has enjoyed peace and stability and rapid development for the past 20 years, with high economic growth rate of 7 percent per year. This has been made possible through trade, diplomacy and cooperation. Indeed, without multilateralism or cooperation, economies will only decline, people will become poorer and the 2030 Agenda objectives will remain out of grasp. Such a scenario will certainly fuel dangerous ideologies and conflicts, he warned.

EUROPE ET ASIE: BÂTIR UN NOUVEAU MULTILATÉRALISME

> *Le multilatéralisme est une forme institutionnelle qui coordonne les relations entre trois Etats ou plus sur la base de principes généraux de conduite, sans considération pour les intérêts particuliers des parties ou pour les exigences stratégiques qui peuvent exister. 1*

Le multilatéralisme implique une capacité à sacrifier les intérêts de court-terme pour ceux de long-terme au nom des valeurs communes et partagées. De ce point de vue, l'Union européenne s'est inspirée dès l'origine dès lors qu'elle est une organisation multilatérale où les intérêts nationaux sont contrebalancés par les objectifs collectifs de coopération et d'intégration régionale. Au niveau global, les Etats membres de l'Union européenne ont toujours soutenu un système des Nations Unies fort pour la résolution des conflits, le maintien de la paix et des agences internationales robustes, de l'OACI (1944) à l'OMC (1995) l'UNESCO, la Cour internationale de justice, la FAO, l'OMS, le PNUD et le PNUE et le groupe de la Banque Mondiale. Dans ce but, les Etats membres de l'Union européenne assurent 40% du budget de l'ONU.

LA CRISE ACTUELLE DU MULTILATÉRALISME

L'approche coopérative est désormais menacée. Ce qui constitue les biens communs semble plus difficile à identifier. L'actuelle administration américaine est en train de mettre à bas les fondements institutionnels de la globalisation et la confiance que les milieux d'affaires avaient dans des opérations fondées sur un système de droit et de règles. Le mécanisme d'arbitrage de l'OMC est bloqué depuis le 10 décembre 2019 par refus de la délégation américaine de nommer de nouveaux juges dans la Cour d'appel. De même, en 2018, les Etats-Unis se sont retirés de l'accord de Paris sur le climat, avec effet à partir de 2020. Le Brexit anglais a reçu l'appui de la Maison Blanche qui ne cesse de porter atteinte à la cohésion de l'Union européenne. Pour la première fois depuis 1950 une administration américaine n'est plus engagée dans le processus d'intégration de ses alliés européens.

Les disputes sur le commerce et les tarifs entre les Etats-Unis d'une part, la Chine, le Canada, le Mexique, le Brésil, la France, l'Allemagne, le Japon et la Corée du Sud d'autre part, affectent des pays alliés. Le démontage systématique de l'ordre libéral international post-1945 est en cours, sous l'action de son principal architecte. Il en résulte que « le mauvais génie du mercantilisme est sorti de sa boîte. Le risque est une fragmentation du monde en blocs commerciaux régionaux, autour des Etats-Unis, de la Chine et de l'Union européenne".

D'autres facteurs sont à l'œuvre, qui réduisent la coopération et mènent à une politique d'équilibre des forces, notamment en Asie où, à la différence de l'Europe, il n'y a pas de structure de sécurité collective.

De sorte que si le multilatéralisme n'est pas encore atteint de «mort cérébrale», il est urgent d'établir des formats, des horizons et des espaces nouveaux de

coopération internationale, que les experts nomment le « pluri-latéralisme ». Les menaces et les défis sont pressants et bien des questions internationales ne peuvent être traitées sur une simple base bilatérale : environnement, accords commerciaux régulés, système financier international, cyber-sécurité et terrorisme.

Sur chacun de ces sujets, les dialogues « pluri-latéralistes » offrent de possibles voies pour avancer. Par exemple, l'Union européenne et la Chine peuvent travailler ensemble sur les questions relatives à l'OMC - car la Chine a besoin de ses règles commerciales – dès lors que la Chine s'engage sur la voie de la protection des investissements étrangers. L'UE peut également dialoguer avec la Chine sur le développement durable et la promotion d'une économie plus verte compatible avec le commerce. La conscience des risques inhérents à l'échec d'une coexistence économique pacifique a conduit la France et l'Allemagne à lancer, le 26 septembre 2019 au siège de l'ONU à New York une nouvelle Alliance pour le multilatéralisme qui a associe déjà plus de 60 Etats, du Canada, du Mexique et du Chili au Ghana et à Singapour.

L'ALLIANCE POUR LE MULTILATÉRALISME

Cette Alliance lancée par les deux ministres français et allemand des affaires étrangères est un réseau informel de pays unis dans leur conviction qu'un système international fondé sur des règles est la seule façon d'assurer la paix et la stabilité internationale et que les défis communs ne peuvent être dépassés qu'en coopération.

Dans une période où les principes centraux du système international et les instruments de la coopération internationale sont mis au défi, l'Alliance pour le multilatéralisme vise à rassembler ceux qui croient à la force d'une coopération solide et efficace. Ceux qui s'accordent pour travailler ensemble sont convaincus que les objectifs et les principes du droit international, de la justice et de la Charte des Nations Unies restent les fondements indispensables de la paix, de la sécurité et de la prospérité.

L'Alliance entend renouveler l'engagement global pour un ordre international régulé, des principes réaffirmés et adaptés si nécessaire. Ses objectifs sont :

- Protéger et préserver les normes, accords et institutions aujourd'hui en péril ou sous pression ;
- Suivre un agenda proactif dans les domaines où la gouvernance fait défaut afin d'affronter les nouveaux défis qui exigent une action collective ;
- Avancer dans les réformes, sans compromis sur les principes et les valeurs, afin de rendre les institutions multilatérales et l'ordre politique et économique global plus inclusifs et efficaces, pour obtenir des résultats tangibles pour les citoyens dans le monde.

L'Alliance proposera un calendrier multilatéral respectant le rôle vital de l'ONU, conforme aux objectifs et principes de la Charte de l'ONU et du droit international. Ses partenaires sont déterminés à agir comme vecteurs d'un ordre international régulé et fondé sur le droit.

Dans le domaine de la politique étrangère, le multilatéralisme signifie que les Etats coopèrent afin de promouvoir des objectifs communs et d'équilibrer les intérêts concurrents. Car le respect des règles et la coopération sont bénéfiques pour tous dès lors qu'ils partagent les mêmes valeurs et principes. A l'ère de la globalisation, presque tous les pays sont

interconnectés. Les conflits dans une région peuvent avoir des effets directs sur des populations éloignées. Le changement climatique provoque des problèmes qui ne se limitent pas aux frontières. C'est pourquoi la coopération internationale est plus importante que jamais.

Parmi les initiatives déjà agréées par l'Alliance, citons l'appel à respecter le droit international dans divers domaines : sécurité et confiance dans le cyberespace ; partenariat international sur l'information et la démocratie ; position commune sur le changement climatique et la sécurité ; technologies du futur, désarmement et contrôle des armes ; biens publics mondiaux et renforcement des institutions internationales ; égalité entre femmes et hommes.

M. Sovann Ke lors d'une réunion plénière sur le multilatéralisme[4].

Pour M. Sovann Ke, représentant permanent du Cambodge aux Nations Unies, les Nations Unies sont l'organe le plus représentatif à même de défendre les vertus du multilatéralisme, l'un des moyens les plus adéquats de relever les défis du XXIe siècle. C'est en travaillant ensemble que la communauté internationale pourra atteindre des résultats cruciaux. Le représentant en a voulu pour preuve l'Accord de Paris ou encore le Programme 2030 qui mettent en valeur le pouvoir « transcendantal » de la diplomatie. Il s'est, dans le même temps, élevé contre l'unilatéralisme qui nuit à la prospérité de l'ensemble de la communauté. Le Cambodge jouit, depuis ces 20 dernières années, de la paix et de la stabilité et d'un développement rapide avec une croissance économique élevée de 7% par an. Cette situation a été rendue possible grâce au commerce, à la diplomatie et à la coopération. En effet, sans multilatéralisme, ni coopération, les économies ne pourront que décliner, les peuples s'appauvrir et le Programme 2030 patiner. Un tel scenario alimentera assurément les idéologies dangereuses et les conflits, a-t-il mis en garde.

1.2 STRENGTHENING PARLIAMENTARY PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

The international system is getting more complex and is rapidly evolving in a direction towards a multiplex world - a world of complex interconnectedness, interdependence, and inter-operability. Nation states are becoming more interdependent. Global issues are getting more complex and interconnected. It is now clear that no single country can address global issues such as climate change, terrorism, violent extremism, natural disasters and pandemic diseases. Multi-stakeholder collaboration has been recognized as the fundamental approach to provide holistic and effective solutions to these shared challenges. This text aims to explore the roles of Parliament in addressing global issues, with a focus on the realization of the sustainable development goals (SDGs), and how the Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership can be used as a mechanism to achieve these ends.

ROLES OF PARLIAMENTS IN ADDRESSING GLOBAL ISSUES

Global issues such as climate change and violent extremism have become more complex, with impacts that cross national boundaries. Parliaments have started to adapt their modus operandi in order to position themselves to effectively address these global issues, realizing that the only effective way to address them is through international cooperation and partnership.

Some of the international roles of Parliaments are to contribute to intergovernmental negotiations and the institutional building processes, to carry out parliamentary oversight over international negotiating processes, to ratify and enforce international agreements, to promote multi-stakeholder dialogues on international issues and responses, and to disseminate information on international issues and organizations to citizens.

Global issues and external engagement have become more relevant for Parliaments and the people. Members of Parliament need to communicate and get input for and from their constituents regarding international issues that affect their security and social-economic well-being. As democratization of opinion rises thanks to the ever-presence of information and communication technology (ICT), Members of Parliament are compelled to communicate with their constituents more effectively to meet the rising expectations of the people. At the same time, those in Parliament who deal especially in foreign affairs can invite leaders of government ministries and state agencies to give briefings and address probing questions on the international issues, foreign affairs, and trade policies that affect their citizens.

ROLES OF PARLIAMENT IN REALIZING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Building global partnerships on sustainable development is expressed in Goal 17 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). As this goal implies, international partnerships and multi-stakeholder collaboration are critical to realizing the SDGs. The

SDGs also stress the importance of inclusiveness - the participation of all segments of society - in order to mobilize and share knowledge and expertise, and also to provide the needed technical and financial resources.

The parliamentary institution, which plays a vital bridge between the State and society, is one of the key stakeholders in mobilizing resources and directing a national agenda towards realizing regional and international goals. Therefore, public-private and civil society partnerships are critical to concretizing the SDGs. Goal 16 elucidates the importance of promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development. The Declaration of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development states that, "we acknowledge the essential role of national parliaments through their enactment of legislation and adoption of budgets and their role in ensuring accountability for the effective implementation of our commitments".

As stated in the declaration, the Parliament has four important roles to play in realizing the SDGs, namely oversight, legislation, representation, and budget scrutiny. To help fulfill this mission, Parliaments can increase national involvement, provide a platform for national and international discussions and dialogues, encourage debate and consensus building among national stakeholders, develop robust legal frameworks that motivate stakeholders to implement the SDGs, collect input from citizens and civil society groups, allocate appropriate levels of funding, and conduct oversight using annual checks and requesting and reviewing reports by the respective committees concerning progress made in achieving the SDGs.

Parliamentary contributions to Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs) help to evaluate and track the progress regarding the SDGs. The key functions of the VNRs are planning and institutionalizing, gathering input and data, writing and reviewing, and conducting presentations and follow ups. The deliverables of the VNRs are the enhancement of multi-stakeholder partnerships and the promotion of active participation, along with a sense of ownership, among all relevant parties. Furthermore, the prioritization of the SDGs in national development planning, the raising of public awareness, policy advocacy, and the development of effective and inclusive assessment mechanisms regarding the implementation of the SDGs are considered vital.

The key challenge for Parliaments, especially in Asian countries, is how to increase their engagement and influence over the SDGs agenda, as the SDG programs are mainly shaped by the executive body. International parliamentary forums such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), the Asia Pacific Parliamentary Forum (APPF), the World Parliamentary Forum on Sustainable Development (WPFSD) and the Asia-Europe Parliamentary Meeting (ASEP) need to invest more effort and resources in developing international consensus as well as planning an engagement strategy regarding the SDGs.

ROLES OF THE ASIA-EUROPE PARLIAMENTARY PARTNERSHIP MEETING (ASEP)

The Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership Meeting (ASEP) is the meeting of Parliamentarians from Asia and Europe that seeks to provide policy

inputs and recommendations to the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process. ASEP is the parliamentary arm of ASEM, and its first meeting took place in 1996. As it is an informal forum, its declarations are not legally binding.

ASEP has two main objectives. First, it serves as a forum for inter-parliamentary contacts, exchanges and diplomacy among Parliaments, and as a vehicle to promote mutual understanding among the people and countries of Asia and Europe. Second, it provides a link between the Parliaments of Asia and Europe and ASEM, and thereby enabling an active parliamentary contribution to the ASEM process, particularly in bi-annual meetings.

Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is one of the key areas of cooperation facilitated by the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). In their joint statement in 2018, ASEM leaders stressed the importance of multi-stakeholder partnership in pursuing social and economic inclusion, sustainable societies and people-centered development. Moreover, ASEM leaders proposed linking the issue of ASEM connectivity with sustainable development to help to address the 2030 Agenda. Meanwhile, the Declaration of the 10th Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership Meeting (ASEP 10) places an emphasis on the importance of multilateralism and international partnership to address climate change and sustainable development.

CONCLUSION

Today, parliamentary institutions are playing an increasingly important role in addressing a range of complex and interconnected global issues. Concerning the SDGs, the Parliament has several important roles to play such as oversight, legislation, and budget scrutiny. However, to increase its influence in shaping and implementing the SDGs, Parliaments need to strengthen their leadership and institutional capacity, and to develop effective engagement strategies.

ASEP is one of the key international parliamentary forums that can further promote parliamentary dialogues and consultation on the SDG agenda, especially in building the necessary international partnerships and multi-stakeholder collaboration. In this effort, capacity building, knowledge sharing, and collective efforts on the SDGs need to be further promoted.

Specific recommendations for ASEP are: (1) encourage all ASEP members to carry out a Voluntary National Review (VNR) for their country and to create a knowledge-sharing platform encompassing the results of those VNRs; (2) institute capacity building programs in ASEP developing member countries on the SDGs for Members of Parliament and staff; and (3) create an ASEP Special Envoy on the SDGs in order to effectively engage with the parliamentary members of ASEP and international organizations such as the United Nations.

1.3 THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS IN FACING TRANSNATIONAL CHALLENGES: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

We live in a globalized world where opportunities and challenges, including global warming, trade, migration, biodiversity protection, transnational crime and ocean governance, transcend national borders and require international cooperation. With globalization the boundaries between what are considered national policy and international relations are sometimes blurred. Indeed, what is decided in Beijing or Washington by governments and global markets will most likely impact the present and future of populations in Brazil or Spain, in Cambodia or Australia.

After a long history of devastating conflicts, European countries now have in place well-established methods of international cooperation, organized through the institutions and the laws of the European Union (EU), which has among its fundamental principles the transfer of some aspects of national sovereignty to the supra-national level. Not surprisingly, the EU is a champion of multilateralism and strongly believes in a rules-based multilateral system as the most effective way to address, in a fair and collaborative way, today's common challenges.

While this approach is facing resistance from some powers in the international community, it is largely shared within Asia, as confirmed during the ASEP 10 meeting in Brussels in 2018, in which multilateralism was one of the two featured topics. More recently, a shared commitment was demonstrated at the last ASEM Foreign Ministers Meeting held in Madrid, Spain, in December 2019, under the theme "Asia and Europe: together for effective multilateralism".

Of course, there are differences between the European and the Asian ways, both in methodology and substance. Legally binding agreements characterize the European way while Asians favor consensus and trust based on good relations and national sovereignty. Economic relations are the priority for Asian governments, while commitments regarding human rights or the fight against climate change are equal priorities for Europe. The two continents do, however, have a fundamental interest in fighting protectionism and isolationism, and both agree on the need to maintain an open multilateral system.

While globalization has brought important benefits such as lifting hundreds of millions of people in the world out of poverty, it has also destabilized the economic and socio-cultural foundations of our societies, creating fear and insecurity among many in Europe. People fear they are losing control of their future and feel insecure in their present circumstances. This has led to opposition to the "remote elites and bureaucracies" who decide, along with a mounting resistance to multiculturalism, manifested in the strengthening of populist policies across much of the continent. Today, many political leaders face a lack of trust from citizens who consider them a part of a distant world detached from their realities. There is a growing gap between decision-makers and voters, highlighted in debates concerning a crisis of democracy as a governance system.

Globalization has also supported international institution-building: multilateral

organizations have proliferated since the 1990's in order to manage the process and impact of globalization. These organizations have been set up as means to foster regional stability, manage conflicts, support economic growth, reduce development gaps, build prosperity and address global challenges in a rules-based environment. They take different formats, from those deeply integrated, such as the EU, to very weak ones such as SAARC.

With increasing frequency, decisions on key policy issues effecting large numbers of people are discussed and made within regional or multilateral frameworks: from WTO to APEC on trade and economic development; from EAS and ARF to NATO on security; from UNFCC to AOSIS on climate change. The G20 discuss all those issues as well. This is due to the global nature of a growing number of issues and their increasing technical complexity. Such decisions are largely made outside the control of national representative institutions, such as parliaments, which find it difficult to exert their scrutiny and oversight powers over those supra-national bodies. This is a major weakness that results in a lack of support from the average citizen for decisions taken by those bodies and institutions. Generally speaking, regional integration processes tend indeed to suffer from a democratic deficit: a top-down approach is often pursued and there is limited involvement from other stakeholders, including from elected parliamentarians and civil society representatives.

At a time when major decisions are being made further away from citizens, another, and divergent, major development is also taking place: Government policies and decisions are under greater scrutiny from civil society groups, media and ordinary citizens. A better educated electorate, making full use of social media tools - which are changing the democratic process - has easy access to an abundance of information, expresses opinions and tries to directly influence decision-making.

And this is a good thing: all walks of life must be engaged to gain public acceptance of policies and international agreements that directly impact on citizens' lives. The public now expects leaders to act with transparency and within democratic arrangements. Information, dialogue and participation are key words to claim legitimacy. The demand for legitimacy and accountability is growing everywhere.

In this context of global challenges and new democratic expectations, the role of Parliamentarians is a crucial one: as representatives of the people they must add their voices to global affairs debates and negotiations, trying to shape and influence policies and conducting diplomatic relations parallel to those of the executive. Parliamentary diplomacy adds legitimacy, resilience and political weight to decisions. This can be done by national Parliaments when contributing to, and monitoring, their country's policies in addressing global issues (as recently seen with the EU-Canada free trade agreement or CETA).

This is useful and important, but international cooperation on transnational challenges is, more often than not, carried out by a combination of global, regional and sub-regional organizations. Multilateral co-operation has therefore become a new frontier for legislators who aspire to see intergovernmental organizations made more accountable and transparent.

This may not be easy, as sovereign States are reluctant to give away powers to their own national legislature. There is even

more resistance to grant powers to supra-national parliamentary assemblies (and the European Parliament is confronted with this issue on a daily basis). To achieve greater levels of legitimacy, to hold regional organisations accountable and to respond to common challenges, regional representative assemblies need to be set up and strengthened to contribute to, and oversee, decisions taken by those organisations.

A significant number of regional and international organisations around the world have already equipped themselves with representative assemblies (IPU, WTO, AIPA, APF, APA) or regional parliaments (EP, PAP). Of course, they vary in design, powers and performance but the fact is that many transnational parliamentary institutions remain weak and their role, impact, power and policy inputs too limited.

This is not to say that parliamentary diplomacy should supersede traditional diplomacy. The general principle remains: it is for the executive branch of government to negotiate international agreements on behalf of States, and it is for Parliaments to scrutinize government action, influence policies pursued by the government in negotiating those agreements, ratify them, implement their provisions through the adoption of appropriate legislation and budget allocations, and oversee the implementation process as a whole.

But Parliaments engaged in diplomacy do have advantages: they do not necessarily commit their governments to arrangements made, and can therefore act with more flexibility in sensitive situations, or where disagreements are deep. They can propose and discuss more innovative solutions. Their engagement diversifies the avenues for dialogue and provides additional room for maneuver as they have no formal role in negotiations. For example, the European Parliament tends to express blunt messages on governance and human rights or market access in its relations with China. These messages complement the work of the EU Member States, and put pressure on the European Commission to maintain the right balance between values and interests.

Besides the Parliaments of the EU Member States, which of course have a direct impact on domestic and global policies through their own parliamentary debates, budget allocations, hearings and resolutions, the European Parliament (EP) is formally recognized as the elected representative body of the EU, and its Members are directly involved in decision-making: the EP is co-legislator, with the European Council, in the majority of domains, with the notable exceptions of foreign affairs and taxation. The EP adopts or rejects legislation and international agreements (for example rejecting in 2010 the EU-US agreement on financial data sharing or ratifying the FTA with Singapore in February 2019) and votes on resolutions to influence EU policies on matters dealt with in international forums, such as climate change or cyber-security. It also approves annual budgets and oversees the work of a multinational administration which, in other settings, often operates free of any checks and balances.

Within the European Union more than 60 percent of legislation is no longer decided at the national level, but at the EU level. And in case of contradiction or conflict, EU legislation takes precedence over national legislation: the EP, a directly elected institution, is step by step taking over the legislative and oversight functions.

Legislators contributing to the work of regional assemblies face their own challenges: they must manage different

and sometimes conflicting interests, which can be local or national, or specific to their political family[A]. Above all, they must identify what is in the (long-term) regional and/or global interest. This requires adopting a political culture based on consensus-building that prioritizes global needs over local or national ones. In a regional context (but often too in national environments, depending on the political system) one has to build bridges and foster agreements to seek broad consensus. When discussing the economy, when solving crises, when combating terrorism, when tackling social issues, data protection, climate change or energy security, the entire community must be considered.

This is why strong regional parliamentary assemblies are needed in order to provide oversight over the work of supra-national bodies, to review their decisions, to follow-up on implementation, to express support for some policies, and to amend or oppose others. Even if these parliamentary assemblies do not enjoy direct decision-making powers, the initiatives, statements and resolutions produced can have a profound impact on the "official diplomacy" conducted by the executive branch of government. They can contribute to and influence international developments by expressing views which are sometimes different from regional organisations, due to their relative flexibility.

In a globalized world marked by increasingly influential non-state actors, one where key decisions on public affairs transcending national borders are largely taken in global and regional forums, global and regional parliamentary assemblies such as ASEP must be empowered to hold those forums accountable and add legitimacy to their decisions. Legislators play an important role in the decision-making process at the national level. Likewise, they must become key actors in regional structures where more and more significant decisions are being made.

1.4 COVID-19 IMPACTS AND RESPONSES

1.4.1 INDONESIA'S RESPONSES TO THE COVID-19 CRISIS

THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY

"A new normal." In 2020, this term has often been used to describe our shared situation. The outbreak of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), now a global pandemic, has transformed our way of life.

Each passing day during this crisis is a defining moment. "The decisions people and governments take in the next few weeks will probably shape the world for years to come... Decisions that in normal times could take years of deliberation are passed in a matter of hours. Immature and even dangerous technologies are pressed into service, because the risks of doing nothing are bigger. Entire countries serve as guinea-pigs in large-scale social experiments."[5].

The ability of each country to respond to this global pandemic and mitigate its impact is certain to determine the fate of nations for years to come. However, this pandemic is too big a challenge for any one country to face alone. Some people have even likened the war against COVID-19 to World War II, only this time, instead of fighting against each other, all nations are on the same side. Of course, every nation must protect its own citizens against a virus that does not distinguish between race, beliefs or political views. However, limiting the responses to only the country level has proved insufficient to address the complexity of challenges brought on by this pandemic. The virus has brought with it cascading consequences stretching far beyond the health of individual citizens, and reaching across national borders. Hence, this pandemic is a turning point, compelling us to restore our faith in the merit of global cooperation and collaboration.

COVID-19 is also a wakeup call, a powerful reminder of the need for global cooperation and solidarity, for it hit the world at a time when the multilateral system faced pressure from the rivalries between major powers. In a webinar conducted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) on 28 April 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) Director General emphasized that global solidarity was essential for fighting this pandemic, [6] in a spirit that echoed the message of the Indonesian House's Speaker, Puan Maharani. In her opening speech to address the virtual panel discussion held by the Committee for Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation of the Indonesian House of Representatives, she made a similar call for international solidarity, revisiting the idea of working together as a family of nations, as advocated by the former Indonesian President Soekarno 75 years earlier [7].

Parliament plays an essential role in moving the wheels of global cooperation. Parliament, as well as individual MPs, is in a unique position to intensify cross-border communication to garner solidarity among Parliamentarians. However, the growing international role of Parliament requires support from adaptive inter-parliamentary organizations [8]. Innovation is the keyword, especially since COVID-19 has changed the way people interact with each other. Gone are the days when the role of inter-parliamentary organizations

was limited to facilitating contact and communication of Parliamentarians through annual assemblies. Recent innovations include a recent IPU compilation on how Parliaments are coping with the pandemic, along with its series of webinars with partner international organizations on various issues related to the crisis.

THE SPECIFIC RESPONSE OF THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT TO THE COVID-19 CRISIS

The Government of Indonesia has taken a leading role to reaffirm international cooperation and collaboration. Together with Ghana, Liechtenstein, Norway, Singapore and Switzerland, Indonesia introduced the UN Resolution on Global Solidarity to Fight Corona Virus Disease 2019. The Resolution, co-sponsored by 188 countries, put an emphasis on international cooperation as a central tool to address the pandemic, encouraging the exchange of information, scientific findings, and best practices under the leadership of the WHO. Furthermore, Indonesia is a participant in the WHO Solidarity Trial. This aims to accelerate medical breakthroughs in the search for effective medicines and treatments for COVID-19 [9]. Beyond the UN, Indonesia has also actively encouraged cooperation and collaboration within organizations such as the G20, ASEAN, G77, D8, OIC, MIKTA, WTO, WIPO, ICAO and IMO.

COVID-19 has also changed the way Parliament works. The above-mentioned IPU compilation of parliamentary responses to the pandemic helps us to share and compare parliamentary practices [10]. It reveals that remote work, avid use of information and communication technology, as well as the implementation of physical distancing have become common preventative measures among various Parliaments. The House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia has embraced this new normal by implementing all of those procedures. On 30 March 2020, the Indonesian House of Representatives held its opening session under several protective measures, with some Parliamentarians attending physically and many more attending virtually. Following the opening session, similar arrangements have been implemented for the Parliament and parliamentary secretariat; all discussions between the secretariat and its legislative counterparts are now in the form of virtual meetings.

It is often that in times of crisis democracy becomes the casualty. As in most nations, in Indonesia the major power to make decisions on policies to curb the pandemic has belonged to the executive. In order to ensure that Government efforts to adjust public health and social measures, while managing the risk of a resurgence of cases, should not in any way undermine democracy, transparency, and accountability, parliamentary shutdown was never an option for Indonesia.

Although the Indonesian Parliament started its session at the end of March, a few weeks after the first two cases of COVID-19 were announced by President Jokowi, the work of Parliament had never ceased. A day after the first cases were announced, the Indonesian House, through its Speaker Puan Maharani, reminded the Government to prioritize public health and safety, beyond other concerns, including the resulting economic impact. She urged the Government to be transparent in the management of the infection cases and to strengthen border-checks and early detection as well as other proactive measures. She even suggested establishing an integrated and coordinated team to fight the pandemic [11]. These calls were raised amidst a growing public concern that the executive

was focusing on mitigating the economic impact of the pandemic rather than on preparing for, and mitigating, what came immediately after the first infection.

No country anticipated the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, it can be considered reasonable that governments all over the world exercised their emergency powers to combat it. But the need to act boldly and quickly is not an excuse to concentrate all the power and authority with the executive. A concentration of power may lead to its abuse. This is where Parliament's constitutional mandates are needed more than ever.

It is within such a context that the Indonesian Parliament established a Parliamentary Team to Oversee COVID-19 Crisis Management. This team was tasked to deal with how the executive responds to related health issues, as the Government declared COVID-19 a Public Health Emergency through a Presidential Regulation on 31 March 2020. The Team made an early point to remove inter-institutional ego-sectoral [C] in the management of the crisis. It was assigned to monitor the development of domestic infrastructure needed to address the health crisis including PCR test kits, vaccine research and other measures.

The Parliament also raised a debate on the Government Regulation in lieu of the Law on State Financial Policy and Financial System Stability, since the regulation granted the Government the power and flexibility to encroach on the domain of existing laws and procedures to enact financial policy during the pandemic. The new regulation was envisioned as an overarching legal umbrella to provide budgetary, financial and monetary policies to deal with the impacts of COVID-19.

The regulation allowed Government to raise the budget deficit cap to more than 3 percent of GDP, a move which was previously restricted by the State Finances Law. It also cut the required procedures on revising the state budget structure without prior consultation with the Parliament. A controversial aspect of the regulation, criticized by some portions of the public, gave a sort of immunity to the authorities, as they cannot be charged under penal and civil laws when exercising the policy during the pandemic.

The debate ended on 12 May, marked by the adoption of the regulation by the Indonesian Parliament into law. The adoption came after a heated discussion on its contents, at which point the Parliament acknowledged that there was a crisis unfolding that required an extraordinary response. It was accepted that changes in the state budget structure without prior consultation with the Parliament were needed to enable the swift action necessary to prevent further financial catastrophe.

However, this expansion of power and the extraordinary authority the Government was granted during the crisis was not without limit. A highlight of the parliamentary debate that should not be ignored was the addition of a "sunset clause" to the budget deficit cap flexibility, which is set to expire in 2023. The government has also committed to return to the normal process of budget deliberation for the year 2021. Furthermore, the executive stated it would request parliamentary debate on the upcoming year's budget by mid-June, 2020. This includes a debate on public debt.

Under the adopted law, Indonesia has allocated approximately Rp 405.1 trillion

(USD 27.6 billion) worth of total stimulus, including to the healthcare sector (USD 5.1 billion), social safety net sector (USD 7.5 billion), taxation incentives and people's business credit (USD 4.8 billion), and recovery program (USD 10.2 billion) [12]. It has also set a budget deficit cap of around 5.07 percent of GDP, or around Rp 852.9 trillion (USD 57.9 billion). To finance the deficit, the government proposed to offer USD 57.11 billion worth of government bonds [13]. During a meeting of the Parliament, a debate occurred on how to maintain a low interest rate for these bonds. The main concern of the Parliament was how to limit financial consequences in the decades to come [14]. To address this, the Parliament needs to scrutinize debt planning, proposals and payment feasibility, notably to ensure that money raised through the increased debt will be used to support those who have been impacted the most. In short, debt management is one of many areas where Parliament needs to be very much involved, particularly in a time of crisis.

1.4.2 THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON CAMBODIA'S LEADING ECONOMIC SECTORS

INTRODUCTION

The world has been shocked by the unprecedented COVID-19 crisis. The new virus has had a negative impact on 213 countries and two territories around the world, infecting more than 7 million people, which, at the time of writing, has resulted in 400,000 deaths and the full recovery of 3.4 million people. The economic consequences have also been significant, costing the global economy between USD 5.8 trillion to USD 8.8 trillion due to socio-economic disruption, unemployment, city lock-downs, and severe public health responses [15, 16].

In Cambodia, the first case of coronavirus was confirmed on January 27, 2020. The government intervened in an active and timely manner by ordering a temporary suspension of face-to-face training in schools, banning large group gatherings, postponing the 2020 Khmer New Year holiday, including a restriction on people travelling to their hometowns, and initiating a public information campaign involving social media, phone service providers, and tuk-tuks (tricycle-motorbikes), motorbikes, and cars. Other steps taken include restricting inbound flight from infected countries and mandating quarantines for inbound international travelers and all those who have associated with any infected patients. As a result, as of May 2020, there had been no deaths from cases of COVID-19 in Cambodia and 123 patients had recovered, with three patients still under medical treatment. However, the outbreak has remained, with an outlook that is very uncertain and unpredictable. There has been growing concern about a second or third wave of the virus since a vaccine has yet to be developed.

The advent of COVID-19 has led the World Bank (WB) to predict that Cambodia's economy is likely to experience its slowest growth rate since 1994, contracting between -1 percent (baseline) or – 2.9 percent (downside), putting at least 1.76 million jobs at risk in 2020 and beyond [19]. In the worst-case scenario, the Asia Development Bank (ADB) has estimated that Cambodia could lose up to 3.49 percent of GDP, equivalent to USD 856.5 million [17].

The worst hit sectors in Cambodia have been tourism, manufacturing exports, and construction, which together accounted for 70 percent of growth and 39 percent of total employment in 2019 [19]. During the same year, about 10 percent (or 1,500,000 people) out of the total population

Table 1. Cambodia's main growth drivers and employment

Drivers of growth	Tourism	Garment and footwear	Construction	Total
Contribution to GDP growth (2019, percent)	18.7	17	35.7	71.4
Direct employment (000)	620	941	200	1,761
Percent of paid employment[1]	13.9	21	4.5	39.4
Percent of non-farm employment	11.2	17	3.6	31.8
Percent of total employment	7.1	10.7	2.3	20.1

Source: adapted from WB 2020
Note: 1 Wage employment

(15.3 million people) were living under the poverty line [20,21]. The impact of COVID-19 is expected to increase that rate from 3 percent to 11 percent, resulting from a 50 percent loss in income over six months for households involved in tourism, wholesale, retail trade, garments, construction, or manufacturing [19].

TOURISM

The tourism sector (including hospitality) represents 18.7 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) growth during 2019 (Table 1) [19]. The top five countries contributing to international tourism in Cambodia were China at 22.5 percent, followed by Vietnam, Thailand, Korea, and the USA (Figure 1) [22]. The sector created about 620,000 direct jobs and about 1 million indirect jobs. The sector welcomed 6 million international arrivals, generating 5 million USD in international receipts in 2019, compared with 2.5 million USD in 2013 (Table 1) [22].

With the international spread of COVID-19, the sector has been hit hard and dropped between 50 and 90 percent [23]. This was led by the initial outbreak in China; with the large share of Chinese tourists in Cambodia the sector completely collapsed, as international flights fell to just 1 percent of previous levels. The outbreak has also resulted in prolonged international travel restrictions and internal lockdowns, leading to tourist arrivals decreasing by 25.1 percent (year-on-year [y/y]) in the first two months of 2020—the first decline since the 2008–09 global financial crisis [19]. Siem Reap, Cambodia's most popular tourist destination, experienced a 45.6 percent decline in tourist arrivals during the first quarter and a 99.6 percent reduction (y/y) in April of 2020 (WB 2020). About 169 companies in the tourism sector have also closed temporarily, leaving roughly 16,891 people unemployed [25]. Many low-skilled hotel staff have received only half of their salary due to a large-scale reduction in hotel occupancy. ADB estimates that the tourism sector may have lost as much as USD 856.5 million (3.5 percent of the GDP) in a worst-case scenario (Table 2) [17].

The government's intervention and restrictions affecting international tourists included a suspension of visa exemptions, tourist visas, e-visas, and visas on arrival for one month. According to the government, foreigners wishing to travel to Cambodia have been asked to obtain a visa at a Cambodian diplomatic mission abroad and a COVID-19 negative health certificate issued no more than 72 hours before departure.

Table 2. The decline in tourism revenues by the growth of the domestic product

	Best case		Moderate case		Worse case	
Country	% as of GDP	in $ millions	as % of GDP	in $ millions	as % of GDP	in $ millions
Cambodia	-1.409	-345.7	-1.929	-473.4	-3.49	-856.5

Source: ADB 2020

To help reduce the burden on the hotel sector, all registered hotels and guesthouses in Siem Reap, Preah Sihanouk, Kep, and Kampot provinces were exempted from taxes until May 2020 [18]. Cambodia has also implemented macroeconomic policies such as cutting interest rates, continuing a cycle of easing that began in 2019, as well as other fiscal measures to help support the economy at large [17].

The government has also tried to control the virus and thereby safeguard the economy by implementing contact tracing when needed, ensuring adequate supplies of personal protective equipment, strengthening laboratory capacities, and ensuring adequate communication to the public about risks and prevention.

Despite the current difficulties faced by the hospitality sector, there have been no reports of any hotel construction projects being stopped or of developers canceling their plans, and several new hotels opened over the last few weeks of February 2020, with more on the horizon [24].

MANUFACTURING EXPORTS

The garment and footwear industry has been the main driver propelling Cambodia's economy, contributing 17 percent to the growth in GDP and providing 940,000 direct jobs, or 10 percent of total employment in 2019 (Table 1). However, after the global spread of COVID-19, since March 2020, there has been little demand from consumers and retailers abroad. The supply of materials used to produce the goods has likewise been postponed. As a result, as of 1 May 2020, there were about 256 garment, footwear, and travel goods factories that had suspended their operation due to the COVID-19 outbreak, affecting more than 130,000 workers [25].

The government has intervened by announcing monthly relief payments of USD 70 per worker (USD 40 from the government plus USD 30 from the factory owner) for those laid off during the COVID-19 crisis [26]. On 1 June 2020 the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training announced provision of this financial support to laid-off workers in the garment, foot-wear, and tourism sectors [27]. The government's payments have been categorized into 3 types, providing USD 15 for workers laid-off for 7 to 10 days, USD 30 for those laid-off between 11 to 20 days, and USD 40 for those 21 days to 1 month. This allowance scheme has been praised as a good example of the government tackling the epidemic crisis in Cambodia, even though the relief could not cover all affected sectors.

However, the biannual indemnity payments for the garment and foot-wear workers has been postponed until 2021 because the government is also providing relief to factory owners to ease their burden of having no orders and no revenues during this pandemic [28, 29].

Figure 1. Top ten international arrivals in January 2020



	China (RPC)	Vietnam	Thailand	Korea (ROK)	USA	UK	France	Japan	Laos PDR	Australia
2020	123,550	75,929	53,874	37,206	30,315	20,042	19,344	18,767	17,850	14,087
2019	182,449	63,493	44,087	41,364	30,254	19,654	22,189	19,435	62,134	15,470
Share (%)	22.5	13.9	9.8	6.8	5.5	3.7	3.5	3.4	3.3	2.6
Change (%)	-32.3	19.6	22.2	-10.1	0.2	2	-12.8	-3.4	-71.3	-10.5

Source: Cambodian Ministry of Tourism 2020

CONSTRUCTION AND REAL ESTATE

At present, construction, Cambodia's largest sector, accounts for 35.7 percent of total GDP, followed by tourism and garment-footwear (Table 1). Construction related activities provided 200,000 jobs in 2019. Investments from partners in the in the region, in particular from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, have contributed 50 percent of the total foreign direct investment inflows to the sector in recent years [19].

After the onset of COVID-19, with capital inflows to the sector being cut off, many predict an end to the construction boom. Already, the amount of steel imported for the construction industry has been reduced by 47 percent in the first two months of 2020, and foreign direct investment for the sector declined by 40 percent during the same period [19]. Adding to concerns is the large volume of outstanding credit affecting the construction, real estate, and mortgage sectors, and an expected rise in nonperforming loans [19]. This slowdown in the construction sector will be a drag on overall economic growth, even though its impacts on employment should be relatively small because much of the latest boom was fueled by the development of luxury high-rise buildings, which tends to be capital intensive [19].

CONCLUSION

The government of Cambodia has followed the advice of the nation's public health experts, especially those in the Ministry of Health, acting promptly and effectively to address the COVID-19 crisis with an initial response strategy. As a result, up to 21 June 2020, there have been no deaths among the COVID-19 cases, and 127 patients (female: 39, male: 88) have recovered, with two Cambodian male patients still under treatment [30, 16].

Though financial assistance payments can help to temporarily relieve losses in income or salary, the significant economic impact of COVID-19 will put around 1.76 million people at risk of unemployment within the hardest hit sectors of tourism, garment-foot wear, and construction [19]. Without further mitigation measures, the number of people falling into poverty is likely to rise, including among migrant workers returning from Thailand and their dependent families.

1.4.3 PARLIAMENTS IN EUROPE FACING THE COVID-19 CRISIS

The European Parliament and the national Parliaments of the Member-States of the European Union have been active in the critical fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, attempting to mitigate its impact, protect its people and economy, and promote solidarity.

The European Parliament has supported the ten actions taken by the European Commission to fight the coronavirus, though we should remember that health issues are not under the control of the EU, according to the treaties [D], but of national governments. Despite this, the EU has set up a series of procedures, including the coordinated cross-border transfer of infected persons between hospitals (France, Germany and Luxembourg). Of course this pandemic has had consequences well beyond the health sector, in areas more within the scope of the EU's established powers (financial support by the European Central Bank, softening of budgetary rules, and coordination of external border controls).

This text presents first the actions taken by the EU Commission, then the recommendations of the EU Parliament, and finally the initiatives taken by France and Germany, together.

TEN ACTIONS BY THE EU [31]

Borders

To help limit the transmission of the virus in Europe and beyond, the EU has closed its external borders to non-essential travel, while ensuring critical goods keep moving within the EU through the introduction of green lanes. Additional resources have been made ready for the European Center for Disease Prevention and Control, the agency tasked with providing rapid risk assessments and epidemiological updates on the outbreak.

Providing medical equipment

EU-countries have fast access to the first ever RescEU stockpile of medical equipment, such as ventilators and protective masks, under the Civil Protection Mechanism. In addition, the EU has set up a huge international fund allowing Member States to make joint purchases of equipment and drugs and is mobilizing €3.08 billion in EU aid to purchase more tests and help medical staff care for patients. The EU has also organized an online fundraiser with the aim of raising an initial €7.5 billion for vaccines, medicines and diagnostics to fight the coronavirus worldwide.

Promoting research

The EU's Horizon 2020 research program funds 18 research projects and 151 teams across Europe to help quickly find a COVID-19 vaccine. The specific aims are to improve diagnostics, preparedness, clinical management and treatment.

Boosting European solidarity

The European Parliament has backed new rules allowing Member States to request financial assistance from the EU Solidarity Fund to cover health emergencies. With the newly broadened scope of the fund, up to €800 million will be made available for Member States in 2020 to fight the coronavirus pandemic.

Assuring the EU's recovery

To help the EU recover from the economic and social impact of COVID-19, the European Commission was asked to propose an update to the EU's long-term budget for 2021-2027 that includes

a stimulus package. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) called for a massive recovery and reconstruction package to be financed by an increased long-term budget for the EU, existing EU funds and financial instruments, as well as by so-called recovery bonds. In addition, the Commission presented its post-lockdown roadmap for an effective and coordinated exit strategy that includes large-scale testing and protective materials for people.

Supporting the economy

The EU is putting forward a €540 billion support package to tackle the crisis and support workers, businesses and Member States. In addition, the European Central Bank is providing €750 billion to relieve government debt during the crisis, as well as €120 billion in quantitative easing and €20 billion in debt purchases. MEPs also voted in favor of making €37 billion from existing EU structural funds available to EU countries to tackle the coronavirus crisis and support healthcare services, businesses and workers.

Protecting jobs

To ensure employees can keep their jobs, the Commission has proposed to support short time work (Sure), funding for companies facing decreased demand due to the coronavirus crisis. The European Commission has also unlocked €1 billion from the European Fund for Strategic Investments in guarantees to encourage banks and other lenders to provide up to €8 billion in liquidity to support some 100,000 European businesses.

Repatriating EU citizens

Tens of thousands of Europeans stranded around the world by the outbreak have been returned home thanks to the EU Civil Protection mechanism.

Helping developing countries face the pandemic

The Commission has unlocked €20 billion to help non-EU countries fight the crisis as part of an EU package for a coordinated global response to tackle the spread of COVID-19.

Ensuring accurate information

The spread of disinformation about the coronavirus puts people´s health at risk. MEPs have called for a European information source to ensure that everyone has access to accurate and verified information in their language and have also asked social media companies to tackle disinformation and hate speech.

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT'S COURSES OF ACTION [32]

In a resolution adopted on 14 April 2020, the European Parliament welcomed the EU's fiscal measures and liquidity support to address the pandemic. MEPs have also stated that beyond what is already being done, Europe also needed a massive recovery and reconstruction package financed by an increased long-term budget (MFF), existing EU funds and financial instruments, as well as "recovery bonds" guaranteed by the EU budget. Members clarified that an economic virus response should not, however, involve the mutualisation of existing debt, but instead focus on future investment. The European Green Deal and the digital transformation should be at its core in order to kick-start the economy, MEPs stressed.

Borders

MEPs have insisted that borders within the EU must be kept open to ensure that medicines, protective equipment, medical devices, food and essential

goods can circulate. They acknowledged that the EU's single market is the source of "our collective prosperity" and key to the immediate and continuous response to COVID-19.

Prevention

The European Parliament has called for the creation of a European Health Response Mechanism, to ensure a better response to health or sanitary crises in the future. It is hoped that necessary equipment, materials and medicine stocks could be quickly mobilised to save lives. In the immediate term, MEPs also wanted to see additional EU funding to finance research to find a vaccine.

EU Coronavirus Solidarity Fund

Members also called for a permanent European Unemployment Reinsurance Scheme and hoped to establish an EU Coronavirus Solidarity Fund of at least €50 billion. This proposed fund was aimed at supporting the financial efforts undertaken by the healthcare sectors in all Member States during the crisis, as well as providing future investments to make those healthcare systems more resilient and more focused on those most in need.

Greater powers for the EU to address cross-border health threats

Joint European action to combat the COVID-19 pandemic was, and is, indispensable, the Friday 14 resolution states. Not only must the European Union emerge stronger from this crisis, its institutions should also be empowered to act when cross-border health threats arise. This would enable them to coordinate the response at the European level without delay, and direct the necessary resources to where they are most needed, whether they are materials like face masks, respirators and medicines or financial aid. MEPs also voiced their support for increasing EU production of key products such as pharmaceutical ingredients, medical devices, equipment and materials, to ensure the EU is better prepared for future global shocks.

Coordinated post-lockdown approach needed

MEPs further underlined the need for a coordinated post-lockdown approach in the EU, in order to avoid a resurgence of the virus. They urged EU countries to jointly develop criteria for lifting the quarantine and other emergency measures, and asked the European Commission to launch an effective exit strategy that included large-scale testing and personal protective equipment for the largest possible number of citizens.

European information source to counter disinformation

Finally, the resolution stressed that disinformation about COVID-19 was a major public health concern. MEPs requested the EU should therefore establish a European information source to ensure that all citizens have access to accurate and verified information. Members also called on social media companies to proactively take the necessary measures to stop the spread of disinformation and hate speech related to the coronavirus.

THE ROLE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS

The legislative bodies of some individual Member States addressed, at the national level, several issues related to the temporary restriction of freedoms, tracing and control of infected people, and fact-checking of information.

France was the only EU country where a vote by both National Assembly and Senate were required before the government could declare and act on a State of Health Emergency [33]. Some of the main issues discussed during parliamentary deliberations were the judiciary responsibility of mayors in the reopening of schools and the limits to freedom of movement, still restricted at the time of this writing to a radius of 100 km.

In Germany, a major issue was the issuance of "Corona-bonds" to set up a mechanism for sharing public debts between European Member-States. Chancellor Angela Merkel pressed the point to the Bundestag that such a step was the only one able to avoid a collapse of the EU economic system ("Systemabsturz").

On 20 May 2020, Angela Merkel and France's Emmanuel Macron announced a bilateral agreement to support the economic recovery by helping the weakest regions and sectors in the EU 27. The agreement would allow the EU Commission to borrow up to €500 billion from the financial markets. Of course, differences remain among the EU 27 regarding the scope and the means of European solidarity – debt sharing, loans or grants – to help the countries most affected by COVID-19, Italy and Spain first among them.

To conclude, the EU remains firmly committed to multilateralism as the only reasonable way to deal with this shared challenge, which has been a terrible yet elegant reminder of our increasing interconnectedness. Those of us in Europe saw the virus first appear in industrial districts located in northern Italy (Lombardy) and Bavaria, which both have economic and popular ties to Wuhan in China. From there, it likely entered Spain through some of the 3000 supporters of the football club Valencia, who had visited Milan for a match between their side and Atalanta, from Lombardy. Other early cases have been traced back to a ski resort in the French Alps, likely spread from British persons coming back from a symposium in Singapore where they had dinner with a group from Wuhan. The spread of COVID-19 has illuminated the many ways people from around the world now interact – global business, international seminars, tourism and religious gatherings, sports and work migrations. In 2018, 4.5 billion passengers flew by air. Not surprisingly, the transmission of COVID-19 has also tended to follow the main routes of air traffic. Despite the current crisis, these trends towards increased interaction among citizens of the world seem likely to continue into the future. Coordination and regulation of this increasing interconnected and complex world is a core responsibility of Parliaments.

Among the governments, Parliaments and citizens of Europe, the common experience of facing COVID-19 has renewed a strong belief in the value of multilateralism, an indispensable tool for assisting in the exchange of scientific data, the coordination of emergency responses, and the establishment of common rules. There is also deep regret regarding the unfortunate unilateralist stances being taken by some major powers, especially at a time when coordinated action has proved so necessary. Indeed, the shared crisis of COVID-19, and our aligned response, has demonstrated that multilateralism is the only institutional and political answer to the common challenges and opportunities in our socially, economically, and technologically interconnected world.

1.5 HOW VIRTUAL CAN PARLIAMENT BE?

The COVID-19 pandemic has caused us to focus on the functioning of our political systems. In Switzerland, in particular, it became clear that the relationship between Parliament and government in a time of crisis was not fully defined, and that the role of Parliaments in the current crisis was unclear to its Members and to the government. In a democracy, politics can never be a matter for the government alone, but the question was nevertheless raised: Must a parliament meet, even in times of crisis? To help better understand this question, this text will first give a brief outline of how Switzerland coped with the COVID crisis and, in particular, how the question of parliamentarism arose in the Canton of Zurich.

OVERVIEW[34]

Due to the COVID pandemic, Switzerland was in a state of political emergency from March to May 2020. On the basis of emergency legislation (Article 185(3) of the Federal Constitution), the Swiss Government (Federal Council) made wide-ranging decisions from mid-March 2020, including closing schools and shops from 17 March, banning gatherings of more than five people, and adopting special measures to benefit employees, employers and companies in the areas of short-time working, compensation for loss of earnings, debt enforcement and bankruptcy law. There were also emergency decrees in the areas of education and culture. These emergency ordinances were of a temporary nature, with most planned to expire at the end of August 2020.

These decisions were made by the Swiss Government alone. At least during the first four weeks, they were largely supported by the political parties, politicians and the population without criticism or protest. For its efforts, the government was able to build on a lot of trust. Swiss society has proved to be resilient and has handled the crisis very well. The generations (young and old) have helped each other, and the population has exercised discipline even though there was no ban on public outings. The media and political parties also united to support the measures. Overall, the Federal Council was given a good report card in crisis management. Meanwhile, under the pressure of the COVID pandemic, the Federal Parliament ended the spring session on 16 March 2020. Until the special session from 4 to 7 May 2020, parliamentary business in plenary session was suspended.

The situation was similar at the state level. Cantonal governments quickly convened their crisis teams while 16 of the 26 state Parliaments cancelled their scheduled meetings. In the Canton of Zurich, there was disagreement about what powers the government had, and whether the government could prohibit Parliament to meet for health policy reasons. You see, the Parliament of Zurich has 180 members, above the limit of 100 for assemblies set by the Federal Council. However, the Executive Committee of the Zurich Parliament put a stop to such discussions when it promptly decided to convene Parliamentary sessions. On the one hand, it maintained that the Parliament is a constitutional body, and so which must, according to the constitution, approve the emergency ordinances of the government in times of crisis. On the other hand, Parliament must also be a model for the population. Even in times of crisis, one must faithfully carry out one's duties and ensure the

democratic legitimacy of state decisions. Moreover, no government in Switzerland has the constitutional right to dictate to Parliament when, why and where it meets. Zurich's Cantonal Parliament therefore played a pioneering role in the nation, moving from the narrow historic Parliament building dating from 1698 to a modern exhibition hall on the outskirts of Zurich, to hold a parliamentary session in compliance with the hygiene regulations of the Federal Office of Public Health and according to the recommendations on social distancing. In total, the Zurich Parliament met three times until the resumption of regular weekly operations on 8 May 2020. In accordance with the cantonal constitution, it approved three emergency ordinances from the executive, supplemented one of them with orders to the government, and suspended another. In addition, Parliament voted on all matters that needed to be approved, in particular financial decisions. The parliamentary committees also met again and an overall plan was put forth to negotiate and resolve the accumulated government business in good time. The Zurich Parliament decided it would continue to meet in the exhibition hall for the remainder of 2020.

In these confusing times, where responsibilities had to be clarified, some fundamental questions suddenly arose about Parliament: Why can't a parliamentary session be held by video? How should those Members of Parliament who belong to a vulnerable section of the population be accommodated? There are clear constitutional answers to these questions in Switzerland. Parliaments can deliberate and make valid decisions as long as the majority of Members are present. The constitution also requires that they meet physically. But this does not answer the real question or clarify whether the question has even been asked correctly: from a democratic liberal point of view, shouldn't one instead ask whether parliaments should, or should not, meet during a crisis? Do parliaments have no political say in a crisis? Is democratic discourse not particularly important in a crisis?

It would be presumptuous to suppose one has an answer to all these questions. What we do know is that there are no obvious solutions for the problems they raise - and the next emergency is certainly around the corner. Perhaps not a pandemic, but an energy or water shortage, an economic crisis, a flood or storm - hopefully not a nuclear incident. In the latter case, even a parliament by video-conference would be of no use. To answer these questions, it becomes clear that a change of culture is needed, as we examine the very idea of parliament in a democratic system.

THE IDEA OF "PARLIAMENT"

"Government by discussion" is a slogan which "marks the genuine achievement of parliamentary systems and at the same time one of their democratic traits" [35]. Parliament is an institution to enable legal political rule within the framework of competency and will, negotiation and debate [36]. It is the orderly procedure, according to whose rules the discussion of arguments takes place, generating state decisions which lead the parties in dispute to unity [37]. Parliament as a forum for society or as a stage for politics represents the diversity of opinions in union and is thus symbolic of what we in Switzerland like to call the "will of the nation".

A key to the function of representation in the political process is trust. Parliament implements what Article 2 of the Swiss Civil Code requires of every person in civil

life, to “act in good faith” [E], not only in public life but also in all human relations, i.e. also between interest groups, political groups and Members of Parliament [F] [38]. The democratic foundation of representation is the confidence of the people in the decisions of Parliaments and in particular their comprehensibility. This foundation can only be sustained if the actors also trust each other. Various examples from Switzerland’s political past underscore the importance of political institutions enjoying the trust of those represented: The public was dissatisfied and outraged when the Swiss Parliament only partially implemented the content of two initiatives adopted by the people [39, 40], the first related to limiting urban sprawl and the proportion of second homes (especially holiday homes) in Switzerland, and the second, named “Against Mass Immigration”, seeking a fundamental reorientation of Swiss immigration policy, thereby affecting its fundamental relationship with the European Union. Despite this, the people accepted Parliament’s proposals for implementation and decided not to hold a further plebiscite [G][41]. This acceptance can be traced back directly to the trust of the voters in the political actors. The Members of the Federal Parliament gained this trust by disclosing their decision-making process transparently and comprehensibly. They explained to the people that the implementation proposals were compromises necessary because of Switzerland’s established foreign policy positions. In contrast, the secret preparations of three parliamentary groups not to re-elect two members of the Federal Government did lasting damage to the reputation of the Federal Parliament. It took a few more elections, operating under more transparent rules, until public confidence in the selection and electoral process was restored.

These two examples show that the institution of parliament is particularly suited to creating or restoring identity, integration and trust, especially in combination with direct democracy. Neither the referendum nor the government’s proposal for implementation was able to achieve a balance between the political camps after a bitter struggle for votes. In Parliament, however, a compromise could be negotiated. Accordingly, the idea of parliament as a democratic institution has a peace-making function. Political opponents are obliged to participate in the decision-making process in an orderly and transparent manner. On the one hand, the Parliament forms an interface where politics is transformed into state action, and on the other hand, it is a link between state action and politics [42]. In short, the institution of parliament enables politicians to settle their differences openly, transparently and comprehensibly - and thus peacefully.

Parliament and direct democracy exist together in Switzerland [43]. The latter would be incapable of action without the compromise facilitated in Parliament, either beforehand or afterwards. In the case of Switzerland, Parliament and direct democracy strengthen each other [44]. If Parliament were excluded, the great populist dream would come true and governments would be able to act directly with the people with undivided and unlimited power. Such concentrations of power are anathema to Switzerland as the triad of “people, parliament and government” forms an elaborate but strong democratic balance resulting in integration, trust and peace.

The relationship between the individual and the State is of central importance. The functions of all four state powers (people, parliament, government and

courts) contribute jointly to guaranteeing and developing democracy and human rights: The courts adjudicate matters of non-compliance with legal provisions, the people ensure that human rights are observed, [45] and the Parliament plays an intermediary role between the people and the government or administration [45]. The government represents the State externally, the Parliament represents the people internally[41] and is challenged by the latter through initiative and referendum[46]. This balance makes Parliament a highly responsive and effective source for political initiative and inspiration[47].

For this reason, minorities in Switzerland have always used parliamentary procedure to express themselves publicly. By means of parliamentary actions including motions, issues can be brought onto the political stage via the Members of Parliament that would be lost in the major political procedures, e.g. in initiative and referendum rights, consultation procedures or collective bargaining. This is only possible because party discipline in Switzerland is not as strictly observed as in many parliamentary democracies. With their individualistic understanding of representation, according to which Members of Parliament bring in regional and communal interests or interests of associations in addition to political party interests, parliaments make an important contribution to the integration of minorities and to the cohesion of society.

Parliament thus creates identity and trust and ensures diversity and integration. The political power vested in Parliament and its capacity to settle disputed issues depend on clarity where decisions are made, how the process is regulated and who is involved in negotiations. Every compromise that is decided in Parliament is reached in a democratically established procedure. It is a procedure in which Members of Parliament are involved and, through direct human contact, are able to strike a balance between arguments, facts, dogmas and rhetoric. In this way, Parliament guarantees the introduction, discussion and debate of all political issues [48].

This parliamentary reality implies an immediacy of time and space, a "here and now", the parliamentary reality of politics. The principle of immediacy thus acquires a substantive component that goes further than its conventional definition. It is not just a procedural principle, but a principle that includes the political functions of Parliament as described above. It is defined in such a way that Parliament and its procedure have an integrating effect, guarantee the identification of political diversity and make politics directly malleable and negotiable on the ground.

If people like to point out that Parliament is no more than the average of the population, then that is exactly the point. Parliament cannot and should not be more. It should be the metaphor, the image of our society in all its diversity. The procedure expresses this idea of Parliament, and it does so in the form of the direct action of its actors.

TRUST REQUIRES ASSIGNABILITY

Now one may be inclined to say that the immediacy of parliamentary negotiations can also be established in a video conference, since a subject is discussed and decided upon in negotiations with all parties involved simultaneously. Only the local immediacy is replaced by a fictitious place; it gives way to a virtual immediacy. A virtual immediacy, however, is not compatible with today's

established parliamentary procedure, which is obviously geared towards a physical assembly on site [41, 49].

Assume that a communication tool fulfilled all the requirements for a parliamentary debate, such as the continuous demonstration of the identity of the Members of Parliament during the assembly, secure connections or dedicated lines, assignable votes and voting, possibilities for making applications and submitting proposals, as well as the opportunity for public participation, etc. Even if all of these were to be fulfilled, and even if it were possible to have, for example, 600 people in two councils at the same time, the question would still remain as to how Parliament's institutional identity function could be established given that it is strongly tied to a physical location.

There is no question that in five or ten years a video-conference parliament could function sensibly and well. The technology, especially the user interface, will continue to advance, so that even a virtual symbolic location might be created. And who knows, perhaps we will not even need a device to participate anymore. It is therefore all the more important that projects are now being launched that seriously consider the implementation of a digital parliament [50]. For the time being, however, there is no such tool available and the effort to put the functions of the Parliament described above into a virtual space would be enormous and require, among other things, the drafting of a new parliamentary order.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the identity function and thus the full diversity of a parliament can hardly be represented in a video conference. Rather, the person who moderates the conference and thus continuously appears in the foreground functions as a fixed point and identifier. The president of the parliament becomes the continuum and visual identification point, while the parliament as a whole is pushed into the background. This is fundamentally incompatible with parliamentary tradition. The presidents of the councils should not take a prominent position, but instead provide a kind of judicial neutrality. Virtuality throws the physical layout out of balance, especially since no overall view, the quasi-panoptical parliament, can be conveyed. In Switzerland, there is also the problem that parliamentary presidents are only elected for one year, which increases the challenge regarding the identity function.

Considering that parliaments must remain capable of acting during a pandemic in order to carry out the necessary decisions or elections in an extreme emergency, video conferencing can offer a substitute, but only a temporary one. This is because the core of the parliamentary function is based on direct human contact, which makes it possible to deliberately strike a balance between political forces and arguments in a spirit of trust. Perhaps this cannot happen in a virtual space, because the trust-promoting immediacy of human exchange and thus a central part of democracy is missing. The uniform appearance of parliament would be sacrificed to the individuality of the council members. This may be a new form of parliamentarism, but it will hardly have the same attraction and quality.

FOOTNOTES

A. "Security relations in the Asia-Pacific region make the same points in the negative. In the immediate postwar period, it was not possible to construct multilateral institutional frameworks in this region. Today, the absence of such arrangements inhibits progressive adaptation to fundamental global shifts. The United States and Japan are loath to raise serious questions about their anachronistic bilateral defense treaty, for example, out of fear of unraveling a fragile stability and thereby triggering arms races throughout the region. In Asia-Pacific, there is no EU and no NATO to have transformed the multitude of regional security dilemmas, as has been done in Europe with Franco-German relations, for example. Indeed no Helsinki-like process through which to begin the minimal task of mutual confidence building exists in the region. Thus, whereas today the potential to move beyond balance-of-power politics in its traditional form exists in Europe, a reasonably stable balance is the best that one can hope to achieve in the Asia-Pacific region".

B. Political families bring together parties from different countries sharing the same political agenda. Examples are ALDE (liberal parties in Europe) or Socialist international (worldwide organization of socialist parties).

C. Sectoral ego refers to the tendency for different sectors or agencies to formulate and implement programs and activities in accordance with their own specific mandates, rather than collaborating with related sectors to ensure more effective results.

D. Article 168 of the TFUE, alinea 4 (norms of quality and security on blood and organs and for drugs and devises of medical use). A binational hospital with EU label is active at the Franco-Spanish border.

E Every person must act in good faith in the exercise of his or her rights and in the performance of his or her obligations.

F The manifest abuse of a right is not protected by law.

G Federal laws are passed by the people if 50,000 voters so request within 100 days of publication

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Presentation on the ASEM Sustainable Connectivity Portal during the 10th Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership Meeting (ASEP 10), September 2018 in Brussels, Belgium
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CHAPTER

02

PROACTIVE PARLIAMENTS FOR PEACE, SECURITY AND SHARED PROSPERITY

2.1 THE ASEAN WAY TOWARDS MULTILATERALISM FOR PEACE, SECURITY AND PROSPERITY

THE ASEAN WAY TOWARDS MULTILATERALISM

At the same time that multilateralism worldwide is under enduring strain, multilateralism in Southeast Asia has been gaining strength and influence. Progress has been made through the development of norms and initiatives that encourage cooperative engagement between States. Much of this progress is due to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) - which gained international prominence through its diplomatic efforts to seek a comprehensive political solution to the protracted conflicts faced by Cambodia during the 1980s. Since then, ASEAN has become known as the anchor of stability in Southeast Asia as a result of its cooperative security architectures and its promotion of wider cooperation with the major powers, with East Asia, and with other Asia-Pacific countries.

Subscribing to the "ASEAN Way", its leaders prefer informal procedures because ASEAN believes in a non-threatening atmosphere for exploring ways of problem-solving. Thus, ASEAN participation in multilateral security consultations consistently emphasizes the importance of the "comfort level" of participants, arguing that contentious issues should be dropped from the agenda rather than risk raising tensions. Exemplifying this approach is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which sees multilateralism as a platform for problem-solving and for preventing and containing risks of regional disorder.

ASEAN approaches multilateralism through its unique style of regionalism. This approach entails the evolution of multiple groupings and forums rather than a set of overarching and inclusive institutions, such as those developed in Europe by the European Union. ASEAN multilateralism is generally based on consensus and tends to be non-binding. This is in contrast with the Western approach to multilateralism which pushes for greater institutionalization and binding commitments in its regional organizations. The ASEAN Way towards multilateralism also tends to be process-driven, rather than motivated by specific actors, challenges, or events. In this sense, ASEAN aspires to develop procedures consistent with existing regional norms and practices. This enables participants to interact comfortably with each other, which in turn promotes multilateral interactions, instills mutual transparency and reassurance, and helps to resolve contentious issues peacefully and constructively.

Since its inception in 1967, the ASEAN Regionalism process has been used to forge stronger regional cooperation in the wider East Asia region while at the same time advancing multilateral relations with powers, both near and far. ASEAN does this by continuing to enhance the ASEAN Regional Forum (initiated in 1994 with 27 members), the ASEAN Plus Three grouping (which since 1997 has brought together the ASEAN ten with China, Japan and South Korea), the East Asia Summit (18 members comprising the 13 ASEAN Plus Three countries along with India, Australia, New Zealand, Russia and the United States, which met for the first time in December 2005), and the

Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) (inaugurated in October 2010 with ASEAN Member States plus eight other powers: Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia, and the United States).

An adherence to multilateralism helps to defend the Association's own existing rules and norms, safeguarding the region against being bullied by the major powers. The ASEAN Way towards multilateral security cooperation is all about putting security concerns on the table and applying ASEAN styles of dialogue, consultation and institutions to remove suspicions, create better understanding, build mutual trust, and facilitate peaceful approaches to regional conflicts, avoiding the threat or the use of force. This is how ASEAN, as a whole, is able to engage China multilaterally while Member States, individually, continue to benefit from the United States' restraining presence in this part of the world.

THE CHALLENGES TO ASEAN REGIONALISM

Despite ASEAN success in maintaining positive relations with both China and the US, the biggest challenge to broader multilateral cooperation is the anxiety surrounding potential conflicts among the major powers, and the lack of mechanisms to constrain or help manage their behavior. Although the US is the chief architect of the international order that emerged after World War II, what has been unfurling within American society since President Trump took office in January 2017 is a clear revelation of the nation's growing disengagement from the world. By putting "America First", the US appears to have forsaken the US-led international order. In trying to "make America great again", the US is now rejecting globalization as a positive force. With more aggressive nationalism and a move towards protectionism, the US today is relinquishing its leading role over the multilateral rules-based order that was once a cornerstone of America's policy – and a source of American hegemony.

The phenomenal rise of China is no less stressful for ASEAN. More confident and assertive, China has caught up with the West in terms of economics, technological development and some defense capabilities, and has integrated itself into the global economy. But China has not embraced the Western concept of a rules-based order or other Western values such as representative democracy and universal human rights. When it comes to defending its core interests, such as those pertaining to the South China Sea, China has been consistent and clear with its preference for bilateral negotiation with the parties concerned, rather than relying on multilateral arrangements such as the International Courts. Bilateralism provides a more flexible framework for cooperation, offering China greater leverage over its allies.

Another challenge is ASEAN's own DNA. The deeply entrenched norm of non-interference and consensus-based decision-making can limit the Association's bearing on geopolitical and security flashpoints in the region. The rigid adherence to these principles at times deprives ASEAN of the possibility to take greater strides and command greater respect among Member States and external partners to cement its rightful place as the most effective driver for peace, stability and prosperity in Southeast Asia. For example, one of ASEAN's flagship multilateral cooperation mechanisms, namely the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), still lacks the capacity to enforce a framework for "rules of acceptable behavior".

Internal challenges for ASEAN include the slow pace of its integration process to mitigate economic disparity and inequality between Member States. On management of border security, ASEAN must find a more concrete way to help mediate and resolve disputes between Association members. It can also bolster its spirit of caring and willingness to assist Member States in distress due to domestic issues. Accordingly, a suitable recalibration of the principle of non-interference and a more responsive decision-making process can be explored, as well as a more proactive approach towards the issues of good governance, human rights, democracy, accountability and transparency.

External challenges for ASEAN include its struggle to comfortably discuss hard security issues that infringe upon "ASEAN Centrality". This affects the image and credibility of the Association, which skeptics often refer to as a forum for "only talk and not enough action". ASEAN needs to go beyond these non-substantive reactions in dealing with today's pressing challenges, ranging from the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the South China Sea dispute, the humanitarian crisis in the embattled Rakhine State, the effects of climate change and cyber-attacks, and other non-traditional threats. In this regard, the ARF must advance beyond its role as just a "talk shop" to address today's complex security environment. A progressive three-stage vision of the ARF involves, first, moving beyond the building of trust and confidence, to second, beginning to avert conflicts through preventive diplomacy, and then, third, to stamping out conflicts through conflict resolution.

> *"ASEAN must find a more concrete way to help mediate and resolve disputes between Association members."*

WAYS FORWARD FOR ASEAN TO PROMOTE MULTILATERALISM FOR THE BENEFIT OF PEACE, SECURITY AND PROSPERITY

Multilateralism the ASEAN Way has a long history in the region with its unique way of consultations and collective arrangements in the economic, political and security realms. Although the ASEAN Way of consensus rather than majority rule, commitment to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and decision-making that features informal structures and modalities, has served it well over the past 50 years, there are some who can argue that ASEAN remains a "limited political institution that is still reluctant to address post-Cold War security concerns" [1].

For ASEAN-led multilateralism to thrive and be able to address potent security issues, ASEAN Member States should envisage multilateral cooperation as more than a mere problem-solving exercise in managing regional disorder. To proactively instill peace and to work towards increased prosperity, it can consider the following points.

- More efforts are needed to engage China constructively. China is central not only to how the region's security agenda will evolve, but also to the viability of any security framework that emerges. ASEAN must recognize this reality.

- More effort is needed from ASEAN to achieve the sustained attention and engagement of America, as the region's security situation is more volatile than ever before. The US still has many interests in Southeast Asia, and the continued US presence in the region can help to prevent intra-regional conflicts and domination by outside powers.

- ASEAN must not choose sides but instead maintain its principle of neutrality so as not to constrain its room for maneuver in achieving security arrangements that might lead to the reduction of tensions caused by competition among the big powers. ASEAN should make clear that Southeast Asia is nobody's backyard, and that no outside powers will be permitted to impose on it anything that is harmful to the common regional interest. ASEAN's options will be few if the Association is over-dependent on a single power. Thus, ASEAN needs to continue to engage all external powers, faithfully and constructively.

- ASEAN should continue its attempts to engage the US and China through its existing frameworks such as the ARF, even if there are limitations in terms of what can be accomplished. Washington and Beijing are keen to court ASEAN and to pay some consideration to its wishes when framing their respective policies. How much clout ASEAN has in this regard will depend on its ability to forge unity and centrality - hence there is a need to seriously push forward the ARF, the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ADMM Plus processes.

- For ASEAN to "champion" multilateralism, it must reinvigorate itself and adapt its existing institutions to new trends to ensure that regional and multilateral cooperation are able to function properly in order to tackle regional issues. Particularly, ASEAN must strike a balance between having multilateral cooperation that prefers weak organizational structures with an emphasis on consensus-building, with the alternative practice of multilateralism exercised through EU style legally-binding commitments within overarching institutional structures.

- As the reality of power politics can negatively affect ASEAN multilateralism, it may be beneficial to emulate the EU's style of "effective multilateralism" – a rules-based order that emphasizes shared sovereignty, collective problem-solving and common actions to achieve peace, security and prosperity. Accordingly, ASEAN should endeavor to build a stronger partnership with the EU. As partners, ASEAN and the EU can garner the political will necessary to help shape a new order of multilateralism in order to avert the danger of conflicts and collisions among powerful states. For its part, the EU should also recognize the meaningful contribution of ASEAN towards this evolving multilateralism.

Despite its shortcomings, ASEAN has been remarkably successful in promoting regional cooperation through consensual dialogue. This approach has helped to create a post-Cold War regional order that is distinctive for the way in which multilateral institutions have largely managed to coexist with - and not supplant - either traditional security arrangements, such as alliances, narrower bilateral or wider global structures of economic governance, or other broader security arrangements. As such, the ASEAN Way should be treated as a welcome addition to the building of a new multilateral future.

2.2 PROACTIVE PARLIAMENTS FOR PEACE, SECURITY, AND SHARED PROSPERITY: AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE

Occupying 30 percent of the world's land area and hosting a population of more than four billion [2], Asia is the most diverse continent in terms of politics, economy, and culture. This is due to its vast size, demographic complexity, and historical legacy, inevitably leading to a dynamic yet problematic geopolitical environment. In particular, there are the major sub-regions—East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East—where major powers coexist, collaborate, and compete economically and militarily. This has given rise to contemporary security issues, both traditional and non-traditional, that significantly threaten peace, security, and shared prosperity of not only Asia itself, but also of external partners including the United States, Europe, and their allies.

ASIA'S CONTEMPORARY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Asia's ongoing traditional security issues range from the South China Sea dispute between China and ASEAN claimant States, which disturbs freedom of navigation, disorders international rules and norms, and tests ASEAN solidarity, to the Cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan, made more complicated by the strategic ambiguity [3] of the United States. Korean peninsula (de) nuclearization particularly threatens the security of US allies - South Korea and Japan - while the East China Sea dispute pits the second world economic power (China) against the third (Japan). At the same time, the Syrian civil war continues to generate tensions between the United States and Russia, not to mention the flow of refugees into Europe. The breakdown of the Iran Nuclear Deal has further disrupted regional peace and stability, along with the global supply of oil.

Moreover, the region also continues to experience unsettled international border disputes involving Southeast Asian States, India and Pakistan, and Israel and Palestine, as well as armed separatist movements in Southwestern Myanmar and Southern Thailand. Left unchecked and without proper and timely measures, these issues could potentially undermine regional trust among the Asian States concerned and external partners as well as regional security as a whole.

In the meantime, prevalent non-traditional security issues are, on the one hand, increasingly eroding Asian physical infrastructure and human security, and on the other hand, compelling affected States to pursue collective responses. For example, terrorism, particularly the rise of ISIS in the Middle East and parts of Southeast Asia, has led to physical destruction and humanitarian disasters, including large-scale intra and inter-regional migration. The downfall of ISIS in 2019 has only re-shifted the power and attention to Al-Qaeda, generating fear of the return of ISIS foreign fighters to their home countries, including those in Southeast Asia [4].

In addition, epidemics or pandemics - especially the outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) in China in early 2020 - have resulted in extensive quarantines in numerous countries and even continents, increased racial tensions, and significant economic disruption. These only exacerbate regional threats to human security and extend the lengthy list of pressing non-traditional security issues,

namely climate change, environmental degradation, drug and human trafficking, poaching of natural resources, food and energy security, natural disasters, and cyber warfare, including the calculated dissemination of fake news.

ASIAN EXISTING ARCHITECTURE IN ADDRESSING SECURITY CHALLENGES

In this context, it is clear that no State can single-handedly deal with the multitude of traditional and non-traditional security issues, so collective cooperation mechanisms are indispensable. These shared challenges have, as a result, served as preconditions for the establishment of the Inclusive Asian Security Architecture [5], consisting of, for example, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-plus, the East Asian Summit (EAS), and other related initiatives mandated to address both traditional and non-traditional regional security issues. These institutions operate not only at the Track I (governmental) level, but also through Expert Working Groups (EWGs) at the Track II (backchannel) level, and they could be further promoted by Parliamentary support, which is discussed in following sections. Notably, most of the existing architecture is associated with Asia Pacific-rim States, as the other sub-regions have yet to realize or form any concrete regional initiatives.

ASIA'S SECURITY OUTLOOK: THE ASIAN WAY OF MULTILATERALIZATION

While multilateralism is critical to regional security, it should not be at the expense of Asian centrality. The role of defining their own destiny and sovereignty remains of the utmost importance, an entrenched value in all Asian States. One prime example is ASEAN Centrality [6], in which the ASEAN Way - non-interference, consultation, and consensus - is fundamental to many multilateral institutions, such as ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), ARF, and EAS, etc. Such centrality can be best realized through "informal", "unofficial" or "soft" regionalism, which embeds certain institutional features, including non-supra-nationality, mutual understanding and flexibility, and a lack of legally binding obligations as opposed to those of the "formal", "official" or "hard" regionalism of the West [7]. In this regard, regional institutional design should revolve around the matter of "regional suitability" - what suits Asia - rather than "regional comparison" - comparing the Asian Way with the Western Way of institutionalization. Skillful utilization of this well-suited multilateralism is needed to maneuver carefully between superpowers, especially the United States and China, in order to maximize regional and national interests and to minimize risks of becoming satellite States, while emphasizing the rule of law and norms as keys to maintaining international order.

PROACTIVE ROLES OF PARLIAMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF PEACE, SECURITY, AND SHARED PROSPERITY

As an independent branch responsible for legislation, policy oversight, and popular representation, Parliament has a fundamental role in promoting peace, security, and shared prosperity. Against the backdrop of contemporary traditional and non-traditional security challenges, which are increasingly complex and dynamic in nature, it is timely and necessary that Asian Parliaments be proactive—controlling the situation rather than just reacting to it—by strengthening their traditional roles and embracing new ones.

First, Asian Parliaments have been traditionally authorized to perform a variety of roles which contribute to modelling regional security architecture and economic integration. For example, they are tasked with the roles to ratify and enforce international agreements (that, of course, reflect their national interest), oversee foreign policy, and approve budgets. They are also in charge of proposing, reviewing, and passing laws (though the degree of this authority varies from State to State), to ensure domestic peace and stability, which also has strong implications for regional security. Thus, to be proactive, Asian Parliaments must strengthen these traditional roles through capacity building in order to control and shape the regional security environment to the greatest extent possible, rather than merely responding to challenges when they arise.

Second, to be proactive, Asian Parliaments also need to adapt to more sophisticated roles, including, for example, increased engagement in Parliamentary Diplomacy [8] - diplomatic activities of parliamentary assemblies complementary to executive diplomacy. In this way, proactive Parliaments could supplement the conventional diplomatic channels using growing networks of inter-parliamentary forums, such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA), and the Asian Parliamentary Assembly (APA), among others.

DIVERSITY OF ASIAN PARLIAMENTS: CAPACITY, COMPOSITION, AND CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Just as no two nations are alike, the same can be said of Parliaments in Asia. Diversity would best describe the contemporary status of Parliaments in this particular region in terms of three variables—capacity, composition, and constitutional framework. First, Asian Parliaments differ based on the economic status of their respective States, and these economic gaps correlate with capacity gaps between these Parliaments due to the direct relationship between economic capacity and parliamentary budgeting in specific policy areas. Second, the composition of political parties in each Parliament is the result of the differing political systems of each State. Some nations have elections featuring a variety of competitive parties, in others one party tends to dominate, and in others there is just a single party. Last but not least, Asian Parliaments can also be divided in terms of constitutional framework - presidential and parliamentary [9]. The former contains two separate elections for the head of government and for the Parliament itself, thus separating clear powers between the executive and legislative branches, while the latter has only one election for the Parliament, which then elects a Head of Government, directly responsible to the Parliament.

As one might expect, such dissimilarities of parliamentary capacity, composition, and constitutional framework generate different parliamentary powers over the drafting, review, and passage process. The proactive paths a Parliament has available largely depend on the nature of these differences. Parliaments in more economically developed nations would be equipped with advantages of strong budgetary power, while Parliaments in presidential States with multi-party electoral systems can play a stronger role in shaping legislation. These diverse features - deriving from political and historical legacies - need to be considered when discussing the diversity of approaches Parliaments can take in promoting regional peace, security, and shared prosperity.

2.3 SECURITY CHALLENGES IN ASIA: A PERSPECTIVE FROM EUROPE

In an op-ed from May 2018 Federica Mogherini, then High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, wrote that "Europe and Asia have never been so close [...] our security is interconnected: we face the same challenges, we confront similar threats and we share an interest in preserving peace in our regions and international cooperation on a global scale" [10]. She was referring to the acceleration of the security cooperation between the European Union and Asia, but also, and more importantly, to the similarity between and increasingly integrated character of the security of both Europe and Asia.

For a long time security issues in East Asia, and Southeast Asia in particular, were limited to sub-strategic issues. They conveniently constituted the core of EU-Asia security dialogues but were no more than a potential nuisance for Europe-Asia interdependence. With China's rise to great power status, stakes are higher. Changes in the status quo in Asia are likely to impact not only the Asian regional order but also the global order, and therefore influence the framework in which Europe is operating, in Asia and elsewhere. Therefore, as demonstrated by the South China Sea conundrum, "Security problems in Asia are no longer Asia's alone." Their management remains primarily the responsibility of Asians, but Europe is bound to look at, and whenever possible to contribute to, mitigation of Asia's security issues.

ASIA'S AUTONOMY UNDER THE UNITED STATES' STRATEGIC UMBRELLA

Asia's major security problems have hardly changed since the end of the Cold War. Economic vulnerability, political fragility and unstable governance, along with ethnicity, have always affected large parts of Asia and therefore regional stability through manifestations such as terrorism, separatism and armed rebellion, piracy and poaching of natural resources, and even drug trafficking. Similarly, territorial boundary disputes [11] are not new to the region. They were considered relatively minor irritants as long as they remained confined to Southeast Asian countries. They did not prevent, and to some extent contributed to the process of regional integration. As observed by US scholar Marvin C. Ott, "to a degree that far exceeded that which existed anywhere else in the Afro-Asian world, the Southeast Asian states [have] developed regional institutions and patterns of interactions that gave the region increasing coherence as a single political, economic and even security entity" [12]. In a Southeast Asia which has faced no major security threats from within or without the region since the end of the Cold War, existing disputes were addressed through peaceful management mechanisms. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), created in 1994 and for a long time the security institution of ASEAN, aimed essentially at "fostering constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of interest and concern" and was meant to function as a contribution to "confidence building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific" [13].The United States guaranteed a regional order which provided Asia with the political space and autonomy to act on non-strategic security issues on its own.

FROM REGIONAL TO GLOBAL: CHINA'S RISE AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ASIA'S SECURITY

China's ascendance to great power status did not modify the existing regional institutions but radically (although gradually) changed the context in which they were operating. The first decade of the 21st century saw the gradual internationalization of the security concerns of the region. A more confident and assertive China now claimed sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea, antagonizing competing claimants (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam). Bilateral maritime disputes within ASEAN did not cease to exist, but were subsumed into a larger one opposing China and a number of ASEAN Member States.

Moreover, the militarization of the Paracel and Spratly islands, where China built 20 and seven outposts, respectively [14], exacerbated the potential for conflict and internationalized it at the same time. China not only challenged the interpretation of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on matters such as the regulation of military forces in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), narrowing the definition of "freedom of navigation", but also the very principles of international law, introducing for example the notion of "historical rights". In the process, China created uncertainty where the rule of law had introduced predictability. The uncertainty applied to all, including Europeans. Asian security problems were no longer limited to Asia.

> *"The first decade of the 21st century saw the gradual internationalization of the security concerns of the region."*

CHALLENGE TO MULTILATERALISM, AND SINO-US POLARIZATION: ASIA DISPOSSESSED FROM ITS STRATEGIC FUTURE

Additional factors, in particular the Sino-US polarization and the convergent challenges to multilateralism, are now contributing to the internationalization of Asia's security problems as well as to its dispossession from its own strategic future. The growing Sino-US rivalry and the subsequent regional polarization is turning every issue into a zero-sum game in which each actor is forced to choose sides, weakening Southeast Asia's cohesion and creating tensions between each country's individual priorities.

The polarization of the region between Chinese and US interests is further accompanied by a growing challenge to multilateralism: in different ways, the two behemoths of international relations are actively weakening multilateralism institutions. The neglect of ASEAN and all ASEAN-led institutions by the United States [15], and the US preference for bilateral relationships in which the asymmetry of power systematically works in its favor, has been met by China's activism. Beijing has invested in its relations with ASEAN institutions and is capitalizing on its economic investments in several ASEAN Member States in order to deprive the Association of its significance, to divide the region politically, and to limit the ASEAN capacity to oppose Chinese policies and efforts to model regional dynamics according to its will.

Moreover, the center of gravity of Southeast Asia is gradually shifting outside the region. This in turn is leading to the erosion of ASEAN centrality, understood here as the ASEAN consensus-based decision-making mechanism, which has

so far effectively curtailed all hegemonic temptation in the region. Asian security priorities and security architecture were further institutionalized during the same period with the creation, in 2005, of the East Asia Summit (EAS)[16] followed, in 2010, by the creation of the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) [17]. But the new institutions are increasingly a hostage of the US-China competition for global influence.

Debates around the concept of Indo-Pacific illustrate the dilemma East Asian countries are currently facing and the limited means they have to escape it. Pressed to choose between China and the United States, they have endorsed the Indo-Pacific to preserve their link with the US but defined it in their own inclusive way in order to avoid antagonizing China and protect themselves against the most negative consequences of the Sino-US rivalry. Yet all Indo-Pacific strategies are still in their initial stage and their impact on regional dynamics still uncertain.

ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY AS A GAME CHANGER?

In this context, new and important dimensions of security, such as environmental security, could bring back to Asia the inclusivity which is increasingly eluding it. Climate change, for example, is a threat multiplier. It re-designs maps, displaces populations, creates new sources of tensions and impacts critical infrastructures. Threats to biodiversity, marine or otherwise, lead, directly and indirectly, to similar consequences. Indeed, threats to environmental security affect all other dimensions of security. Experts recognize, for example, that Asia will be among the hardest hit by climate change. Low lying coastal cities in many Southeast Asian countries, and the millions of people who live there, are particularly vulnerable. However, environmental security issues are almost always trans-boundary and their solution a collective endeavor. Marine environmental protection (MEP) is one example. It has been estimated that the current rate of reef destruction in the South China Sea, one of the world's most diverse marine ecosystems, hosting 76 percent of the world coastal species and 37 percent of reef-fish species, means that its littoral States may suffer some USD 5.7 billion a year in potential economic loss [18]. The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Blueprint 2025 encourages Member States to "promote cooperation for the protection, restoration and sustainable use of coastal and marine environment..." [19] but there is still no institutional translation of this principle in ASEAN's relations with the other major stakeholder, China. And although marine environmental protection is an important aspect of climate change adaptation, there is still no overarching regional convention or institution governing the management of shared marine environment despite various multilateral regional cooperation mechanisms. Yet environmental security protection provides the opportunity of a (relatively) de-politicized and cooperative approach to the South China Sea issue based on technical grounds, and is still worth pursuing.

THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS

Parliaments have a responsibility of their own in the framing of the security architecture in Asia. It is, first of all, their role to ensure that agreements signed by governments are in compliance with national interests and international engagements. They also have a role of control and oversight over foreign and security policies conducted by governments through their foreign affairs and defense committees. For this purpose they enjoy a powerful instrument, as they

approve the budgets of the ministries concerned.

They also have the responsibility to educate the larger polity about foreign affairs and security matters. Public political debates articulate the values underlying national foreign policies and contribute to inform societies about issues affecting national and regional security, as well as about the nature of the responses provided by governments on foreign policy and security issues. As such, Parliaments also have the capacity to facilitate the implementation of international agreements at the national level. In the case of Asia, and more specifically of ASEAN, Parliaments have therefore the capacity to facilitate regional integration through the implementation of ASEAN declarations and agreements. The more diverse the representation, the more effective Parliaments will be in reaching out to populations and in developing consensual approaches to foreign policy.

Last, but not least, Parliaments can also conduct their own diplomacy. Parliamentary diplomacy "is a complementary tool which has the potential to achieve results that might appear to be difficult for traditional diplomacy or for conventional diplomatic channels" [20], as underlined by the 40th General Assembly of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA). Parliamentary diplomacy can create strong partnerships to deal with regional challenges, in particular to prevent the fragmentation of the Asian security architecture. In essence, parliamentary diplomacy is a diplomacy of influence. Through a variety of networks, Parliamentarians may communicate messages and promote more subtly the national interest of their respective States. For that reason, parliamentary diplomacy should be the preferred instrument to deal with environmental security issues.

Parliaments can therefore play a central role in the preservation of the unity and inclusivity, as well as the multilateralism that are increasingly eluding Asia. They are therefore interlocutors that Europe cannot ignore and should instead cultivate. Although the degree to which they are faithful representations of the popular will vary from one country to another, they can be powerful instruments for governments to resist the centrifugal pressures that Asia is currently experiencing. As such they can contribute significantly to regional and global security.

2.4 PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OVER THE USE OF FORCE AND ARMED FORCES

> *The purpose of war, and therefore of the conduct of warfare, is always political. Since war cannot be justified strictly in its own terms, its meaning must derive from a policy logic, or impulse, external to itself* [21].

INTRODUCTION

All wars are political. Wars between states, and wars within them, are always waged for political reasons, purposes and aims. This central tenet regarding war has been valid since the earliest days of recorded history, and continues to be true to this day [22].Because wars are political they tend to affect entire populations and entire nations. There was perhaps a time when kings and rulers could wage limited war without the support of their subjects, and perhaps was there once a time when wars did not wreak havoc on entire countries. Modern industrialized wars and the effects of globalization have changed that, and the people of a nation are now more than ever affected by international conflict and war; hence there is a need for democratic influence on strategic decision-making and control over national armed forces.

THE CASE FOR DEMOCRATIC CONTROL

Ideally, the role of a Parliament should extend "to all sectors of government activity, particular in terms of budget allocations." This of course includes the principal power of an elected assembly, the power to vote and to approve laws proposed by the government. In this sense, a government "functions under the control of parliament" [23].The elected body represents the people, and thus acts on their behalf, and functions as a balancing power vis-à-vis the executive arm. Accordingly, the executive branch is kept accountable and in check by the Parliament.

This balancing act is one of the cornerstones of democracy and can be considered especially important when it comes to the use of military forces. Without such democratic oversight, the executive would be all powerful and could easily neglect the views and opinions of its population, and their political opponents. Thus, without parliamentary oversight, pluralistic democracy faces an existential threat.

Even though it can be argued that issues relating to the security of a nation "have special characteristics" [24], it stands quite clear that Parliaments should also have extensive influence over a State´s foreign relations and on matters relating its national security and defense.

In the past, kings and despots were supreme commanders of military forces [25]. These forces were as a consequence primarily loyal to the King, not to the people. As such, the army was always a potential threat to the local populace. This is also the reason why Machiavelli,

the renaissance thinker on political affairs, argued that a nation should abolish private armies and mercenary troops and instead institute conscripted citizen militias [26]. In the modern era, with the spread of democracy and an increased belief in political participation, it should no longer be up to monarchs, autocrats and elites to decide on how and if to use military force and the armed forces. Instead, it is ever more important for elected representatives to partake in the decisions regarding the use of force and forces.

THE PRIMACY OF POLITICS

According to well-known strategist Colin S. Gray, "there can be no argument over the primacy of the political over the military" [27]. The meaning of this is that military operations should be subjected to larger political goals and aims. From that also follows that military forces should be organized in a way that reflects those same political goals and aims. There was a period in history when politicians were expected to hand over control of war and warfare to military experts and military professionals, so that the latter would be able to operate in a sort of "politics-free zone". Because such ideas were commonplace, war in the early twentieth century became a senseless slaughter, "bereft of political purpose" [28].

It may be reasonable to argue that war and warfare is a complicated matter and that it requires experts to make decisions regarding the organization and use of military and security forces. It is probably also natural that most people included in conceptualizations of military strategy are military professionals and not civilians. At the same time, the strategy intellectuals, if we may call them that, the people responsible for formulating the grand strategies of a nation, are most of the time civilians [29].

By making sure armed forces and warfare is subjected to democratic control, that political purpose of war can be harnessed, reined in and perhaps controlled so that the security of its populace is not needlessly or recklessly threatened. It is crucial to rein in the ability to make war so that a nation is not drawn into a conflict because of the individual feelings of a leader.

THE EXECUTIVE SHOULD OPERATE UNDER A LEGAL FRAMEWORK

In 1983, after the bombings of the US Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, where more than 220 US servicemen were murdered, President Ronald Reagan and his national security team discussed the continued presence of US military troops in the country. Even though the President was outraged by the bombings, to the extent that he in his diary admitted feeling "hatred for the humans who can do such a cruel but cowardly deed" [30],he did not unilaterally seek a vendetta, but took the case to Congress for approval. In his diary, President Reagan specifically refers to the so called War Powers Act [31] and how he was seeking "Congressional approval of the Marines being in Lebanon" [32].Even though the US President is the supreme commander of the US military, he does not have the power, unlike the Kings and rulers of the past, to wage war unchecked and at will [33].

On the contrary, the US Constitution deems congressional approval not only required, but absolutely necessary before the President of the United States can deploy troops overseas or use armed force [34]. In the US this is referred to as congressional oversight and is a formal mechanism introduced to keep the military under democratic control. Most modern democratic states have similar mechanisms in place.

IDEAL STRATEGIC PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES

In order to safeguard the democratic oversight of military forces and the use of military force, Parliamentarians must be part of the strategic planning process. They should not just be invited into the process, they must be seen as natural and necessary partners, and even as stakeholders.

Now, some may give counter-arguments, claiming that military operations must be kept secret and that strategy is too complicated for people not trained in military matters to understand, let alone control. Firstly, even if there is a clear need for particular parts of a strategy to be kept secret, that is not an excuse to keep elected the representatives of the people completely out of the loop. On the contrary, the presence of secrets makes democratic oversight even more important. To ensure that strategic planning of this nature remains well guarded, those involved can and must be vetted for security reasons. Secondly, and this may be the strongest argument for democratic representation in the decision-making process, "strategy cannot be guided wholly by military considerations" [35]. In fact, civilians must unconditionally be considered the masters over the military [36]. This goes back to the relationship mentioned above: war is about politics. The political function of war and warfare must always come first.

Democratic representation in the decision-making process can take many different forms, but should not be taken lightly. There should for instance be a special cabinet or committee comprised of democratically elected individuals representing the national assembly or Parliament. In this committee all issues pertaining to defense policy and the national strategy should be debated. Whether there is then a second or even third format in which decision-making regarding the actual use of force, or if the committee can also be a part of that, is besides the matter. What matters is that both policy as well as decision-making regarding the use of forces includes democratically elected individuals.

CONCLUSIONS

War is probably the worst thing that can happen to any nation; civil war perhaps being even worse than international war. Therefore, any decision to go to war, or to use military forces, must be thoroughly checked and be subjected to several layers of deliberation. First, the use of force must be executed in line with existing laws, both international law but also national legislation. Secondly, whenever a nation feels obligated to resort to the use of military force, it must be done in a democratic way, allowing for political debate on the necessity of war as well as a discussion about all strategic options at hand. It can never be acceptable that the decision to draw a nation and its peoples into armed conflict is made unilaterally by the executive branch.

That oversight should be exercised by a democratically elected assembly and its Parliamentarians. These Parliamentarians should naturally be included in all aspects of strategic as well as military planning, policy, as well as decision-making processes. The realm of war and international conflict is political, thus the master of these issues should be civilian.

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The Four Races statue represents workers from different trades and continents in Geneva, Switzerland in front of the WTO building

CHAPTER

03

PROMOTING THE RULES BASED INTERNATIONAL MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM FOR INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

3.1 MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS FACE CHALLENGES

Multilateral trade cooperation has flourished since the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 and its successor the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. These frameworks set the legal ground rules for international commerce between their members (of which the WTO now counts 164 countries) [1].

Using the WTO framework as a base, dozens of multilateral free-trade agreements (that is, arrangements for the flow of goods and services with little to no impediments between three or more countries) have been negotiated around the world, including in ASEAN with the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and most recently in Africa with the African Continental Free Trade Area.

However, the presidential administration of the world's largest economy, the United States, has had a change of heart on multilateral systems, turning instead to bilateral negotiations of a more combative variety. The U.S. has introduced costly protectionist measures leading to escalating tensions, uncertainty, and even full-scale tariff wars with its trading partners.

Perhaps emboldened by the U.S. administration, other countries have started to engage in similar tactics, most notably Asia's two largest electronics suppliers, Japan and South Korea.

> *"The U.S. has introduced costly protectionist measures leading to escalating tensions, uncertainty, and even full-scale tariff wars with its trading partners."*

With these threats to the global trade order, it is worth reexamining the case for trade and the importance of multilateral agreements, especially to ASEAN Member States, now and in the future.

WHY DO COUNTRIES TRADE?

The classical economics case for trade is that a country can improve its welfare by specializing in its comparative advantage (the products and services it can produce at the lowest relative cost in terms of other production foregone) while trading with other countries to satisfy its consumption demands. Comparative advantages can arise from a country's climate, technology, skill level, or government policies, to name a few [2].

Trade can also contribute to peace. In fact, the WTO system was born out of a desire among powers to avoid a repeat of the Second World War. As such, the WTO's mission emphasizes principles such as equality, cooperation and peace through negotiation [1].

TRADE'S IMPORTANCE TO ASEAN

The ASEAN region's population of more than 600 million makes it the world's third largest market trading block and seventh largest economy by some measures [3]. Although merchandise exports overall have grown from USD 990 billion in 2008 to USD 1447 billion in 2017, the composition of export partners for ASEAN Member States has remained roughly unchanged over the last ten years: 24 percent of exports

are to AFTA partners, 43 percent are to partners within the region but not a part of AFTA, and 33 percent are with external trade partners [4].

The figure below shows that ASEAN has by far the greatest untapped potential to expand its preferential tariff scheme to include more regional partners, but has made little progress in doing so over the last decade.

EXPORTS AMONG TRADE AGREEMENTS, REGIONS, AND THE REST OF THE WORLD

Figure 1. ASEAN Trading Partners



Source: WTO World Trade Statistics 2019

ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS IN PUTTING MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS BACK ON TRACK

In the face of trade tensions, the WTO expects that annual merchandise trade growth will have fallen to 1.2 percent in 2019, down from 3.0 percent in 2018 [5]. What can be done to reverse the tide of uncertainty so that trade may rebound to its full potential in driving global growth?

Parliaments and inter-parliamentary organizations can play a role in reminding the world's governments that trade lifts all boats. By providing an alternative voice to those executive bodies that currently hold multilateralism in disfavor, and by giving needed support to those governments that wish to increase cooperation, legislative bodies can help to adopt and expand multilateral trading systems. For their part, AIPA Member Parliaments can work to accelerate and expand regional trade with an enlarged AFTA, which could both increase prosperity in the region and show other partners and the world that multilateralism is here to stay. Alternative

> *"By providing an alternative voice to those executive bodies that currently hold multilateralism in disfavor, and by giving needed support to those governments that wish to increase cooperation, legislative bodies can help to adopt and expand multilateral trading systems."*

trade agreements could also be sought, such as in the case of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership [1] and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership [2] in which members of ASEAN have integrated into both cross-regional and intra-regional trade arrangements.

Multilateralism can also be enhanced through digital infrastructure and technology, as supported by the European Parliament in addressing the challenges facing multilateral trading systems [6, 7]. For instance, as a part of the legislative function, the International Trade Committee of the European Parliament has adopted a report on blockchain technology to enhance global trade and increase transparency, as blockchain stimulates collaboration and reduces the risk of non-payment and the procedural costs of paperwork [7]. The system could facilitate trade across customs borders, where exporters could upload documents to a WTO application and prove compliant with the rules of a respective trade agreement.

Parliaments also play a fundamental role in shaping, overseeing and communicating government activities that ensure fair and inclusive trade which fosters development, employment and poverty reduction [8]. Efforts could be taken in cooperation with government and business interests in which the parliaments utilize research and educational services to provide reports on relevant trade issues. Parliamentary outreach and media workshops could also be used at the local level to explain the importance of a rules-based trade system to the public [7].

> *"Parliaments also play a fundamental role in shaping, overseeing and communicating government activities that ensure fair and inclusive trade which fosters development, employment and poverty reduction."*

3.2 MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEMS: AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE

THE POST-WAR INSTITUTIONS

The multilateral trading system that was created in the aftermath of the Second World War which succeeded in moving the global economy towards a much freer trade regime for decades, is now in a state of flux. The multilateral trading regime, governed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) – until 1995 an intergovernmental arrangement known as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) – is a remarkable success story of global governance (Basedow, 2017) [8].

It has made notable progress in achieving a near-free global trade regime for decades. First, average tariffs among the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries that ranged from 20 to 30 percent in the 1950s now stand at less than 4 percent. Second, quantitative restrictions on global trade in the form of trade quotas have been brought down sharply. Third, new multilateral rules and enforcement mechanisms covering trade in services, intellectual property rights, and investments have generally made trade relations among countries more predictable. Fourth, the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO governing multilateral trade has been strengthened. Finally, the GATT/WTO regime has evolved from a small club of 23 developed Western economies in the post-war era into a truly global institution with 164 members, with more countries wishing to join.

Despite these overall successes, the multilateral trading system under the GATT/WTO regime has faced many setbacks in the past, including the notable failure of the Doha Round of trade negotiations. However, it is the unilateral raising of tariffs by the United States on Chinese products in 2018, which, in turn, led to retaliatory actions by China against the United States, which has introduced much deeper and wider cracks in the multilateral trading system. Whereas past setbacks had impeded further progress in multilateral negotiations, the current fissures pose an existential threat to multilateral trading systems (Panagariya, 2018) [9].

THE UNITED STATES-CHINA TRADE CONFLICT

On March 8, 2018, the United States unilaterally imposed a 25 percent tariff on steel imports and a 10 percent tariff on aluminum imports from China. Closely following that, China took a retaliatory action on April 2, 2018 by levying a 25 percent tariff on its food imports from the United States. On July 6, 2018 the United States decided to take further unilateral action, imposing a 25 percent tariff on Chinese imports worth USD 34 billion. China responded the same day with its own tariffs at the same rate on imports of equal value from the United States. On August 2, 2018, the United States threatened another round of 25 percent tariffs on imports worth USD 200 billion from China, to which China responded with its own counter-threat of tariffs on imports worth USD 60 billion. Subsequently, the United States issued another list of imports from China worth USD 16 billion on which it imposed a 25 percent tariff beginning on August 23, 2018. China immediately announced

retaliatory tariffs on imports from the United States of equivalent worth, at a corresponding rate of 25 percent.

Compounding the tariff based assault on multilateral trade begun by the United States in 2018, President Trump then delivered a body blow to the WTO by withdrawing the United States' membership of the organization's Appellate Body that facilitates the settlement of multilateral trade disputes. When disputes over compliance with the rules governing multilateral trade arise between countries, the Appellate Body under the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism help to resolve them. Although countries have at times filed too many frivolous trade disputes at the WTO, overburdening the dispute settlement mechanism, member countries have placed the preservation of the system above all else and therefore abided by the rulings. In general, members also avoided raising trade barriers except under various safeguard provisions of the GATT-WTO agreements. And when violations occurred, countries generally sought relief through mediation via the GATT and WTO instead of retaliating unilaterally. But the recent trade actions of the United States have a strong unilateral flavor and hence strike at the very basis of the multilateral trade regime. Whether an acceptable remedy to the WTO's dispute settlement process will evolve sooner rather than later is thus an open question at this stage.

As far as the trade conflict between the United States and China, there have been some hopeful signs. In early 2020, the two countries signed the "phase one" agreement which includes pledges from China to increase its imports of American farm products and other goods, provides protection for United States technology, and creates new enforcement mechanisms. The United States cancelled an impending and damaging round of new tariffs and promised to slash in half the 15 percent tariffs previously imposed on consumer goods like clothing. China also agreed to import an additional USD 200 billion of American products over two years above the USD 187 billion it imported in 2017 before the trade conflict began, including an additional USD 32 billion in agricultural products. Many experts believe that the "phase one" trade deal does not amount to a trade peace between the two nations, but only a truce.

ASIA'S RESPONSE

In general, most Asian countries have maintained a neutral stance on the trade conflict between the two dominant global economic powers, largely reflecting their varied geopolitical alliances. However, Asian countries have time and again reiterated the need for, and their commitment to, preserving the multilateral trading system that the world has painstakingly nurtured for decades.

At the same time, many Asian countries have proceeded with both cross-regional and intra-regional economic integration initiatives. The first such initiative was the signing of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) – a cross-regional trade and economic integration initiative (that includes 11 countries around the globe - Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Brunei, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Chile, Peru, and Mexico), after the United States pulled out of the 12-member Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as soon as President Trump took office in January 2017. The CPTPP was signed in March 2018 and was ratified by a majority of members. It became effective on December 30, 2018. South Korea is seen as a likely future member of the CPTPP, while more recently

Thailand and Columbia have expressed interest in joining.

More recently, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – a 16-member regional economic partnership consisting of the ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India – is reaching its final stages. All the member countries, excluding India, are aiming to sign the agreement in 2020 and implement it beginning 2021. RCEP, an initiative begun in 2012 as an attempt to integrate trade agreements between ASEAN nations and their major trading partners (dialogue partners) into a single agreement, would be the world's largest trade agreement by population and income covered.

RCEP has a huge potential to raise global income (Reinsch et. al., 2019). A study by Brookings Institute – a think-thank based in the United States – estimates that RCEP has the potential to boost global incomes by USD 285 billion annually, which in absolute terms is twice the estimated gains from CPTPP (cited in Reinsch et. al., 2019). The deal makes significant strides in dealing with rules of origin, intellectual property, and tariff reduction, while still coming up somewhat short in other areas, like e-commerce. During the final negotiations, there was a setback when India pulled out of the agreement. While India's move was somewhat unexpected, the departure will not impact the progress of RCEP. The RCEP provisions that specifically address India will be frozen, and other small changes may be made in order to account for India's departure. RCEP will remain open for India to rejoin at any time (RCEP also contains a more general accession provision), but it seems unlikely that India will consider rejoining RCEP prior to the signing of the agreement.

CONCLUSION

Over the last several decades, nearly every Asian country has benefitted vastly from the postwar multilateral trading system and its key governance institution, the WTO. A rules-based, open global trading regime has enabled country after country in Asia to follow an outward-oriented trade policy regime and integrate into the vast global market. The results have been a surge in exports, the creation of millions of jobs at home, and a steady climb up the development ladder. China is perhaps the clearest example of this progress, having benefitted by following an export-led growth strategy since the beginning of 1980s.

Consumers in Europe, the United States and elsewhere have, in turn, benefitted from a whole set of goods and services that they can import from Asia at much lower prices than if produced at home. The multilateral trading system has thus benefitted developed and developing countries alike. Whenever trade-frictions arose between countries, they could resolve them through the rules-based multilateral dispute settlement system under GATT/WTO. However, the unilateral raising of tariffs by the United States starting in 2018 and its withdrawal from WTO's Appellate Body responsible for resolving trade disputes between countries have introduced significant strains on the multilateral trading system. Over the same period, many observers have noted that China has also, at times, employed somewhat problematic policies at home which tend to undermine the rules-based multilateral trading regime.

It is in the interest of the international community for both the United States and China to resolve their trade conflict amicably and expeditiously, so that the postwar multilateral trading system

that has been so carefully cultivated over the past decades is returned to a healthy state. Most Asian countries have responded with a dual-track approach in the aftermath of the US-China trade-conflict. On the one hand, they have all announced their commitment to the multilateral trading system. On the other, they have also facilitated trade liberalization through fast-tracking cross-regional and intra-regional integration initiatives such as the CPTPP and RCEP. Such a dual-track Asian perspective seems to be an appropriate response to the evolving cracks in the existing multilateral trading system. This two track approach should reinforce global trade integration, one way or another.

Map 1: EU-Asian Trade



Source: European Commission DG Trade Statistical Guide 2019

3.3 MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEMS: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

> *While bilateral trade agreements may be less complex, nations engaged in them are still faced with this fundamental tension between sovereignty and order at the heart of globalization.*

The modern system of rules-based multilateral trade had its start in 1941 when, in the midst of the Second World War, Churchill and Roosevelt met in Newfoundland and made a joint statement, which would later become known as the Atlantic Charter [10]. Despite pressing wartime matters, two of the eight articles (namely 4 and 5) of the charter were dedicated to trade [11], and the charter led to the conception of a number of transnational institutions including GATT and the Bretton Woods system [10].

After the war, Europe became increasingly integrated, initially with the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950 and later with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. However, these agreements were not just dry economic documents solely focused on commercial trade, but expressed underlying political and moral values about Europe and its relationships with other nations. The Schuman Declaration (which led to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community) mentioned "the development of the African continent" as one of Europe's "essential tasks" [12] and the Treaty of Rome (which established the EEC) has an entire section (part 4) dedicated to "Overseas Countries and Territories" [13].

Further evidence that more than just economic factors played a role during the founding of the EU is that the USA was a strong supporter of the creation of the EEC, despite the fact that a customs union without the USA in it had economic costs to American businesses. According to current WTO Deputy Director-General Wolff, the USA (partially) supported the EEC in order "to form an economic bulwark against Soviet expansion" [14]; so political ideals prevailed over strictly economic considerations. While the EU has grown in size and economy in the decades since, moral and political values still underpin much of its trade philosophy. In fact, the EU's growth has only further strengthened the "conception of its role as a leading and 'normative' power" [15, p.73]. The EU exercises this power both in the WTO as well as through bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements.

> *While the EU has grown in size and economy in the decades since, moral and political values still underpin much of its trade philosophy."*

THE WTO

The EU is a member of the WTO (as are all of its Member States) and considers the WTO "indispensable in ensuring free and fair trade" [16, p.1]. The EU

> *"The EU regards a strong rules-based system as a prerequisite for sustainable growth, in large part because the EU economy is deeply integrated into global value chains which require predictability and stability."*

regards a strong rules-based system as a prerequisite for sustainable growth, in large part because the EU economy is deeply integrated into global value chains which require predictability and stability [16]. One testament to the ability of the rules-based multilateral trading system to provide stability is that the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, unlike the 1930s depression, did not lead to trade wars or even to a big surge in protectionist measures [16, 17, 18].

A decade later, however, the rules-based multilateral trading system does seem to be in trouble, with increasing threats of unilateral protectionist measures, a lingering US-China trade war, and even threats from the USA to withdraw from the WTO [16, 10]. The Dispute Settlement System (DSS), considered the "jewel in the crown" of the WTO by the EU [19, p.2], is at risk of collapse as the USA is blocking new appointments to the Appellate Body (AB), creating an impasse [19]. This American obstruction is due to a number of concerns it has about the WTO and the "activist approach of the Appellate Body" [20, p.28], the most substantial (and most complex) of which are related to the tension between American sovereignty and the global jurisdiction of the WTO. The USA objects to the AB reviewing its domestic law and to the AB treating its own reports as precedent [20].

In addition to problems with the AB, the stalemate created after the inconclusive Doha Development Agenda (sometimes called 2001 Doha Round, hereafter in this document; DDA) has led to an increase in bilateralism as WTO members seek to make trade agreements outside of the multilateral WTO system [19]. Part of the reason for the current logjam is the WTO's "single undertaking approach", meaning that WTO deals (like the DDA) have to be passed in their entirety or not at all; there is no option to pick certain provisions and not others [21]. Another explanation for the failure of the DDA is the north-south divide; developed nations of the north see giving market access as an economic risk that should come with compromises from those getting access, while developing nations in the south rebuke such a commercial mindset and instead see the DDA as an avenue to change existing unfair rules set by developed nations [18]. This issue is further complicated by the fact that the old WTO conception of countries as being either developed or developing (or least developed) is becoming outdated with the BRIC [A] countries growing to the extent that developed nations feel ill at ease giving them unreciprocated concessions [17].

While the EU Parliament still considers the WTO "the best option for international trade" [19], the EU has been seeking its reform, including by strengthening enforcement mechanisms, giving committees more power to make incremental changes to the rules, and addressing the USA's concerns about the AB [16]. However, while the USA has been making a number of its own free trade agreements (FTAs) the EU has not sat idly by; in 2006 it broke its moratorium on new trade agreements and forged a large number of FTAs, including several with developed countries [17]. 'Trade for All', a policy document from 2015 by

the EU Commissioner for Trade (Cecilia Malmström at the time), stated that FTAs are needed alongside multilateral WTO agreements. Multilateral agreements may have bigger impact, but they are much more complex; the EU Commission believes regulatory convergence is easier to achieve through bilateral negotiations [22]. This philosophy seemed to have been applied in ASEAN; while bi-regional negotiations with ASEAN were held, they turned out to be too complex. The EU has since made bilateral FTAs with Singapore and Vietnam and is in negotiations with all other ASEAN members (except prospective member East-Timor). It seems the liberalization of trade is too urgent and important for the EU to wait until the issues with the WTO system are resolved [15].

SOVEREIGNTY AND THE NEW WORLD OF TRADE

Some of the problems with the WTO stem from a tension between a desire by States to remain sovereign and a need for a multilateral system of rules to govern trade between nations. Under the Westphalian nation-state model, countries have absolute sovereignty over what happens within their borders. In a globalized world, where products are often made in five or six countries (by companies that may be registered in another country altogether), this model is becoming increasingly more difficult to maintain. While bilateral trade agreements may be less complex, nations engaged in them are still faced with this fundamental tension between sovereignty and order at the heart of globalization.

Pascal Lamy, former Director-General of the WTO and EU Commissioner for Trade before that, frames this issue into what he calls the "old world of trade" versus the "new world of trade", with our current world being in a transition phase between the two [17, 23, 24].

In this conception the 'old world' is one where policy makers try to protect domestic producers from external competition through protectionist measures (such as tariffs and quotas). In such a world, trade negotiations are relatively straight forward; opening trade would mean lowering or removing protectionist measures, whereby any concession can be reciprocated (if country A lowers tariffs on X, country B can reciprocate by lowering tariffs on Y), and where the end goal is zero (i.e. no tariffs or quotas). On the other hand, in the 'new world' protectionism is unhelpful as it hurts the global value chain domestic producers are part of. This protectionism is replaced by precaution; policy makers try to protect the consumers (rather than producers) by setting regulations and standards for goods and services sold in the domestic market. Removing differences in regulation is a fundamental part of opening trade in this new world. However, regulations cannot be traded off as easily as tariffs can, countries are unlikely to lower their health and safety regulations in return for their trading partner lowering theirs. Where trade negotiations in the old world where about moving (protectionism) downwards, in the new world it is about moving (precaution) upwards [23, 24].

This way of framing modern trade would explain the complexities of a multilateral rules-based trading system. While countries could theoretically lower standards (and producers might even cheer on such a move), consumers and consumer organizations would be up in arms; no country could do this if it wants to maintain democratic legitimacy. Tariffs and quotas do not have normative value in and of themselves, but precautionary measures (i.e. regulations) are about risk

management and are inherently value-laden [23, 24]. Since values are influenced by culture and different countries have different cultures, opening trade in the new world (i.e. harmonization of regulations) becomes a Gordian knot [17].

The importance of democratic legitimacy was felt firsthand by the EU during the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. The aim of the TTIP was convergence of the EU and the USA regulatory frameworks, but despite both already having relatively high regulatory standards in place, it proved too complex to harmonize them. In addition, many EU citizens saw the TTIP as a threat to the EU regulatory model, which was symbolized in public discourse by protest against "chlorinated chicken" that was allowed for sale in the USA, but not in the EU [25]. The aforementioned "Trade for All" policy document was released in 2015, as public criticism of the TTIP was reaching a crescendo, and TTIP negotiations were on the brink of collapse (negotiations ended in 2016 and the EU Council ruled the negotiation directives obsolete in 2019 [26]). In "Trade for All", the EU commission stated it learned from this and vowed to be more transparent in future trade negotiations by making negotiation directives and outcomes public in a more timely manner [22].

EU VALUES AND SPECIAL TREATMENT

As mentioned before, the EU has long mixed trade policy with normative power and aspirations of global development. An example of this is the 'general system of preferences' (GSP), which reduces or removes import duties for products from developing countries as well as the Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme, which removes all duties and quotas (except for armaments) for the 49 Least Developed Countries [27]. EU policy documents explicitly mention the importance of enforcing "social justice, respect for human rights, high labour and environmental standards, and health and safety protections" through trade policy [22, p.22].

Some academics argue that the normative language in EU policy documents is merely empty discourse with little bearing on reality, which is played up or down depending on who the EU Commissioner for Trade is [15]. Nevertheless, discourse about, in the words of the EU Commission, "align[ing] trade policy with European values" [22, p.24] seemed to have had a real effect in ASEAN. The EU's involvement in the Initiative to Promote Fundamental Labour Rights and Practices in Myanmar is mentioned in "Trade for All" as a means of "responsible management of global supply chains" [22]. And the partial withdrawal of EBA preferences for Cambodia after the EU Commission judged that the Cambodian government did not do enough to allay their "serious concerns" over unresolved cases involving labor unions [28] is also an example of the EU using trade policy as a political tool.

However, such policies are becoming less effective as the world moves further into Lamy's "new world" of trade; EBA and other special preferences (or withholding thereof) are harder to rationalize in the new world; you cannot give a regulatory advantage to producers from some nations but not others as that would undercut the whole purpose of systematic regulations (i.e. managing risks for consumers) [23, 24]. Consequently, while all trade agreements by the EU in the last decade have had a chapter on "sustainable development" [15], external normative pressure may become harder to apply through trade policy, and those chapters run the risk of becoming unenforceable discourse.

FUTURE EU ROLE IN TRADE FOR INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

The EU is, and likely will remain, an ardent supporter of a strong rules-based multilateral trading system. The EU economy is too integrated in global value chains not to be. However, as long as the WTO remains in a stalemate position where it is unable to develop new agreements or appoint new members to the Appellate Body, the EU will likely continue to expand bilateral and plurilateral FTAs.

Additionally, while normative values will likely still go hand-in-hand with any new EU trade deals, the enforcement of the normative aspects of the deals will probably be superficial.

Finally, the (at the time of writing) ongoing Brexit negotiations and the rise of euroscepticism (the eurosceptic Parliamentary group "Identity and Democracy" has 76 of 705 seats in the EU Parliament now that the UK MEPs have left) make the EU's position precarious. It will likely want to keep the UK in its regulatory sphere. At the same time, as public outrage over TTIP has shown, it cannot afford to make bilateral agreements that need regulatory reform without transparency and democratic input if it wants to keep euroscepticism at bay.

Container ship in the Gulf of Thailand
Magnifier

FOOTNOTES

A. BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China; i.e. countries on the brink of becoming developed countries)

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Wind turbines
SSUAphotos

CHAPTER

04

CLIMATE CHANGE, RESOURCE SECURITY AND THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS

4.1 FOOD SECURITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: A VIEW FROM SINGAPORE

Climate change, especially global warming and its disruptive effects, poses a serious challenge for many countries. The rise of sea-levels, in particular, is an existential challenge to small island states like Singapore. Accordingly, Singapore has worked actively for an international consensus, reached in the Paris Agreement, for every party to take "climate action" to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Singapore is playing its part, working to reduce its carbon footprint and increase sustainability in all areas, from utilities and transport to industries, businesses and households: an endeavor involving every stakeholder. Technology can be a game-changer to help Singapore not only to raise its already high energy-efficiency and its use of renewable energy, but also to move towards a circular economy that strives for zero waste by re-using, whenever possible, all materials and resources.

In successive reports, the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has issued dire assessments on how climate change will affect the planet. Its latest report does not augur well for Southeast Asia, prompting UN Secretary-General Mr. António Guterres to say in his opening remarks at the 10th ASEAN-UN Summit on 3 November 2019 in Bangkok: "[The] climate emergency is the defining issue of our time. Four of the ten countries most affected by climate change are ASEAN Member States. This region is highly vulnerable... to rising sea-levels, with catastrophic consequences for low-lying communities."

IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY

Various studies suggest that rising temperatures alone may cause rice yields (based on current strains under cultivation) in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam to fall by as much as 50 percent from 1990 levels by 2100. Because significant agricultural activity takes place in low-lying areas, such as the rich Mekong Delta and coastal zones, which are vulnerable to flooding and salinity intrusion resulting from the rise in sea levels, the yields in rice and other produce are likely to be further impacted. More generally, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and IPPC have estimated that climate change may cause a 10-25 percent fall in crop yields by 2050. This considerable decline in crop yields will be a substantial threat to global food security, which is already under pressure from a growing world population that may reach ten billion by 2050, up from 7.3 billion today.

SINGAPORE'S APPROACH TO FOOD SECURITY

Singapore is a cosmopolitan city and food paradise where one can enjoy cuisine of nearly every conceivable variety and price. The Global Food Security Index, published by the Economist Intelligence Unit, ranked Singapore as the world's most food secure in 2018 and 2019. Quite understandably, many people in Singapore do not worry much about reliable access to food. However, policy-makers cannot ignore the very real threat to Singapore's future food security. Having moved away from agriculture a generation ago to allow for more economically productive

uses of its limited land and resources, Singapore is now seriously working on ways to produce food cost-effectively and sustainably, as a city, and to thereby contribute to global food production. At the same time, Singaporean solutions may help half of the world's population now living in urban areas to do their part to alleviate a future global food shortage.

On 1 April 2019, the Singapore Parliament passed an Act to establish a new statutory board, the Singapore Food Agency (SFA), under Singapore's Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources (MEWR). The SFA's mission is to ensure and secure a supply of safe food for Singapore. Bringing together food-related functions that previously straddled various agencies for a more holistic approach to strengthen food safety and security, the SFA now has regulatory oversight across the entire food chain "from farm-to-fork". The agency is also working with partner businesses to transform the national agrifood industry and create good jobs for Singaporeans. To enhance Singapore's food supply resilience, the SFA is pursuing a "30 by 30" goal to locally produce 30 percent of Singapore's nutritional needs by 2030, which will represent a multi-fold increase in local production compared with current levels. To get to 30 by 30, the agrifood industry will need to apply research and development (R&D) to create solutions that overcome resource constraints, raise productivity and strengthen climate resilience.

The SFA encourages existing local farms to innovate and upgrade (e.g., by integrating climate control and automation into their operations) to raise productivity. The SFA encourages state-of-the-art indoor farms that optimize plant growth and increase yields exponentially through high-tech solutions like LED lighting and climate control. These farms, by controlling growing variables, are climate-resilient and are better at maintaining high quality standards. The SFA similarly encourages more resilient, productive and sustainable fish farming, as traditional fish farms with open-net cage systems are highly susceptible to external incidents such as algae blooms and oil spills. One company using such a closed containment system since 2012, to raise fish like barramundi, sea bass or red snapper, is Singapore Aquaculture Technologies.

SUSTAINABILITY, THE WAY FORWARD

The SFA is working with several institutes of higher learning to provide knowledge and skills to our young people to become agriculture and aquaculture technicians, urban farming specialists and researchers. It also supports the growing interest in urban farming, using available spaces like balconies and rooftops. Projects like these bring the community together and involve people directly in food production, which increases awareness of food security issues and imparts an attitude that people should value food and minimize food waste. As food is also vulnerable to spoilage, a considerable amount is lost in the global value chain before it reaches the consumer. The FAO has estimated that about a third of food produced is lost or simply wasted in the global agrifood value chain – a proportion that is slowly creeping up at a time when hunger still affects many around the world.

Reducing food loss and food waste is undoubtedly the most effective way to reduce the carbon footprint in the agrifood sector with no downside. Although the proportion of food loss/waste in Singapore is lower than average, estimated at 20 percent, it is still far too high. Consumers are now being

encouraged to buy, cook and eat just enough, while food waste minimization guidebooks for food retail establishments, food manufacturing establishments and supermarkets have been published and made available to the industry since 2014. Efforts are also being made to collect and redistribute unsold or excess food. As for food loss, a study found that 7.2 percent of the food that Singapore imports a year, by tonnage, is lost (i.e., it perishes) on the way to Singapore, with a further 5.5 percent lost during distribution within Singapore. Producing food locally will not only enhance Singapore's food security by providing a buffer in times of crises, but also help to lower food miles for the food consumed inside Singapore. Besides, a short local supply chain from farm-to-fork means that the food items can reach the consumer fresh, avoiding losses that would have arisen in a long import food-value-chain.

Like every sector in Singapore, the agrifood sector is embracing sustainability. Creating the SFA as part of the MEWR facilitates the "environment family" using a holistic approach to manage water, food, energy efficiency and waste issues through identifying and exploiting synergies across the energy-food-water-waste nexus. As the SFA works to enhance food security for Singapore, it will advocate circular economy approaches to agrifood production to make the best use of resources, to reduce loss and waste, and to recycle (i.e., convert) food waste into agricultural feedstock or fertilizers. What is waste to one sector can often be reutilized or transformed for another. Some local farms already apply circular economy principles. One indoor farm, Sustenir, is using carbon dioxide to enhance vegetable yields. One layer farm carries out bio-digestion using its poultry waste to produce energy to dry by-products from the food manufacturing industry to produce chicken feed. The larvae of some insects, like the black soldier fly, feed on agrifood waste to produce fertilizers, while the grown larvae could also serve as feedstock for fish or poultry.

Recent developments in producing novel foods such as plant-based alternative proteins to animal meat, milk and eggs in commercially viable ways, and in farming algae and insects as more sustainable sources of protein, may open another sustainable pathway for Singapore to diversify its sources of protein to meet nutrition requirements for its 30 by 30 goal. Since producing protein-rich food based on soy, pulses, cereals and tubers incurs a lower carbon footprint than meat production from livestock, this may help to revamp the global protein industry which is facing mounting challenges regarding its environmental sustainability.

R&D IN INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS AND FUTURE FOODS

To catalyze R&D on technological solutions for tropical aquaculture and urban agriculture in Singapore, with goals like improving disease and health management (e.g., through genetic improvement of key tropical species and varieties with traits adapted for indoor farming), the SFA issued a grant call on 17 December 2019 for relevant research proposals. The goal is to raise the productivity of local food producers beyond what is achievable by current best-in-class technologies, while taking into consideration cost effectiveness, environmental sustainability and climate resilience. At the same time, the Agency for Science, Technology and Research launched a seed grant for research related to the creation of protein-rich foods, to address some of the fundamental challenges in alternative

proteins. It is hoped that this will lead to novel R&D approaches and ground-breaking science "to develop evidence-based, proof-of-concept technologies and solutions" with due regard for food safety, nutrition, palatability, scalability and cost-effectiveness, sustainability, and other real-world considerations.

THE NEW MANUFACTURING: AGRIFOOD PRODUCTION

Whereas agriculture ceded its place to manufacturing in Singapore 30-40 years ago, technology is now enabling farming and food production to return as a different kind of manufacturing, with a new breed of techno-preneur farmers and novel food innovator-creators. Singapore's accomplishments in this exciting sector to enhance its food security via urban food solutions will no doubt be shared with others, beginning with neighboring cities in Southeast Asia, so that others can experience a similar revolutionary movement to enhance local food security while helping to boost the overall global food supply.

Rooftop garden atop a Housing and Development Board car park in Yishun, Singapore
Olivia Choong / https://tendergardener.com

4.2 CITIES OF ASEAN FACING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND CLIMATE CHANGE

FINDINGS

In 2011, the portion of the Chao Phraya River that flows through Bangkok overflowed, flooding 40 percent of the city. Whole neighborhoods were paralyzed for several days, with serious economic consequences. The flood resulted in more than USD 46 billion spent in repairs and rehabilitation, including USD 8 billion for the city of Bangkok alone. Making matters even worse, from 2013 to 2015 the Thai capital could have sunk by 1.8 meters.

Indonesia's massive capital city, Jakarta, sinks 7.5 to 10 cm per year, and 40 percent of the metropolis is below sea level. This affects the north of the city, its ports, its nautical bases, its fish markets and its gigantic shopping centers. In response, President Joko Widodo initiated a plan in April 2019 to move the capital to the eastern coast of Borneo.

Ho Chi Minh City is sinking by 8 cm per year. In 2009, the Vietnamese Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment informed the public that 6 percent of the surface of the city was threatened. In the Philippines, a portion of the nearly 13 million inhabitants of metro Manila face impending catastrophe, as the city plunges 4.5 cm per year.

With 54 percent of its population living in areas near or below sea level, and especially in these large cities, Asia appears to be particularly vulnerable to the duel threats of subsidence and rising sea levels.

THE GROWTH OF METROPOLISES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

In 2019, Southeast Asian cities with more than two million inhabitants now have a combined population of 167 million out of a total population of 664 million. This amounts to 26.3 percent.

Table 1: Metropolises and megalopolises have the following populations:

Jabodetatek (Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi)	35 m
Metro Manila	24 m
Bangkok (Krung Thep Maha Nakhon)	18.9 m
Ho Chi Minh City	13.6 m
Bandoung	8.7 m
Kuala Lumpur	8.2 m
Singapore	8.1 m
Hanoi	7.4 m
Yangon	7.4 m
Surakarta	6 m
Medan	5.2 m
Yogyakarta	4 m
Phnom Penh	3.3m
Cebu	2.8 m
Malang	2.8 m
Palembang	2.5 m
Cirebon	2.5 m
Johor Bahuru	2.4 m
Denpasar	2.2m
Mandalay	2 m

Map 2: Metropolises and Megacities in Southeast Asia

AN EXCEPTIONAL COMBINATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK FACTORS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: SUBSIDENCE AND THE EFFECTS OF GLOBAL WARMING ON SEA LEVELS

The metropolises of Southeast Asia are almost always located in densely populated alluvial zones and deltas, on soft ground and marshy land extending over neighboring rice fields. Rapid urbanization and industrialization in such areas is causing subsidence, the sinking of the ground's surface, which is directly leading to the increased number of floods, especially during the monsoon season.

There are a number of reasons for this subsidence. According to specialists from Deltares, an independent institute for applied research in the field of water and subsurface, the largest "remains the pumping of groundwater". But, they add, "The weight of buildings certainly contributes to the compression of the thin sedimentary layers. These coastal areas, mainly composed of layers of sand, clay and peat, are particularly malleable."

Sinking cities are particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels. According to the IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, approved by IPCC member governments on 24 September 2019, sea and ocean levels could rise by as much as 1.10 m by 2100 if nothing is done. The projections below show the consequences of rising sea levels for Asian cities if global warming is contained at 2°C, the limit provided for in the Paris agreements of 2015, and compares them with the case of the warming having reached 4°.

Figure 2. Global sea level rise (SLR) and average land subsidence for several coastal cities (please note that subsidencecan differ considerably within a city area, depending on groundwater level and subsurface characteristics)



Source: Deltares, 2015

Table 2: Current population below the elevation of an average annual flood in 2050, top six countries Moderate emissions cuts

Country	SRTM	Coastal DEM	Change
1. China (Mainland)	29 million people	93 million people	+67 million people
2. Bangladesh	5 million people	42 million people	+37 million people
3. India	5 million people	36 million people	+31 million people
4. Vietnam	9 million people	31 million people	+22 million people
5. Indonesia	5 million people	23 million people	+18 million people
6. Thailand	1 million people	12 million people	+11 million people
Total, global	**79 million people**	**300 million people**	**+221 million people**

Moderate emissions cuts

(RCP 4.5), Kopp et al. 2014. median climate sensitivity, Population exposure estimates do not factor in potential coastal defenses, such as seawalls or levees.

Source: Climate Central, Oct. 2019

Another risk for these cities is the pollution of surface water and the drying up of groundwater despite an abundance of rain, due to the pumping from underground sources necessary to supply populations with potable water and to the increased presence of concrete roads in place of friable soils and mangroves through which those sources are naturally replenished. There is also an increased risk of cracks in bridges and dikes and of accidents in electrical networks and pipes. Less visibly, but no less worrying, are sagging roads that result in streets with collapsed areas and offset sidewalks, and cracks, sometimes several kilometers long, which threaten power lines and railways. The buildings tilt and their foundations are weakened, leading to the risk of collapse.

ADAPTATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES

Measures to cope with these risks have been successfully initiated in several metropolitan areas.

Tokyo, for example, which had sunk by 4.25m between 1900 and 2013, is no



Land subsidence from a multi-sectoral perspective

Source : Deltares, 2015

longer sinking. In 1968, in an effort to slow down subsidence, the State put in place regulations that limited the extraction of groundwater and generated other water sources like dammed river basins and treated wastewater. Shanghai, having sunk by 2.5 m since 1920, attempted to artificially recharge its aquifers. Bangkok, built only 1.5 meters above the sea, was sinking by about 10 cm annually until a few years ago. The municipality has managed to slow this process, limiting subsidence to one or two cm today. Also, the creation of large parks, such as Centenary Park, has helped to fight floods and store water in the event of a natural disaster.

While adaptation strategies are sometimes confined to a single metropolitan area, mitigation measures are often part of broader efforts to limit the rise in sea levels through a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. In order to succeed, these measures require parallel subnational, national, regional and global actions to support more efficient and economical energy policies that give priority to renewable energies when possible, and attempt to reduce the use of fossil fuels.

THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS

Water management and control is at the heart of the history of State construction in Southeast Asia. What is new is the magnitude of the effects wrought by climate change. To promote adaptation and mitigation strategies, Parliaments can act by bringing forward legislation, raising public awareness, monitoring the effective implementation of laws, and cooperating regionally.

A) LAWS AND REGULATIONS

To regulate the use of water in general, and groundwater in particular, and to manage urbanization, laws are needed, especially in the cases where governments have been reluctant to take action.

If inhabitants do not benefit from an effective distribution network for drinking water (which is the case for 65 percent of the inhabitants of Jakarta), they will continue to pump water from the aquifers, exacerbating the city's subsidence problem. In Jakarta, a city profoundly threatened by the twin specters of sinking land and rising seas, the response has been to build a wall four meters high and 32 km long. The first phase, 8 km in length, started in 2014 and is due to be completed in 2025. The undertaking, widely criticized by environmentalists, involves also constructing a 500 km coastal breakwater designed to protect the metropolis from the Java Sea. The cost of the project, known as the National Capital Integrated Costal Development Masterplan, is an estimated USD 40 billion, equivalent to the funds needed to build a new capital.

Thailand's approach to dealing with subsidence in their capital has been to adopt tough regulations, emulating the approach taken by the Japanese in Tokyo. Bangkok's Groundwater Act was adopted in 1977 to better manage groundwater, targeting the most vulnerable areas. Since then, the city's rate of subsidence has slowed down but has not stopped: the illegal drawing of water continues, though to a lesser degree.

As governments develop other such policies and adaptation strategies, they must always take climate risks into account when assessing the potential impact on individuals and other stakeholders.

B) AWARENESS OF POPULATIONS AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

Parliaments can, by organizing symposia, expert hearings, parliamentary missions and regional field visits, help to raise awareness among their fellow citizens about the challenges and policies required to adapt to and mitigate these challenges. This encompasses the need to:

- identify the vulnerabilities of the region, the economy, the environment and the population to climate change;
- raise awareness of the risks linked to climate change and the need to prepare for them;
- identify possible consequences and classify them in order of importance, probability and urgency;
- monitor and assess whether anticipated changes to the environment are occurring and, if so, at what speed;
- calculate the costs and benefits of the different adaptation strategies (doing nothing, relocating, building infrastructure, transforming the economic activity, etc.);
- analyze the responsiveness of adaptation strategies and their results;
- continuously assess the risks and the strategies employed.

C) MONITORING ACHIEVEMENTS

Ad hoc parliamentary committees should carry out annual audits and inspections assessing the degree to which laws have been implemented.

D) REGIONAL COOPERATION

ASEAN countries share the same types of natural environments, the same intense urbanization processes, the same water challenges and the same climate threats. It is therefore of profound mutual interest, in the spirit of ASEAN, to share experiences and examples of good practice in order to save precious time in this race against calamity.

LES VILLES D'ASIE DU SUD-EST FACE AUX RISQUES D'ENVIRONNEMENT ET DU CHANGEMENT CLIMATIQUE

CONSTATS

En 2011, le fleuve Chao Phraya, qui traverse Bangkok, a ainsi débordé, inondant 40 % de la ville. Des quartiers entiers ont été paralysés pendant plusieurs jours, avec de graves conséquences économiques. La capitale thaïlandaise pourrait s'enfoncer de 1,8 mètres d'ici 2025. L'inondation de 2011 a entraîné plus de 46 milliards de dollars en réparations et réhabilitations dont 8 milliards uniquement pour la ville de Bangkok.

Jakarta s'enfonce de 7,5 à 10 cm par an et 40% de la métropole se trouve en dessous du niveau de la mer. Ceci affecte le nord de la ville, ses ports, ses bases nautiques, ses marchés aux poissons et ses gigantesques centres commerciaux. Le Président Joko Widodo a décidé en avril 2019 de déplacer la capitale sur la côte orientale de Bornéo

Ho Chi Minh-Ville plonge de 8 cm par an. En 2009, le ministère vietnamien des Ressources naturelles et de l'Environnement indiquait que 6% de la surface de la ville était menacée. Aux Philippines, une partie des environ 13 millions d'habitants de la ville métropolitaine de Manille fait face à une catastrophe imminente, la ville plongeant de 4,5 cm par an.

Avec 54 % de sa population vivant dans des zones proches du niveau de la mer, et notamment dans ces grandes villes, l'Asie apparaît comme particulièrement vulnérable.

LA CROISSANCE URBAINE DES MÉTROPOLES EN ASIE DU SUD-EST

Les villes de plus de 2 millions d'habitants concentrent 167 millions habitants, sur un total de 664 millions en 2019 en Asie du Sud-Est, soit 26,3 %. Cette croissance est très rapide.

Table 1: Les métropoles et les mégalopoles ont les populations suivantes

Jabodetatek (Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi)	35 m
Metro Manila	24 m
Bangkok (Krung Thep Maha Nakhon)	18.9 m
Ho Chi Minh City	13.6 m
Bandoung	8.7 m
Kuala Lumpur	8.2 m
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Cebu	2.8 m
Malang	2.8 m
Palembang	2.5 m
Cirebon	2.5 m
Johor Bahuru	2.4 m
Denpasar	2.2m
Mandalay	2 m

Une combinaison exceptionnelle de facteurs de risques d'environnement en Asie du Sud-Est : subsidence et effets du réchauffement climatique sur le niveau de la mer

Les métropoles du Sud-Est asiatique sont presque toujours situées dans des zones alluviales rizicoles densément peuplées, des deltas et des terrains meubles et marécageux et elles s'étendent sur les espaces rizicoles voisins.

Le premier risque est la subsidence des sols, due à l'urbanisation et à l'industrialisation, qui est la cause directe des inondations qui se multiplient, notamment durant les périodes de mousson.

La subsidence rend ces grandes villes particulièrement vulnérables à la montée des eaux. « La raison principale reste le pompage des eaux souterraines, expliquent les spécialistes de Deltares, un institut indépendant de recherche appliquée dans le domaine de l'eau et du sous-sol. Mais le poids des immeubles participe assurément à la compression des minces couches sédimentaires. Or, ces zones côtières, majoritairement composées de couches de sable, d'argile et de tourbe, sont particulièrement malléables. »

Or, les villes qui coulent sont particulièrement vulnérables à l'élévation du niveau de la mer. Selon le rapport spécial du Groupe d'experts intergouvernemental sur l'évolution du climat (GIEC) sur l'océan et la cryosphère dans un climat en évolution, approuvé par les gouvernements membres du GIEC le 24 septembre 2019, le niveau des mers et des océans pourrait augmenter de 1,10 m d'ici 2100 si rien n'est fait. Les projections ci-dessous, élaborées par le centre de recherches sur le réchauffement climatique montrent les conséquences de l'élévation du niveau des mers pour les villes asiatiques si le réchauffement planétaire est contenu à 2°C, limite prévue par les accords de Paris de 2015, et le compare avec un réchauffement atteignant 4°C.

Figure 2. L'élévation du niveau de la mer (ENM) et la subsidence moyenne dans plusieurs villes côtières (à noter que la subsidence peut différer considérablement au sein d'une même ville selon le niveau des eaux souterraines et les caractéristiques du sous-sol)



Tableau 1: 'Nombre actuel de personnes vivant sous le seuil moyen d'inondation annuel estimé pour 2050, parmi les 6 pays les plus à risque.'

Pays	SRTM	DEM côtier	Changement
1. Chine (continentale)	29 millions de personnes	93 millions de personnes	+ 67 millions de personnes
2. Bangladesh	5 millions de personnes	42 millions de personnes	+ 37 millions de personnes
3. Inde	5 millions de personnes	36 millions de personnes	+31 millions de personnes
4. Vietnam	9 millions de personnes	31 millions de personnes	+22 millions de personnes
5. Indonésie	5 millions de personnes	23 millions de personnes	+18 millions de personnes
6. Thaïlande	1 million de personnes	12 millions de personnes	+11 millions de personnes
Total	**79 millions de personnes**	**300 millions de personnes**	**+221 millions de personnes**

Réductions d'émissions modérées

(RCP 4.5), Kopp et al. 2014. Sensibilité médianne au climat, L'estimation de l'exposition de la population ne prend pas en compte d'éventuelles mesures de protection, comme les digues.

Source: Climate Central, Oct. 2019

Les autres risques sont la pollution des eaux de surface, l'assèchement des nappes phréatiques malgré l'abondance des pluies, en raison de la multiplication des routes bétonnées à la place des mangroves et des sols friables et du pompage pour alimenter les populations en eau potable. On note également les risques de fissure de ponts et de digues, des incidents sur les réseaux électriques et les canalisations. Moins visible, mais pas moins inquiétant, les routes s'affaissent provoquant des rues aux zones effondrées, des trottoirs décalés mais aussi des fissures, parfois de plusieurs kilomètres de long, qui menacent les lignes d'électricité et les voies ferrées. Les bâtiments s'inclinent et leurs fondations sont fragilisées, entraînant des risques d'effondrement.

STRATÉGIES D'ADAPTATION ET D'ATTÉNUATION AUX RISQUES D'ENVIRONNEMENT

Des mesures d'adaptation à ces risques ont été engagées avec succès dans plusieurs métropoles.

Ainsi, Tokyo, qui s'était enfoncée de 4,25 m entre 1900 et 2013 ne s'enlise plus. L'Etat a décidé à partir de 1968 de mettre en place des régulations pour limiter l'extraction des eaux souterraines et ralentir la subsidence et trouver d'autres sources, par des barrages sur les bassins



La subsidence des terres dans une perspective multisectorielle **Source : Deltares, 2015**

fluviaux et en traitant les eaux usées.

Shanghai, qui s'était enfoncé de 2,5 m depuis 1920, a agi sur la recharge des nappes phréatiques, méthode jugée moins efficace par les experts car la subsidence a des effets visibles sur les infrastructures.

Bangkok n'est construite qu'à 1,5 mètre au-dessus de la mer. Alors qu'il y a quelques années, elle s'enterrait d'environ 10 cm par an, la municipalité a réussi à ralentir le phénomène pour restreindre la subsidence à un à deux cm aujourd'hui. Par ailleurs, la création de vastes parcs, comme Centenary Park, permet de lutter contre les inondations et de stocker les eaux en cas de catastrophe naturelle.

Alors que les stratégies d'adaptation se limitent parfois à une seule zone métropolitaine, l'objectif des mesures dites d'atténuation est de réduire les émissions des gaz à effet de serre. Cela suppose une politique énergétique infranationale, nationale, régionale et mondiale efficace et économe, qui donne la priorité aux énergies renouvelables quand cela est possible, ainsi que la réduction de l'utilisation des combustibles fossiles.

RÔLE DES PARLEMENTS

La maîtrise des eaux est au cœur de l'histoire des constructions étatiques en Asie du Sud-Est. Ce qui est nouveau est l'ampleur des phénomènes, en raison du changement climatique.

Pour promouvoir ces stratégies d'adaptation et d'atténuation, les Parlements peuvent exercer un quadruple rôle de législation, de sensibilisation de la population, de contrôle de la mise en œuvre effectives des lois et de coopération régionale.

A) LOIS ET RÈGLES

Pour réguler l'usage de l'eau et des nappes phréatiques et pour maîtriser l'urbanisation, il faut des lois, surtout lorsque les gouvernements sont réticents à prendre les mesures qui s'imposent.

Si les habitants ne bénéficient pas d'un bon réseau de distribution d'eau potable (cas de 65% des habitants de Jakarta), ils continuent de pomper dans les nappes en exacerbant le problème de subsidence de la ville. À Jakarta, une ville profondément menacée par le double spectre de la subsidence et des mers montantes, le choix a été fait de construire un mur de 4 mètres de haut et de 32 km. La première phase, pour une longueur de 8 km, a débuté en 2014 et devrait s'achever en 2025.

Ce projet, dit Plan directeur national d'aménagement côtier intégré de la capitale, très critiqué par les écologistes et qui implique aussi une digue côtière de 500 km, devrait protéger la métropole de la mer de Java (coût estimé à 40 mds$, équivalent à celui d'une nouvelle capitale).

Ainsi, à Bangkok, l'expérience japonaise a été suivie par le vote de réglementations plus sévères. La loi « The Groundwater Act » a été adopté en 1977 pour une meilleure gestion des eaux souterraines, en ciblant les lieux les plus vulnérables. La subsidence a ralenti dans être arrêtée car le puisage illégal des eaux continue.

Pour être efficace, une stratégie d'adaptation doit inclure le risque climatique comme un phénomène ordinaire dans l'élaboration des politiques afin que les gouvernements, les communautés d'affaires et les individus soient pleinement conscients de ce risque potentiel comme ils le seraient d'autres types de risques dans l'évaluation de leurs plans.

B) SENSIBILISATION DES POPULATIONS ET DES ACTEURS

Les Parlements peuvent, par l'organisation de colloques, d'auditions d'experts, de missions de parlementaires et de visites régionales de terrain, contribuer à sensibiliser leurs concitoyens sur les enjeux et les politiques requises dans les deux domaines de l'adaptation et de l'atténuation des défis cités :

- identifier la vulnérabilité de la région, de l'économie, de l'environnement et de la population face au changement climatique ;
- identifier des impacts possibles et classer ces derniers par ordre d'importance, de probabilité et d'urgence ;
- surveiller pour évaluer si les changements climatiques anticipés sont en train de se produire et auquel cas, à quelle vitesse ;
- calculer des coûts et des bénéfices des différentes stratégies d'adaptation (ne rien faire, relocaliser, construire des infrastructures, transformer l'activité économique, etc.) ;
- analyser la réactivité des stratégies d'adaptation et leurs résultats ;
- faire prendre conscience aux intéressés des risques dus au changement climatique et la nécessité de s'y préparer ;
- évaluer de façon continue les risques et les stratégies employées.

C) CONTRÔLE DES RÉALISATIONS

Les commissions parlementaires ad hoc devraient réaliser chaque année des audits et des missions d'inspection sur le degré d'application des lois votées.

D) COOPÉRATION RÉGIONALE

Les pays de l'ASEAN partagent, depuis toujours, les mêmes types d'environnement naturel, les mêmes processus de métropolisation, les mêmes défis hydrauliques et les mêmes menaces climatiques. Il s'agit donc d'un intérêt partagé et des échanges d'expériences et de bonnes pratiques dans l'esprit de l'ASEAN sont donc précieux pour faire gagner du temps dans cette course de vitesse.

4.3 CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE PROTECTION OF FOREST AREAS: A REVIEW FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA

CONTEXT

Climate change is exerting a profoundly negative impact on ecosystems, agricultural production and economies [1, 2, 3]. It is likely to prolong the dry season, increase temperatures and modify the frequency of extreme events relating to rainfall and floods [4, 5]. These changes have already started undermining world food production systems, with impacts varying by region [5].

Deforestation is a major cause of climate change, resulting in the loss of land cover and triggering a reduction of evapotranspiration and cloud cover. This, in turn, contributes to changing climatic conditions. It also exacerbates global warming by adding CO2 to the atmosphere [6]. Land conversions for agriculture and commercial timber-logging are the leading causes of deforestation, as seen most noticeably in the Amazon basin and other tropical regions, including Southeast Asia [7, 8]. The change in land use patterns in the tropical region between 2000-2007, for example, contributed 14-20 percent to the level of global greenhouse gas emissions [7]. Soaring global demand for food and agricultural products has necessitated the intensification of farm production and the need for clearing still more forest for farmland [9].

Reducing deforestation and promoting afforestation are cost-efficient options to decelerate global warming and help to mitigate climate change [6, 9]. This text provides an overview of the state of tropical forests in Southeast Asia, highlighting the impact of deforestation and climate change and summarizing the policies that countries in the region are using to combat the issue.

STATE OF FOREST AREAS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Forest areas in Southeast Asia have been reduced mainly as a result of the expansion of agricultural land [10, 11]. The region has experienced a rapid agricultural transition since the Green Revolution, driven by soaring global demand for agricultural products [12], and can be seen most clearly in Southeast Asia in the surge of commercial crop production [13, 14]. The data shows a reduction in forest areas for most countries in the region, with the exception of Vietnam, Lao PDR and the Philippines, where there is an increase (Figure 1). In Lao PDR, a policy to reassign land use, reducing slash-and-burn agriculture and designating reserved forest areas, has contributed significantly to the reduction of forest clearance for farming [15].

Farmland in Thailand increased from 23 to 42 percent between 1960 and 1993, while the increase was 11 percent for Malaysia during the same period [16]. Driven by the global demand for vegetable oil and biofuel, oil palm cultivation increased exponentially in both Malaysia and Indonesia [17] between 1990 and 2007, when an estimated eight million hectares of forest were cleared to make way for the farming of these trees, with millions more reserved for future expansion [18]. Around 85 percent of the world supply of palm oil was produced in the

two countries in 2004 [13]. In 2014, land under oil palm cultivation reached 15 million hectares [19].

The decrease in the size of forest areas appears to be most significant in Cambodia, Indonesia and Myanmar from 1990 to 2016. Forest cover declined from 73 to 52 percent in Cambodia, from 65 to 49 percent in Indonesia, and from 60 to 43 percent in Myanmar. Cambodia and Indonesia have experienced the region's fastest expansion in land used for cultivation over the last two decades [16]. Apart from clearance for farming, commercial logging has been the main cause of forest degradation in Myanmar [20]. In Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar, increased investment from China together with an abundance of inexpensive forest land have driven a boom in commercial crop production, especially rubber and cassava [21, 22]. By 2050, the land used for growing rubber will quadruple, much of which will involve forest clearance [23].

IMPACT OF FOREST DEGRADATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE

As mentioned earlier, the reduction in forest areas has stimulated global warming and accelerated climate change [6]. As a result, Southeast Asia is now experiencing phenomena such as rising sea levels and more extreme weather events, particularly floods, heatwaves, droughts, forest fires and tropical cyclones. By 2100, the temperature in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam is expected to increase by 4.80C with sea levels rising by 70 centimeters [24]. The increase in temperature will trigger changes in monsoon rainfall including delayed rainy seasons and more intense monsoon flooding [25]. Since 2009, mainland Southeast Asian countries, including Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar and Lao PDR, have experienced rainfall that is lower than the long-term average, while in the Philippines, the impact of El Niño has resulted in delayed and shorter rainy seasons [24].

Figure 1: Trend of Forest Cover



Source: World Development Indicators 2018

Changing rain patterns, an increase in temperatures, and more frequent extreme weather events - such as droughts and floods - severely impact crop yields, making agriculture one of the sectors most vulnerable to climate change. Increased temperatures have been associated with a reduction in crop productivity [26, 27]. According to a recent study, rice production in the region could drop by as much as 10 percent for every 10°C increase in temperature. Under the current climate change scenario, and without adaptation and technical improvement, the study's model estimates a 50 percent drop in rice yield in the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam and a 34-75 percent drop in Indonesia by 2100 [24]. Exacerbating the problem, recent droughts in Thailand and the Philippines have triggered alarm related to water shortages for agriculture [24, 28].

Erratic rainfall, rising sea levels salinity have put the delta regions of Vietnam and Myanmar at risk of water logging, stagnant floods and soil salinity [24]. In Indonesia, floods have impacted 268,823 hectares, resulting in the loss of 1,344 million tons of rice [24]. Submergence could potentially affect 15-20 million hectares of rice fields across Southeast Asia, threatening the countries' food production and food security [24]. A 40 cm rise in sea level could potentially displace a population of 21 million who live along the coastal and delta regions of Southeast Asia. About 11 percent of Vietnam's population, for instance, would be affected if the sea level increased by one meter [29]. Many parts of Jakarta are already below sea level, while Bangkok and Manila are being threatened by a rising sea, heavy and sustained rainfall and tropical cyclones [30].

Climate change, along with dam construction along the Mekong River, has modified monsoon patterns, increasing temperatures in the basin and affecting the hydrological flow of the river and its characteristics [24, 31]. The water level in the Mekong River reached its lowest point for 60 years in 2019, according to the Mekong River Commission. A major forthcoming impact will be on the ecological productivity of the Tonle Sap Lake in Cambodia, leading to a decline of its ecosystems services [32]. Prolonged droughts, increased temperatures in the atmosphere and the change in land use are conditions conducive to another major problem - increased forest fires [33]. This has been seen, for example, in Kalimantan and Sumatra in Indonesia, where forest fires have diminished the ecological services provided by the forest including the maintenance of biodiversity, water cycling and climate regulation [33]. Climate change and increases in temperature are also likely to undermine the regeneration of some forest species such as pine and mangrove [34, 35]. Similarly, climate change can modify both the chemical and physical properties of the sea, altering the seasonality and distribution of fish stock. The impact could result in a ten percent decrease in Southeast Asia's fish catch by 2050 [36].

POLICY ON PROTECTION OF FOREST AREAS

Protection of natural forests is central to the environmental and climate change policy in most Southeast Asian nations [37]. Various legal frameworks and approaches have been implemented [38]. At the regional level, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has established two working groups - (1) on Nature Conservation and Biodiversity (AWGNCB) and (2) on Water Resources Management (AWGWRM) – both of which are part of ASEAN efforts to combat deforestation and boost afforestation and

reforestation. Apart from this, ASEAN has initiated several strategic frameworks on forest conservation and climate change, for example, the ASEAN Multi-Sectoral Framework on Climate Change, the ASEAN strategic approach to address issues in the agriculture, forestry and fisheries sectors, and the Heart of Borneo Initiative [39]. An ad hoc working group was established in 2002 to develop a pan-ASEAN timber certification scheme. [40] The Declaration on Environmental Sustainability was endorsed by ASEAN in 2007; one of its objectives was to strengthen law enforcement combatting illegal logging and the illicit trade in forest resources. The declaration gave rise to the ASEAN Regional Knowledge Network on Forest Law Enforcement and Governance.[40] Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand are currently members of the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) [37].

At the national level, Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) has been at the core of forestry policy [37]. Under SFM, a Code of Practice (COP) was developed to regulate forest management and to reduce the potential environmental and social impact of deforestation. ASEAN endorsed this COP in 2001. In 2009, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia and Myanmar produced their own COP [37]. A major reform of the forestry sector began earlier - in 1999 - for Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, then later for Cambodia and Vietnam [38]. Thailand banned forest logging in 1988. Under the Bali Declaration, similar actions against illegal logging and trading were implemented in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines [40]. Indonesia has passed several legislative provisions aiming to preserve the forest [41]. Cambodia, like some of its ASEAN neighbors, has developed a comprehensive set of biodiversity guidelines for timber concessions [37].

In response to the UNFCCC and Kyoto protocol, Southeast Asian nations have shown commitment to climate change mitigation by actively designing and implementing a number of REDD and REDD+ programs, many of which focus on forest preservation and promoting sustainable land use [42, 43, 44]. Under the National REDD+ Strategy, the Philippines, for example, has been diligently implementing forest protection mechanisms in protected areas. The program is having a strong effect in boosting the country's carbon stock, though it has blocked local people from an important source of income. Similar results can be seen in Thailand's implementation of the Protected Forest Conversion Program [44]. The Forest Protection Program in Indonesia has had a strong positive impact on both emissions reduction and local livelihoods because the incentives from forest management have been allocated to the local people [44]. Myanmar is using Community Forestry as an integral part of its forest management program [45]. In Lao PDR, successful policies have been implemented to control land use in order to reduce forest clearance for farming and to preserve the forest [15]. Cambodia has been implementing a REDD National Program since 2011 in an effort to promote sustainable forest management and to market carbon credits. The program aims to support Community Forestry and enhance the management of protected areas [46].

ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS

Despite efforts, the natural forest areas in the ASEAN region continue to decrease while the impacts of climate change are mounting. Facing these rising concerns, the role of Parliaments is vital to ensure effective law and policy implementation.

Within its oversight role, Parliaments could conduct regular meetings with relevant ministries, identifying key challenges in implementation and enforcement in order to provide timely feedback before approving laws and allocating funds.

Parliament can consider adding amendments to existing legislation and policies related to forest management by providing concrete inputs during the formulation stage, ensuring that their implementation will help address the key issues. Review of ministerial progress reports could help provide a comprehensive picture regarding the development of the sector. Other inputs and good practices could be drawn from the integration of voices from civil society and research institutions that work on climate change, forest conservation and agricultural development. Integrating these voices might also help to ensure that the issues and impacts of deforestation and climate change happening at the local level are being transmitted to the Parliament. Members of Parliament can then serve as a bridge, sharing what they learn with other national leaders. In their representative function, Parliaments might consider organizing field visits and public hearings to raise awareness among their citizens about the effects of deforestation and climate change.

ASEAN Parliaments can also work together to share good practices and lessons learned about how best to cope and adapt to the impacts of climate change. Large scale challenges like deforestation, prolonged droughts, floods, rising temperatures, and the successful implementation of the REDD and REDD+ program, are best dealt with under a multilateral framework.

4.4 FROM CLIMATE CHALLENGES TO EFFICIENT LAWS

IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN ASIA, WITH A FOCUS ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

The impact of climate change on water, food and energy differs between regions and countries for geoclimatic as well as demographic and socio-economic reasons.

Asia, particularly Southeast Asia, is, according to the United Nations, the region of the world most threatened by climate change. However, integrated initiatives at the regional level in Asia to respond to the threat seem underdeveloped, particularly in the framework of ASEAN. The Southeast Asian sub-region, with a population of more than 620 million, is well aware of the links between the climate crisis, sustainable development and human security, since four of the 10 countries in the world most affected by climate change - Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Vietnam - are ASEAN Member States [47]. These countries, like the whole of Southeast Asia, are regularly confronted by cyclones and floods. According to the United Nations an expected 70 percent of the world's population that will be most affected by sea-level rise lives in ASEAN countries [48].

ASEAN has expressed its collective concern about climate change in numerous declarations, and has adopted sector-specific action plans and regional decisions to address transboundary pollution [49] and the protection of biodiversity [50]. However, a regional plan addressing environmental issues as a whole has not yet been agreed up on by the Association. Nevertheless, it has been announced that an ASEAN strategic plan on the environment is currently being drawn up, known as the ASEAN Strategic Environmental Plan [A] [51].

This more detailed action plan is intended to serve as a guiding document for ASEAN to promote environmental cooperation among its Member States until 2025. It should be noted, however, that while the United Nations asserts that the link between water, food and energy is at the heart of sustainable development [52], and the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) refers to the water-food-energy nexus as something to always take into account when considering options for adaptating to climate change [53], this nexus does not seem to be explicitly part of the seven priorities included in the framework of this strategic plan [54]. For its part, the European Union, in collaboration with other partners, has developed an online resource that precisely illuminates this concern [55].

Climate change, quite clearly, must be addressed at the multilateral level [B]. However, while the most prominent global multilateral agreements tend to receive the most attention, there is a growing interest in the value of those that are regional and sub-regional, directing attention to the most relevant environmental issues, and applying local knowledge to inform potential solutions and increase incentives to cooperate with neighbors [54, p.35]. In some cases, such as trafficking in hazardous waste and smuggling of wildlife products, it is difficult to see how implementation can even be envisaged without regional, subregional or bilateral cooperation and information sharing [56].

However, individual States can implement strategies to mitigate the effects on their respective territories, economies and populations. As of 2017, 176 countries have adopted environmental framework laws, 150 countries have enshrined environmental protection or the right to a healthy environment in their constitutions, and 164 countries have established government-level bodies responsible for environmental protection [57, pp.4-5]. These environmental laws, rights and institutions have contributed to slowing, and in some cases reversing, environmental degradation and to achieving the public health, economic, social and human rights benefits that often accompany environmental protection [57, p.8].

Too often, however, the implementation and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations are far from sufficient to address environmental challenges. Laws sometimes lack clear standards or necessary mandates. Others are not properly adapted to national and local contexts and therefore face unforeseen challenges due to conditions on the ground. Many developing countries give priority to macroeconomic and economic development when allocating public funds and setting priorities. [C] As a result, environment ministries are under-resourced and politically weak compared with ministries responsible for economic and natural resource development [57, p.8]. While international technical and financial assistance has helped many countries to develop environmental framework laws, neither the national budget nor international assistance have been sufficient to create the strong environmental agencies needed to adequately build the capacity of agency staff and national judges in environmental law, or to create sustainable education on laws and their implementation [57, p.3].

Gaps in the implementation of environmental law are by no means limited to developing countries. Many developed countries have adopted aggressive and comprehensive environmental laws, but their implementation has stalled, according to the results of biennial reviews by European Union Member States, published in 2017 by the European Commission [D][58, p.13].

Finally, taking a comprehensive inventory of national legislation and regulations is a fool's errand as the environment is a cross-cutting issue covering multiple sectors (agriculture, urban planning, transportation, energy, consumption, food, irrigation, industry, training, etc.). Environmental law also overlaps with many forms of law and standards (from the social and customary norms of villages to the statutory laws of nations, not to mention the voluntary standards adopted by companies and organizations). It also extends across many levels of governance (from customary governance among indigenous peoples and rural populations to sub-national and national governance, regional and international government regulations). Moreover, it is often the responsibility of more than one agency or department at several levels of government.

ASIA, THE REGION MOST EXPOSED TO CLIMATE CHANGE

The list of climatic hazards to which Asian countries are exposed is long. According to the Germanwatch Global Climate Risk Index, six of the 10 countries most affected in the last 10 years were Asian (Burma, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Vietnam and Thailand). Making matters worse, many Asian metropolises are coastal cities, such as Bombay, Manila, Jakarta, Shanghai, Bangkok and Singapore. Some, such as the Indonesian

capital, are already below sea level. According to the World Bank, the expected rise in ocean waters in East and Southeast Asia would, depending on its magnitude (1 to 3 meters), affect between 37 and 90 million people, especially in Vietnam, China and Indonesia. South Asia is even more exposed, particularly Bangladesh and India.

As for the rise in temperatures, this will markedly affect South Asia. By 2050, one third of India's population could be exposed to extreme temperatures (above 35°C) for at least three months per year. Warming is expected to affect crop yields in significant proportions, particularly on the Indian subcontinent (in the order of 8 to 10 percent, depending on the type of seed). The issue of food self-sufficiency is becoming a burning issue in a region in which population growth will remain the highest in Asia.

Another type of devastating climatic hazard - typhoons - are hitting Asian coasts with increasing magnitude, particularly the Philippines, Japan, China and Indonesia. There is a growing awareness of these multiple risks, and the corresponding shifts in public opinion could lead to new and more proactive political decisions [59].

Among the world's regions suffering from water scarcity, Asia faces a lack of human, institutional and financial capital that limits access to water, despite its natural abundance. This limited access to water has severe effects on agricultural production [60, p.36]. Less than 25 percent of river water is withdrawn to meet the needs of the inhabitants, and malnutrition is rampant. In contrast, there is an increase in access to water resources in Northern Europe, Russia, and North America, which allows for higher agricultural production [60, p.36].

ASIA, THE SOURCE OF HALF THE WORLD'S GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS

Asia accounted for almost half of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2018 and two-thirds of the increase in CO2 emissions in 2017, a proportion that could continue over the next decade. Asians have made massive investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency, but their current commitments remain insufficient to reverse the trend. Additional actions, like slowing down deforestation and forest degradation in Asia, particularly in Indonesia, are also crucial to reducing global emissions [61].

The explosion in emissions is mainly due to the formidable economic catch-up process - which the region has been undergoing over the past 50 years - that is based on industry, infrastructure and exports, accompanied by an over-consumption of energy. Although per capita emissions in some Asian countries such as India and Indonesia remain well below the global average, they are still much higher than the average in developed countries in the region such as China and Malaysia [63]. Asia is, however, also a continent that is particularly exposed to the consequences of climate change, which might jeopardize future growth prospects.

Moreover, by 2100, heat could make South Asia uninhabitable, according to a recent study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), published in the journal Sciences Advances. If no action is taken to reduce greenhouse gases, "the increase in summer temperatures and humidity could reach levels exceeding the capacity of the human body to survive without protection", the scientists warn.

The countryside is more affected than the cities, even though it is the cities (with their high population concentration) that produce most of the pollution. The most intense risk of future extreme heat waves is concentrated around the densely populated agricultural regions of the Ganges and Indus basins. South Asia, a region inhabited by about one-fifth of the world's human population, faces a unique risk from unmitigated climate change due to an unprecedented combination of severe natural hazards and acute vulnerability [62].

ASIA, THE REGION WITH THE GREATEST FOOD NEEDS

It is predicted that, by 2050, the world will have about nine billion people, and, on a global scale, food will be a major problem. Today there are already 850 million people who do not receive enough for their basic needs, so food production has to increase significantly by that time [E][63].

Food needs are greatest on the Asian continent, ahead of Africa. To feed a growing population, the efficiency of agricultural practices needs to be considerably improved, both for rain-fed and irrigated agriculture, but this is not enough, as fertilizers are likely to become much more expensive (nitrates follow the price of oil and phosphate, and reserves may be depleted). However, it appears that some regions do not have enough arable land, in particular Asia and the Middle East/North Africa, with a population that represents more than half of the world's total. In Asia, 75 percent of arable land is already exploited. This scenario demands significant technological changes in order to improve efficiency (+50 percent of rain-fed and irrigated agriculture in Asia), with a controlled and limited investment in irrigation [60, p.20].

FINANCING AND PROSPECTS IN ASIA

Data from the Climate Fund Update shows that for 18 Asian countries, [64] a total of USD 4.5 billion for 453 projects and programs has been granted by 18 multilateral climate change programs and funds. However, significant amounts of funding have flowed to fast-growing economies such as India and Indonesia, mainly for mitigation, not adaptation projects. On the other hand, a number of countries with considerable climate change risks, such as Sri Lanka, have received relatively little.

In 2019, USD 749 million in new approvals were recorded, more than half of which are reserved for mitigation, mainly through the Green Climate Fund [65]. However, the Green Fund approved one adaptation project for the region and four multi-household projects in addition to these five mitigation projects, for a total of USD 619 million in 2018 [F][66].

Bilateral funding is also channeled to Asia to complement the flow of multilateral climate funds. This includes the bilateral climate funds of Australia, Germany and the United Kingdom, which are active in the region [G][66]. A Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Southeast Asia was signed between Germany and ASEAN on 2 November 2019. At the core of this common commitment is a conviction to jointly address the major global challenges - the management of globalization, climate change and trade issues.

Moreover, as Asia is home to the world's largest urban population, and its cities and towns are growing at an unprecedented pace, it is understandable that more than USD 300 million in climate finance has been approved for the region on projects to support various aspects of low-carbon and climate resilient urban development [66].

Map 3: Fossil Fuel and CO2 Emissions by Country



The challenge seems to be twofold for Asia. On the one hand, in order to comply with the Paris Accords in 2015, Asian greenhouse gas emissions need to be reduced so that the global community can contain the temperature rise to below 2°C. On the other hand, Asian countries need to develop strategies to ensure the prosperity and security of the region.

WHAT ROLE FOR PARLIAMENTS AND PARLIAMENTARIANS?

Parliaments and their members have a dual role to play. Because climate change issues go beyond national borders, it comes within their remit to put it on the agenda for discussions at the national level and for inter-parliamentary meetings. Parliaments need to, alongside the other constitutional powers, provide elements of effective responses to the challenges of climate change and water-food-energy security within their national territory.

AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL

With regard to parliamentary diplomacy at the regional level, ASEAN parliamentarians could devise a regional plan to address environmental issues as a whole. It would then fall upon them to expand their approach to consider the water-food-energy nexus when shaping this ASEAN strategic vision. The benefits of establishing an effective plan is evident, as Asia is the region most exposed to climate change.

From an inter-regional point of view, dialogue between regional organizations (ASEAN, EU, etc.), in particular between regional parliamentary organizations (AIPA, European Parliament, etc.), as well those during inter-parliamentary meetings organized in preparation for inter-regional summits (such as ASEP), are crucial moments for exchange that can be used to advance inter-regional solidarity agreements. In these settings, fresh solutions can emerge. For example, Europe could help Asia to address its agricultural production deficit and food needs by providing technological support in the agri-food sector, and Asia, in turn, could emit less greenhouse gases, which is a major priority for the EU.

AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

While climate change is clearly a global challenge, the approaches taken by each country's Parliament need not be the same. Today, funding coming to Asia from Europe tends to support efforts towards mitigation over adaptation. Asian parliaments should not overlook policy options that consider adaptation intended to solve problems in a sustainable manner, taking into account their own particular circumstances.

At the moment, laws sometimes lack clear standards or necessary mandates or are not suitably adapted to the challenges on the ground. This can have considerable consequence insofar as the environment is a cross-cutting issue covering multiple sectors (agriculture, urban planning, transport, energy, consumption, food, irrigation, industry, training, etc.).

The effects of a changing climate are vast, and so the implementation and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations are often insufficient to address environmental challenges. Budgetary constraints are a constant, and so trade-offs are always necessary. Therefore Parliamentarians in their function of representation, law-making (passing new laws after a proper impact assessment or amending laws to adjust them) and oversight have a crucial role in ensuring solutions are effectively designed and implemented to bring maximum benefit to those being affected by climate change.

Map 4: Climate Change Risk Levels



Rank	Country	Category
1	Bangladesh	Extreme
2	Sierra Leone	Extreme
3	South Sudan	Extreme
3	Nigeria	Extreme
5	Chad	Extreme
6	Haiti	Extreme
7	Ethiopia	Extreme
8	Philippines	Extreme
9	C.A.R.	Extreme
9	Eritrea	Extreme

Source: Maplecroft 2014

4.5 EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY: CHALLENGES IN DIVERSIFYING AND DECARBONIZING THE ENERGY FUEL MIX

THE ENERGY MIX

The term "energy security" embraces a wide range of issues. These include global climate change, the finite nature of fossil fuels and the anxieties surrounding the production of nuclear energy. Additional challenges arise from disruptions of the energy supply, particularly when used as a weapon, and the high costs of energy imports. While the focus has traditionally been on supply, the demand for energy must also be considered, especially given the emergence of energy "prosumers" who both consume and produce.

After China and the USA, the European Union has the third largest gross domestic energy consumption worldwide and faces numerous policy challenges regarding its future energy supply. These include the changing energy market and energy demand structures, as well as the diversification and decarbonization of the energy fuel mix towards a cleaner and more sustainable energy system. New technology is also needed to help to address changing economic, social and demographic development, for ways to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and to dispose of nuclear waste.

The energy mix of the 28 EU countries [H] is dominated by oil and gas. Since 1980, Europe has not been self-sufficient in the supply of crude oil. The picture has been similar in the natural gas sector since the mid-1990s. In 2017, the EU's energy import dependency reached 55.1 percent (natural gas, coal and oil combined). The countries of origin for imports has changed in recent years, but Russia has maintained its position as lead supplier of crude oil and natural gas, and is now also the main provider of solid fuels. However, since 2004, new partner countries have emerged, in the first instance from the Caspian region.

The EU's energy supply security has become a major geopolitical and geo-economic issue. Crucial to European energy supply security, outside actors such as Russia, China and the United States are also eyeing the region with geopolitical interest. The region's potential is huge once it is integrated into the world market, yet its historic path has greatly hindered an easy transition.

The EU has agreed to a comprehensive update of its energy policy framework to facilitate the transition away from fossil fuels towards cleaner energy and to deliver on its Paris Agreement commitments for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

Production of primary energy, or energy in its natural and un-engineered form, in the EU totaled 758 Mtoe [I] in 2017. When viewed over a longer period, this production was 12.1 percent lower in 2017 than it had been a decade earlier. The highest level of primary energy production among the then EU Member States was in France (17.4 percent), followed by the United Kingdom (15.6 percent) and Germany (15.3 percent).

Primary energy production in the EU-28 is spread across a range of different energy sources. In terms of the size of its contribution, the most important are from renewable energy sources, with 29.9 percent of the EU-28's total production in 2017.

Nuclear heat was second at 27.8 percent of total primary energy production. In France it accounted for almost 79 percent of the national production of primary energy. In Belgium and in Slovakia the share was more than half, and in 11 other Member States nuclear heat was less than half of the total primary energy production. In 14 EU Member States there is no nuclear energy production.

The 2017 share of solid fossil fuels was 16.4 percent and the share of natural gas was 13.6 percent. The crude oil share was 8.8 percent.

Renewable energy sources had a relatively uniform growth rate during the period 2007-2017 and exceeded the growth of all other energy types combined. The production of renewables increased by 65.6 percent during this period. The production levels for the other primary sources fell. For example nuclear energy production dropped by 12.8 percent.

ENERGY DEPENDENCE

The downturn in the primary production of energy has led to a situation where the EU has become increasingly reliant on imports of primary energy, and on secondary derived products (e.g. gas/diesel oil). The EU-28's imports of energy exceeded exports by 948 Mtoe in 2017. The largest net importers in absolute terms were Germany, Italy, France and Spain. In the past, Denmark and the United Kingdom were both net exporters of energy, but today no EU Member State can make this claim. Since 2013, when Danish energy imports first began to exceed exports, all EU Member States have been net importers of energy. Relative to population size, the leading net importers in 2017 were Luxemburg, Malta and Belgium.

The main origins of EU energy imports have changed to some extent. Russia maintained the position as the leading supplier of primary energy to the EU throughout the period 2007-2017, and that country was the principal supplier of crude oil in 2017 with a share of 30.3 percent. The second largest supplier was Norway (11.4 percent). Crude oil supplied from Iraq and Kazakhstan increased significantly, reaching 8.2 and 7.4 percent, respectively, becoming the EU's third and fourth largest suppliers, surpassing Saudi Arabia.

EU imports of natural gas came from Russia (38.7 percent) and Norway (25.3 percent). The share of the third largest supplier, Algeria (10.6 percent), has declined since 2007, while the share from Qatar has more than doubled (5.2 percent).

In 2017 the main share of the EU's hard coal imports came from Russia (38.9 percent). The second largest supplier was Columbia (16.9 percent). The United States became the third largest supplier in 2017 with 16.9.

The security of the EU's primary energy supply is jeopardized because the imports are concentrated among just a few partners. Nearly three quarters (74.6 percent) of the EU-28's imports of natural gas came from Russia, Norway and Algeria, and 72.7 percent of hard coal imports originated from Russia, Columbia and the United States. Imports of crude oil were less concentrated among the main suppliers Russia, Norway and Iraq (49.9 percent in total).

EU dependency on energy imports increased from 44 percent in 1990 to 55.1 percent in 2017, the highest level to date. Since 2004, net imports of energy have been larger than the primary energy

production of the EU. Looking in more detail, 2017 saw the highest rates yet recorded for crude oil (86.7 percent) and natural gas (74.3 percent). The rate for solid fossil fuels reached 43.9 percent.

ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES

More than half of the EU-28's energy comes from countries outside of the EU, and the share has been rising over the last decade. The main share of imported energy comes from Russia, whose disputes with transit countries has led to disrupted supply in recent years. Concerns about the security of supply were further heightened by the conflict involving Russia and Ukraine. New pipelines to secure additional supply are Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2. The Nord Stream pipelines go from Russia via the Baltic Sea – avoiding transit - to the EU. The Trans Adriatic Pipeline is connecting Turkey with Italy through Greece and Albania, bringing gas from the Caspian Sea region to the EU. And new measures for oil and gas markets were designed to prevent disruptions of supply.

The regional geopolitical complexities, resulting from the competing interests of actors, hinder a smooth integration of the South Caucasus and the Caspian region into the world market. The region's dependence on transit countries for the marketing of hydrocarbon production leads to the question whether political factors even allow a diversification of the transport routes and a production increase. At the beginning of the 1990s, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan understood that their considerable hydrocarbon deposits could be a good basis for their future competitiveness in a world where growth still depends on the supply of fossil fuels.

The Energy Community was set in motion in October 2005, integrating neighboring countries into the internal energy market. A broad mix of energy sources and diversity of suppliers, transport routes and mechanisms plays a role in securing a supply of energy. In May 2014 the European Commission released its Energy Security Strategy which aims to ensure a stable and ample energy supply.

Beside the supply side view on energy security, demand side measures, e.g. energy saving and energy efficiency, play a decisive role for the EU's Energy Security Strategy.

The 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU) established a set of binding measures to help the EU reach its 20 percent energy efficiency target by 2020. This means that overall EU energy consumption should be no more than 1,483 Mtoe of primary energy or 1,086 Mtoe of final energy. Under the directive, all EU countries are required to use energy more efficiently at all stages of the energy chain, including energy generation, transmission, distribution and end-use consumption.

In the context of the 2012 directive, several important measures have been adopted throughout the EU to improve energy efficiency in Europe, including:

- an annual reduction of 1.5 percent in national energy sales
- energy efficient renovations to be made by EU countries to at least 3 percent per year of buildings owned and occupied by central governments
- national long-term renovation strategies for the building stock in each EU country
- mandatory energy efficiency certificates accompanying the sale and rental of buildings

- the preparation of national energy efficiency action plans (NEEAPs) every three years
- minimum energy efficiency standards and labelling for a variety of products such as boilers, household appliances, lighting and televisions (energy label and eco-design)
- the planned rollout of close to 200 million smart meters for electricity and 45 million for gas by 2020
- obligation schemes for energy companies to achieve yearly energy savings of 1.5 percent of annual sales to final consumers
- energy audits to be conducted by large companies at least every four years
- protecting the rights of consumers to receive easy and free access to data on real-time and historical energy consumption.

The Commission also published guidelines on good practice in the field of energy efficiency. The completion of this new energy rulebook – called the 'Clean energy for all Europeans package' - marks a significant step towards the implementation of the energy union strategy, adopted in 2015.

The changes will bring considerable benefits from consumer, environmental, and economic perspectives. It also underlines EU leadership in tackling global warming and provides an important contribution to the EU's long-term strategy of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050.

Buildings are responsible for approximately 40 percent of energy consumption and 36 percent of CO2 emissions in the EU, making them the single largest energy consumer in Europe. By improving energy performance in buildings, the EU can more readily achieve its energy and climate goals. The energy performance in buildings directive (EPBD) outlines specific measures for the building sector to tackle challenges, updating and amending many provisions from the 2010 EPBD.

Putting energy efficiency first is a key objective in the package, as energy savings are the easiest way for consumers to save money and for greenhouse gas emissions to be reduced. The EU has therefore set binding targets of at least 32.5 percent energy efficiency by 2030, relative to a 'business as usual' scenario. The amending directive on energy efficiency has been in place since December 2018.

To meet the EU's energy and climate targets for 2030, EU Member States need to establish a 10-year integrated national energy and climate plan (NECP) for the period from 2021 to 2030. The NECPs were introduced by the Regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action (EU/2018/1999). The national plans outline how the EU Member States intend to address:

- energy efficiency
- renewables
- emissions reductions
- interconnections
- research and innovation.

This approach requires a coordination of purpose across all government departments. It also provides a level of planning that will ease public and private investment. The fact that all EU Member States are using a similar template means that they can work together to make efficiency gains across borders.

In the face of the 21st century's global energy challenges, the EU is leading the clean energy transition, striving for a more secure, competitive and sustainable energy system which will address the

existential challenge of our time - climate change. By setting ambitious energy and climate targets for 2030, the EU is giving a clear sense of direction; in addition to these targets, it provides a stable legal framework to foster the necessary investment. But this is not the end of the road: with its 2050 long-term climate neutrality strategy, the EU is also looking further ahead than 2030 and setting the foundations for what a cleaner planet will look like by the middle of the century and beyond.



Dukovany solar and nuclear power facility in Czech Republic
Martin Lisner

4.6 THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE CHALLENGES OF CLIMATE CHANGE: A REGULATORY SUPERPOWER

There is no longer any doubt among scientists that the world's climate is changing. To contain the rise in global temperatures this century below two degrees Celsius from pre-industrial levels, world carbon emissions must fall by 25 percent by 2030. Alarmingly, figures show that carbon emissions grew by 1.5 percent in 2017 and 2018 [67]. Coordinated global action is needed.

THE EU TRACK RECORD

Over the last few years, the European Union has become a global leader in the fight against climate change. Some major recent actions include:

- the Paris agreement adopted during the UN Climate Change Conference (COP) 21, a major political step whereby countries committed to reduce emissions in an effort to keep below a two degree global temperature increase,
- the UN Climate Change Conference, or Conference of the Parties (COP) 23 in Bonn (Germany, 2017), COP 24 in Katowice (Poland, 2018), COP 25 in Madrid (Spain, 2019) and COP 26 in Glasgow (UK, 2020).

Accordingly, the EU has had success in decreasing greenhouse gas emissions while still maintaining a healthy rate of economic growth [68].

The EU is aware that tackling climate change will require an unprecedented collective political effort: the investment needed to limit the rise in temperatures to two degrees is considerable. For its part, the EU has been able the get the Emissions Trading Scheme working again after a decade of under-pricing carbon, and has been relatively successful at reducing emissions from electricity generation. But decarbonising transport, buildings and agriculture will be much harder, and many believed that it can only be done through a carbon tax that penalizes all forms of emissions. Political consent

Figure 1: Between 1990 and 2018, greenhouse gas emissions decreased by 23% while the economy grew by 61%



Figure 2: Targets to fulfill EU's commitments under the Paris Agreement



The EU is the only major economy of the world to have put in place legislation covering all sectors of the economy to cut greenhouse gas emissions, in line with the Paris Agreement.

can only be achieved if revenues from a carbon tax are distributed effectively and fairly. Some participants believe that the EU should impose penalties on carbon-intensive imports from the rest of the world to compel global action.

THE CHALLENGES OF CONSENSUS

As observed during COP 25 in Madrid, the fight against climate change faces a major threat from the US commitment to withdraw from the Paris Agreement in 2020. Another major impediment to a comprehensive solution to the climate crisis has been the failure to reach a consensus on new rules governing carbon trading. Obstacles include the disinterest of China and the US, and the resistance of countries like Brazil and Australia to an outcome they consider overly robust.

The Paris Agreement operates by consensus, which is a task made more complicated by fraying multilateralism and increased US opposition. Reflecting on these difficulties, UN Secretary-General António Guterres observed at the close of COP 25 that, "The international community lost an important opportunity to show increased ambition on mitigation, adaptation and finance to tackle the climate crisis". The EU delegation said it was disappointed by the lack of agreement on carbon markets, and that it was "deeply concerned" that countries' existing climate targets were far off track from what was needed to achieve the goals of the Paris accord [69].

THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL

The European Green Deal (EGD) was presented on Wednesday, 11 December 2019 in Brussels by the European Commission before the COP 25 meeting [68] . The plan is ambitious and necessary. With it, Europe takes a leading position in the urgent fight against climate change, a sweeping step to meet its objective of no net emissions of greenhouse gases by

2050 [69]. As yet, no other advanced economy has acted in such bold fashion to face climate challenges. Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission's president, likened the mission to "Europe's man on the moon moment" [69].

The main objective of the EGD is to achieve carbon neutrality within three decades. This means rethinking policies on clean energy, industry, infrastructure and transport, food and farming [69]. All available policy instruments will need to be deployed and substantial public and private finances tapped "to shift to a model where economic growth is decoupled from resource use" [69]. Details, deadlines and policies are yet to be decided, although Brussels planned to introduce legislation in March 2020 to enshrine the 2050 target [69]. The EGD will be financed using a mix of public funds, private contributions and loans totalling between €180 billion and €300 billion annually [69]. The EU will piece together a fund worth €100 billion over several years to help coal-dependent and heavily industrial former communist countries to adapt, but Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, while generally supportive, are said to be counting on further benefits from the next multiyear EU budget before giving their full backing [69].

Looking in more detail at how aspirations of the Green Deal could be met, the EU will likely need to set tougher environmental standards over a broad range of categories, from auto emissions, car batteries and recyclable packaging to financial products [69]. But the fact that the burden of emissions reduction will also fall on the EU's trading partners might not go down too well. Brussels is said to be extending its emissions trading system to shipping and aviation, drawing up plans in 2021 for a "carbon adjustment mechanism to ensure the cost of imports reflects their carbon input", amounting to a levy on imports from countries that are failing to do their bit [69].

FOOTNOTES

A. At the last ASEAN summit in Bangkok (November 2019), only a few sessions and a lunch were dedicated to the fight against global warming, in the shadow of discussions around the Free Trade Treaty (RCEP). Announcements were made, but deemed insufficient by environmental protection associations.

B. Il existe aujourd'hui, à l'échelle mondiale, de nombreux accords internationaux sur l'environnement : plus de 1 100 accords multilatéraux et plus de 1 500 accords bilatéraux.

C. There is often a perception that environmental rules will slow down or impede development, with too little consideration of the ways in which environmental rules contribute to sustainable development over the long term. As a result, environmental ministries are often marginalized and underfunded.

D. In particular, the review found that Member States suffered from: ineffective coordination between local, regional and national authorities; a lack of administrative capacity and funding; a lack of knowledge and data; insufficient compliance assurance mechanisms; and a lack of policy integration and coherence.

E. Le tableau 6 donne l'augmentation nécessaire de la production alimentaire en tenant compte des changements anticipés des régimes alimentaires (voir Tableau 10) et de la distribution des âges dans la population.

F. India, Indonesia, Vietnam and China have received 58% of approved funding for Asia since 2003 (Chart 2). There are also 15 regional and multi-country projects that account for 2.2% of total approved funds. Most of the mitigation funds support large-scale projects in the areas of renewable energy, energy efficiency and transport. The CTF, Green Fund, GEF and SREP are the largest donors for mitigation in the region. They have approved USD 2.8 billion for mitigation projects since 2003. While adaptation projects and programs in the region receive only about one-third of the amount of mitigation funding, the largest amounts for adaptation projects are provided by the Pilot Program on Climate Resilience (PPCR) to support programs in Bangladesh, Cambodia and Nepal with a total approved amount of USD 269 million and the Least Developed Countries Fund with a total approved amount of USD 204 million.

G. En 2014, la dernière année durant laquelle le CFU a été en mesure de suivre les fonds climatiques bilatéraux, ces flux bilatéraux cumulés vers l'Asie depuis 2008 comprenaient 263 millions US$ de l'Initiative climatique Internationale de l'Allemagne, 130 millions US$ de l'Initiative internationale climatique et forestière de l'Australie et 109 millions de USD du Fonds internationale climatique du Royaume-Uni.

H. Because this article (chapter 4.5) primarily relies on data from 2019 and earlier, the United Kingdom is included in figures when discussing the European Union.

I. Millions of tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) is a unit of energy used to describe the energy content of all fuels, typically on a very large scale. It is equal to 4.1868x1016 Joules, or 41.868 petajoules which is a tremendous amount of energy.

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" IN ESSENCE, PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY

PERSPECTIVES FROM ASIA

THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY

Inter-parliamentary meetings organized in preparation for inter-regional summits (such as ASEP), are crucial moments for exchange that can be used to advance inter-regional solidarity agreements. In these settings, fresh solutions can emerge.

ASEAN Parliaments can also work together to share good practices and lessons learned about how best to cope and adapt to the impacts of climate change.

THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS

Those in Parliament who deal especially in foreign affairs can invite leaders of government ministries and state agencies to give briefings and address probing questions on the international issues, foreign affairs, and trade policies that affect their citizens.

As democratization of opinion rises thanks to the ever-presence of information and communication technology (ICT), Members of Parliament are compelled to communicate with their constituents more effectively to meet the rising expectations of the people.

Parliamentary outreach and media workshops could also be used at the local level to explain the importance of a rules-based trade system to the public.

To be proactive, Asian Parliaments must strengthen these traditional roles through capacity building in order to control and shape the regional security environment to the greatest extent possible, rather than merely responding to challenges when they arise.

Within its oversight role, Parliaments could conduct regular meetings with relevant ministries, identifying key challenges in implementation and enforcement in order to provide timely feedback before approving laws and allocating funds.

Today, funding coming to Asia from Europe tends to support efforts towards [climate] mitigation over adaptation. Asian Parliaments should not overlook policy options that consider adaptation intended to solve problems in a sustainable manner, taking into account their own particular circumstances.

IS A DIPLOMACY OF INFLUENCE."

PERSPECTIVES FROM EUROPE

THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY

Legislators play an important role in the decision-making process at the national level. Likewise, they must become key actors in regional structures where more and more significant decisions are being made.

Global and regional parliamentary assemblies such as ASEP must be empowered to hold those forums accountable and add legitimacy to their decisions.

Through a variety of networks, Parliamentarians may communicate messages and promote more subtly the national interest of their respective states. For that reason, parliamentary diplomacy should be the preferred instrument to deal with environmental security issues.

THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS

The more diverse the representation, the more effective Parliaments will be in reaching out to populations and in developing consensual approaches to foreign policy.

To promote [subsidence] adaptation and mitigation strategies, Parliaments can act by bringing forward legislation, raising public awareness, monitoring the effective implementation of laws, and cooperating regionally.

In order to safeguard the democratic oversight of military forces and the use of military force, Parliamentarians must be part of the strategic planning process.

Parliaments have a responsibility of their own in the framing of the security architecture in Asia. It is, first of all, their role to ensure that agreements signed by governments are in compliance with national interests and international engagements. They also have a role of control and oversight over foreign and security policies conducted by governments through their foreign affairs and defense committees.

[Parliaments] can be powerful instruments for governments to resist the centrifugal pressures that Asia is currently experiencing. As such they can contribute significantly to regional and global security.

Ad hoc parliamentary committees should carry out annual audits and inspections assessing the degree to which [climate] laws have been implemented."

PART 2

PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY IN THE ASEAN CONTEXT



INTRODUCTION

The Regional Atlas on Parliamentary Diplomacy in the ASEAN Context illustrates, and examines, the changing role and processes of parliamentary diplomacy in the ASEAN region. A teaching tool and platform for the ongoing exchange of knowledge and information, this atlas reflects the shared goals of the two institutions responsible for its creation, the Parliamentary Institute of Cambodia (PIC) and the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly Secretariat (AIPA).

Parliamentary diplomacy has become, in recent years, an increasingly important instrument to facilitate international cooperation and problem solving. Working as a complement to the executive branch, where the work of international diplomacy has traditionally taken place, diplomacy by Parliaments, or the legislative branch, is gradually becoming an indispensable tool to help address regional and global challenges. Such challenges, like realizing the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 and meeting the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDGs), require a coordinated and collective response.

The hub of the inter-parliamentary communication necessary to confront the issues facing Southeast Asia is the AIPA Secretariat, which helps to coordinate the collective work of Parliaments from ASEAN Member States. These nations, though diverse, share common interests linked by ties of history, culture and economics. AIPA establishes a meeting place for Parliamentarians from these countries to work together on behalf of the Peoples of ASEAN to address issues of common concern.

Just as Parliaments are embracing changing methods of regional collaboration, the mandate of the PIC includes not only helping to improve the capacity of the Cambodian Parliament, but also the sharing of knowledge and expertise with Parliaments across ASEAN and beyond. It follows that PIC and the AIPA Secretariat have a fruitful history of collaboration, because inter-parliamentary organizations can succeed only if Member State Parliaments have personnel who are highly competent with respect to a range of issues. With this in mind, PIC, with the AIPA Secretariat, has taken an initiative to create a new “Regional Program on Parliamentary Diplomacy”, launched in 2019. This joint undertaking requires a fresh look at the ASEAN region and the expanding responsibility of Parliaments, and so we have produced this atlas.

Its predecessor, released in 2017, was entitled “The Geopolitical Atlas of Cambodia in Asia and in the World”. It was produced in response to a special request from the Secretary General of the Senate of Cambodia, who wanted help preparing parliamentary staff to better support MPs to engage in parliamentary diplomacy as defined in the Cambodian Constitution.

In this context, PIC, an independent and nonpartisan institute originally founded to help strengthen the Cambodian Parliament through the capacity development of its staff and members, created “The National Program on Parliamentary Diplomacy”. As a reference tool for parliamentary staff fellows, those working in Parliament, and anyone interested in Cambodia and its place in the world, PIC authored its first atlas.

The purpose of these atlases are twofold – to serve as a pedagogical tool for the Programs on Parliamentary Diplomacy, and as a reference document providing information to Parliamentarians and Parliamentary staff from AIPA Member States. Under the scientific direction of Michel Foucher, geographer, diplomat and essayist, and with contributions from experts from across the region, "The Regional Atlas on Parliamentary Diplomacy in the ASEAN Context" starts with an examination of the geography and geopolitics of Southeast Asia. It next turns to the establishment of ASEAN, including the foreign policy of its Members and the organization's changing place in the world. The volume surveys the variety of parliamentary systems and structures among AIPA Member States, followed by the history and current trends of parliamentary diplomacy, including its major institutions. Finally, the atlas gives an overview of transnational issues in the region.

The Regional Atlas on Parliamentary Diplomacy in the ASEAN Context strives to be a living atlas, continually updated online and periodically in print, making it a valuable reference document and a vehicle for ongoing collaboration. Because accessing up-to-date information is not always an easy task, working together is the best approach. Accordingly, we kindly ask for the assistance of leaders, experts and informed readers to share relevant knowledge that will be included in future updates of the atlas. To all those who contribute their time and expertise to the creation of this regularly updated, living atlas, we offer our sincere appreciation. Together we hope it will remain a useful resource for parliamentary staff fellows, those working within AIPA Member Parliaments, and to anyone interested in the role of parliamentary diplomacy and the ASEAN region more generally.

To help PIC and the AIPA Secretariat provide an atlas that is always current and relevant, kindly send all comments and contributions to digital.atlas@pic.org.kh.

Dararith KIM YEAT
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF PIC

Isra SUNTHORNVUT
SECRETARY GENERAL OF AIPA

The farming of rice, a primary food source in all ASEAN Member States, remains an important part of the regional economy
Agus Sudharnoko

CHAPTER

05

THE ASEAN CONTEXT

Contributors: H.E. Yiseang CHHIV, Michel FOUCHER, PERIOWSAMY Otharam

5.1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE ASEAN REGION: GEOGRAPHY AND GEOPOLITICS

Southeast Asia currently has 647 million inhabitants, and this is scheduled to rise to 839 million by 2050, when it will represent 8.5 percent of the world's population, as it does now.

From a global perspective, Southeast Asia's geography is both a significant asset and a potential risk. It is one of the world's major isthmuses, lying between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, which means that the region, with its 4.4 million square kilometers of continent, islands and peninsulas, is also an important maritime player. Seaways are the main driver of economic globalization – 90 percent of world trade is conducted by sea – and the on-going third industrial and technological revolution relies on a vast network of interconnecting underwater cables stretching around the globe: Southeast Asia is one of the network's major crossing points. There is a real geographical continuity between the States, which benefits all as every country, apart from Lao PDR, has access to the sea. Three have discontinuous national territory. The inland seas are calmer than the oceans, and this has resulted in a number of active ports. The maritime and island part of Asia is more unified than the continental part. Merchants have plied its waters for centuries, connecting the region to global trade. They encouraged the propagation of Buddhism as early as the 3rd century, followed by Islam from the 13th century. The colonial era consolidated the domination of coastal areas, which include international trade routes (Malacca and Luzon) and two major centers, Singapore and, further north, Hong Kong. The Strait of Malacca is a 800 kilometer corridor taken by 70,000 ships each year – one half of world

> *"There is a real geographical continuity between the States, which benefits all as every country, apart from Lao PDR, has access to the sea."*

trade. The ocean's riches are essential to the regional economy, supplying oil, gas and fish stocks that depend on the range of natural habitats (trenches, platforms, river systems and mangroves). Caravan routes once had the same structuring role in continental Southeast Asia, especially the one between Kunming, Bangkok and Mawlamyine, and the route leading from the Red River Delta to the kingdoms of the Mekong valley. These flows were disrupted during the colonial era and in the ensuing territorial divisions (Lao PDR and Vietnam).

Southeast Asia is made up of both peninsular continental states and archipelagic states, which history and geography have contrived to place between the Chinese and the Indian worlds. It comprises 11 States in all, and they form what the French geographer

> *"The maritime and island part of Asia is more unified than the continental part. Merchants have plied its waters for centuries, connecting the region to global trade."*

Map 5: Independence, History and Population

© Pascal Orcier, 2016.

COUNTRY	Area (thousands of km²)	Population mid-2017 (millions of inhab.)	Birth Rate (per 1,000 inhab.)	Death Rate (per 1,000 inhab.)	Population in 2050 (millions)	Infant mortality Rate (per 1,000 inhab.)	Total fertility Rate (per 1,000 inhab.)	Under 15 (%)	+ 65 (%)	Life expectancy for men (years)	Life expectancy for women (years)	GDP per cap in 2016 (US$)
SOUTH EAST ASIA	4,495	644	18	7	789	23	23	27	6	68	73	11,349
Brunei	6	0.43	16	4	0.54	6	6	24	4	75	79	83,250
Cambodia	181	15.9	24	6	22	25	25	32	4	66	71	3,510
Indonesia	1,905	264	19	7	322	23	23	28	5	67	71	11,220
Laos	237	7	24	7	9	43	43	34	4	65	68	5,920
Malaysia	330	31.6	17	5	42	7	7	25	6	73	77	26,900
Myanmar	677	53.4	18	8	62	52	52	28	5	64	69	6,010*
Philippines	300	105	23	7	151	21	21	32	5	66	73	9,400
Singapore	0.7	5.7	9	5	7	2	2	15	12	81	85	85,050
Thailand	513	66.1	11	8	63	10	10	18	11	72	79	16,070
Timor Leste	15	1.3	38	10	2.4	39	39	44	3	67	70	4,340
Vietnam	332	93.7	16	7	108	15	15	24	8	71	76	6,050

Source: G. Pison, "The Population of the World (2017)," The French Institute for Demographic Studies, 2017.
* IMF, "Asia Development Outlook," 2018. [Online]. Available: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gnp.pcap.pp.cd. [Accessed Feb 2019].

Elisée Reclus has called an "angle of Asia" – a crossroads and an interface between two great cultures.

From India the region has inherited scripts and vocabularies derived from Sanskrit, epic tales, "Smaller Vehicle" *(Hinayana)* Buddhism, a passageway from Islam into the Malay-speaking world, and numerous architectural traits. China disseminated its influence from north to south along the coasts and seaways, bringing Chinese novels and significant diasporas. Major empires and ancient States, followed by colonial constructs, have left an enduring legacy that includes Angkor, Borobudur and Bagan, cities, new States (the Federation of Malaya and Singapore) and, of course, present-day borders.

States formed here at a very early stage, building their capitals on the major alluvial plains, which are also the main centers of population and rice production. These central regions have remained remarkably constant (with a few exceptions such as Pagan and Angkor), and throughout the region the States are strong and centralized. Due to their history, Southeast Asian States are very attached to their national sovereignty and this has been an asset for their development policies.

Southeast Asia was dominated by the European imperial powers, from the Spaniards' capture of Manila in 1571 to the Portuguese withdrawal from Macau in 1999. All the European empires – British, French, Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese – grew from the same logic of commercially exploiting Asia's natural resources, starting with spices. Colonization was driven by private companies and their spice "factories". Then, in the late 19th century, the European states divided up Asia into spheres of influence and started to administer them more directly. Siam alone saw its neutrality safeguarded by a Franco-British agreement (1896). Japan carved out an Asian empire for itself between 1942 and its defeat in 1945, which ushered in a gradual process of decolonization.

> *"Major empires and ancient States, followed by colonial constructs, have left an enduring legacy"*

The current geopolitical map is the result of a long series of pre-colonial and colonial developments. Each of the region's nation States arose in its present configuration at the end of the colonial era (Singapore and Brunei being ports and trading posts on the straits and an important sea route, respectively). This long history must continue to inform foreign policy, as should an awareness of the region's geography.

> *"Southeast Asian States are very attached to their national sovereignty and this has been an asset for their development policies."*

5.2 ACCESSION OF MEMBER STATES TO THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN)

Map 6: ASEAN Regional Integration (1967-2018)



1967: Bangkok Declaration (issued at the height of the Vietnam War by the five original ASEAN member countries: Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore)

1976: First ASEAN Summit in Bali

1977: ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization (AIPO) formed

1978: First ASEAN-EEC (European Economic Community) ministerial meeting in Brussels

1984: Brunei joins ASEAN

1994: ASEAN establishes the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which is focused on security interdependence in the Asia-Pacific region. Besides ASEAN member States, the present participants include Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Russian Federation and the United States

1997: First meeting of ASEAN Plus Three, comprising leaders of the 10 ASEAN members and their counterparts from East Asia — China, Japan and South Korea

1997: First ASEAN-China Summit convenes in Malaysia

1995: Vietnam joins ASEAN

1997: Lao PDR and Myanmar join ASEAN

1999: Cambodia joins ASEAN

2003: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)

2005: First meeting of the ASEAN Plus Six, also called the East Asia Summit, comprising the ASEAN countries plus China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand

2005: AIPO begins transformation to ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA)

2007: ASEAN signs a charter giving its 10 member States a legal identity, a first step towards its aim of a free trade area by 2015

2015: The ASEAN Community is launched as an entity anchored on three community pillars: Political-Security Community (APSC), Economic Community (AEC), and Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) [A]

2015: The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint 2025: measures to guide the next phase of ASEAN economic integration from 2016 to 2025

2016: ASEAN leaders adopted the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025.

ASEAN, whose headquarters are located in Jakarta, works by consensus among its Member States with a presidency that rotates on a yearly basis. After Singapore in 2018, Thailand is holding the chair in 2019 and will be followed by Vietnam in 2020.

5.3 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF ASEAN MEMBER STATES

The present political map is derived from a long precolonial and colonial evolution. Each of the nation States in its present configuration was shaped during the colonial times, the long duration of which remains as a fundamental of foreign relations. The most recent and common factor is clearly the rise of China as a strong regional power which is putting the cohesion of ASEAN into question.

BRUNEI

Brunei had traditionally close links with Malaysia and Singapore, the USA and the UK, as well as with Saudi Arabia. Relations with China are paramount (China is the primary investor in Brunei, and the second largest donor after Singapore, which cooperates in defense affairs). Viewed from Beijing, Brunei constitutes a strategic location along the maritime lanes between the South China Sea and the Malayan straits (and China has been involved in equipping harbors and naval facilities). Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah paid his fifth official visit to China in 2017. In November 2018, during the visit of President Xi Jinping to Brunei, the two countries agreed to upgrade their relations to a 'strategic cooperative partnership'.

CAMBODIA

One of the primary objectives of Cambodia's Foreign Policy is to protect national independence and sovereignty. To realize this objective, Cambodia's foreign policy has been tailored in a way that effectively responds to the region's increasing geopolitical complexity and unpredictability, utilizing a delicate hedging and diversification strategy. Building internal strength and making international friends have enabled the Kingdom to enjoy a durable peace and sustained socio-economic development. Cambodia has established diplomatic relations with 172 countries around the world, among which the Kingdom has concluded two strategic partnerships, with China in 2010 and Japan in 2013. Cambodia also actively participates in multilateral institutions such as ASEAN and the UN.

As a small and open economy, Cambodia relentlessly supports an open, inclusive and rules-based international system, while staying vigilant against risks deriving from geopolitical rivalries between major powers. To avoid being trapped into these mounting rivalries, the Kingdom firmly adheres to the principle of permanent neutrality. This neutrality cannot be, however, construed as a passive policy. Cambodia endeavours to be a contributor to world peace. Under the peace diplomacy pillar, Cambodia has proactively sent its troops to participate in United Nations peacekeeping missions worldwide. Since 2006, approximately 6,000 Cambodian peacekeepers have been deployed in eight countries in Africa and the Middle East under the United Nations' umbrella. Moreover, Cambodia was the key initiator of the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Mine Action Centre.

INDONESIA

Indonesia represents more than a third of the ASEAN population and 40 percent of its GDP. The ASEAN General Secretariat is based in Jakarta, whose first priority in foreign policy is to maintain the unity and centrality of ASEAN. In common with other members, Indonesia has had to define the degree of cooperation with China that it is comfortable with (given that China is its main economic partner) and that country's One Belt One Road program, launched by president Xi in Jakarta (2013). President Joko Jokowi Widodo expressed a determination to make Indonesia a "Global Maritime Fulcrum" (2017) in order to ensure the cohesion of its archipelagic country (wawasan nusantara, archipelagic vision), with a dimension of defense and cooperation with close neighbors. Indonesia is trying to diversify its foreign relations with India (through the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). And it is active with Australia, Singapore and the USA in anti-terrorist cooperation. Singapore and Indonesia show the same interest in the security of the Straits. Japan is the primary donor and is pushing for improved partnership on the issue of connectivity between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

LAOS

In the decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, Lao PDR has transitioned towards stronger relationships with countries to the south, and those a bit farther afield, such as Japan and Australia. As a country formerly enclaved in what was Indochina, Lao PDR has also maintained its close friendship with Vietnam (as exemplified by the Friendship and Cooperation Special Treaty signed in 1997; Vietnam is the second largest investor in the country, and is in charge of training the party cadres) and Cambodia while using its location along the corridor from Yunnan to Thailand, now the country's main economic partner (for electricity and goods). More recently, Lao PDR has strengthened economic ties not only with Thailand, but also China, both of whose investments in the country have risen dramatically over the last several years. Leveraging and balancing constructive relations with partners inside and outside ASEAN, along with an ambitious China, is the current strategy. Lao PDR chaired ASEAN in 2016.

MALAYSIA

Malaysia is also looking for a balance in its foreign relations. After several years of "precious relationship" between the former prime minister Najib Razak and China, the newly elected government under Mahatir bin Mohamad (who has been prime minister again since 2018) has conducted a deep review of previous bilateral commitments in order to reduce the country's dependency on, and debt to, just one major partner. Global partnership has been forged with the USA, and Japan remains an important investor. During its presidency of ASEAN in 2015, Kuala Lumpur launched the "Vision Post-2015" which is a roadmap for the association's next decade. Malaysia is also a member of the Non-Aligned Movement and of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

MYANMAR

Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997 and was its chair in 2014, indicating the normalization of its status in the regional organization. China is a major economic partner with huge investments (USD 2.8 billion in 2016-17) in energy and infrastructure. Since 2013, two pipelines have linked the Indian Ocean to central China. Myanmar also has a close relationship with India, with more than USD 2.1 billion in trade. The Indian prime minister reaffirmed the country's support for the development of the coastal region of Arakan during the celebration at the summit of the 25 years of friendship between ASEAN and India (New Delhi, 25/01/2018). Japan is reinforcing its presence as a major actor in development aid (canceling 60 percent of the debt in 2013, providing loans of USD 500 million every year, plus USD 1 billion announced by Shinzo Abe in 2017 to support rural economies). In 2017 an agreement was signed with Bangladesh for the safe return of refugees (the Rohingya minority in the Rakhine state). Myanmar is the second largest recipient of European Union assistance in Asia (USD 656 million for 2016-2020).

PHILIPPINES

The Philippines chaired ASEAN in 2017 for its 50th anniversary, and its president was able to pay visits to its nine partners and to reach agreements to support cooperation in respect of maritime issues (joint patrols with Malaysia and Indonesia in the Sulu and Celebes seas), and to fight against terrorism and drug trafficking. In 2017, ASEAN and China accepted the general framework of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (2002). The territorial divergences continue to limit the scope of cooperation and investments between Manila and Beijing. The United States, where the greatest number of the expat community has settled (more than 4 million), used to be the country's first partner in defense, based on several agreements. Japan is the only country to have a strategic partnership with the Philippines, and is its second largest economic partner and its first supplier of assistance.

SINGAPORE

During its presidency of ASEAN in 2018, Singapore developed two lines of action: innovation (notably in finance) and resilience (to confront transnational threats). Singapore is also coordinator of EU-ASEAN relations for the period 2018-2020. The 22nd EU-ASEAN meeting for foreign ministers took place in Brussels on 21 January 2019, and a free-trade agreement with the EU was signed in 2019 (there are 10,000 EU companies in Singapore).

The city-state is active in the field of security and in the prevention of conflict: it created the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994 and every year it has hosted the Shangri-La Dialogue - the major forum for Asia security. Small in size, it has always been inclined to balance relationships between Beijing and Washington and between Malaysia and Indonesia. It is, therefore, closely associated with the dynamism of the region. The concept of "small country" has provoked lively intellectual debate in Singapore between experts and diplomats about the future of the country because the era Lee Kwan Yew, the country's founder and the inspiration behind its current success, is fading.

THAILAND

Thailand is a founder of ASEAN, which came into existence in Bangkok in 1967 in the context of the Vietnam War. This is the only country to have been able to maintain formal independence during colonial times. Thailand is an active participant in international and regional organizations, and maintains a particularly close and longstanding security relationship with the United States (Cobra Gold military exercises on a yearly basis in Thailand, with Singapore, Japan, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea). Internal political instability is not a factor in the continuity of foreign policy. The National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), chaired by the chief of the Royal Armed Forces, Prayuth Chan-ocha, has made several official visits to convince foreign investors to come back to Thailand (the USA, China and Japan) and to reassure ASEAN countries (Myanmar and the Philippines). Exports represent two-thirds of GDP and tourism another 12 percent. China invited Thailand to the Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) summit in Xiamen in 2017 because it covets the geographical assets of Thailand (i.e. its central location as a hub in continental Southeast Asia) for its infrastructure project from Kunming to Bangkok. Trade and military cooperation with China is on the rise.

VIETNAM

Vietnam's foreign policy aims to promote the development of the country while maintaining its security and its voice in global affairs. Hanoi has been engaged in a strategy of international integration adapted to its policy of opening (Doi Moi) since 1991: this includes reconciliation with neighboring countries and with the United States, rapprochement with regional and international organizations (ASEAN 1995), the Asian-Europe Meeting (ASEM) (1996), the international organization of "Francophonie" (Hanoi summit in 1997), membership in APEC (1998) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (2007), and several free-trade agreements. The conclusion of a dozen major strategic partnerships is a structuring element of Vietnam's foreign policy. In 2008-2009, Vietnam became a member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and was part of the G20 as chair of ASEAN. It organized the 28th APEC Summit in Danang in 2017 (Danang had a US military base and was on the front line during the Vietnam War) at which the national leaders Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping and Justin Trudeau were present. Vietnam's main trading partners are China, the USA and the EU. The issue of climate change is an important element of EU-Vietnam cooperation. Vietnam's primary aim is to maintain the balance between its two main economic partners- the USA and China - to pursue normalization with Washington and to master frictions with China.

5.4 ASEAN WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

> *"ASEAN is the oldest regional grouping of the Global South. Its longevity beyond rivalries may be explained by its capacity to "live harmoniously together""*

Southeast Asia, a region at the crossroads and rich in raw materials, has for centuries been one of the main theaters of globalization. Its integration within world affairs is basically grounded in economy. But the region has been ravaged by the conflicts of the so-called Cold War. The area saw the tragic application of the American geopolitical theory of the "rimland", according to which territories surrounding the "heartland" - the Soviet-controlled continental interior – needed to be controlled to prevent the spread of Soviet influence and the communist movements to which it provided backing. Born in 1967, within that historical context, ASEAN is the oldest regional grouping of the Global South. Its longevity beyond rivalries may be explained by its capacity to "live harmoniously together", and by the support it has received from Japan, keen to occupy the empty place left by Washington after 1975.

Ever since ASEAN was founded by the five states (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) in 1967 with a joint two-page declaration in Bangkok setting out its goals of growth, progress and stability, the aim of its Member States has been to avoid quarrels between the great powers, and to manage the region's destiny together. One achievement has been the toning-down of nationalist rhetoric. Southeast Asia is not Western Europe, and ASEAN is unlike the European Union, to which it is often compared, in the following ways.

> *"[T]he aim of its Member States has been to avoid quarrels between the great powers, and to manage the region's destiny together."*

In light of its recent decolonization it has chosen informal, rather than heavy, supranational institutions, personal relations play a central role, and national sovereignty is supported as a means to resist external pressures: there is no quest for leadership, members are equal, and decision-making is based on consensus.

The advice from Surin Pitsuwan, secretary general of ASEAN, to his successor Le Luong Minh (in January 2013) is a good illustration of the organization's approach: he urged that ASEAN should be strengthened by streamlining its procedures, that it should act in a "united and coherent" manner, and that it should play third parties off against each other by developing beneficial relationships with the United States, Japan, India, Australia and the European Union.

> *"The goal was to achieve a "balanced and open" diplomatic policy, not to be caught between China and the United States"*

The goal was to achieve a "balanced and open" diplomatic policy, not to be caught between China and the United States, and not to have to choose (no one should have to choose, he maintained, as that would be the nightmare scenario); Beijing and Washington know this and act accordingly, he added. So "We must mature and position ourselves in the updraft". China gives ASEAN a very realistic reflection of its potential, its responsibilities and its flaws, he continued. "We are the only region in the world that takes account of Chinese interests, and that means something to Beijing."

Chinese foreign policy has moved beyond exclusively bilateral dealings to negotiating with ASEAN as a collective organization. It is a crucial partner, as it is flexible and accommodating, in a more balanced relationship, which is necessary for the transformation of its international profile. Its geographical location, on, or close to the major trade arteries, ensures that it is in competition with the United States, and this has allowed ASEAN to assert a central position that is acknowledged de facto by the United States and the EU. ASEAN views China's interest as an advantage (dynamism, proximity, soft power, and so on), even if this partnership is lopsided [1].

An important cultural influence in Southeast Asia in the past, India has switched its "Look East Policy" to an "Act East Policy", and some observers think that India, "Asia's perennial problem child, has unusually great potential, and every chance of dethroning China if it tries" [1].

> *"Chinese foreign policy has moved beyond exclusively bilateral dealings to negotiating with ASEAN as a collective organization."*

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Buildings of Parliaments of ASEAN Member States






CHAPTER

06

PARLIAMENTS OF ASEAN MEMBER STATES

Contributor: Michel FOUCHER

6.1 POLITICAL CONTEXT: FROM ECONOMIC EMERGENCE TO POLITICAL TRANSITION

Emerging as an economy has an impact beyond increased trade and business. The Institute for Research on Contemporary Southeast Asia (IRASEC) has examined political crisis and transition in Southeast Asia and produced a typology of political regimes [1, 2].

Southeast Asia is presented not only as a region undergoing an economic miracle, but also as a remarkable political laboratory - one of the world's most interesting regions in which political transition can be analyzed. After the end of the Cold War, the region saw gradual progress towards democracy in the absence of any pre-existing liberal political tradition.

The aforementioned reports consider that a political transition is clearly underway in Southeast Asia: the relationship between citizens and the State, the nature of debate, the blossoming of political parties and activism (NGOs) show a clear desire for change. Such vibrancy cannot be dismissed solely as protest. It is obvious that the countries are taking a range of political paths. A typology of the forms of States and governance in Southeast Asia lists four monarchies, six republics and one federation. The political systems range from no party (Brunei) to single party (Lao PDR and Vietnam) to a strong governing party in a system of free elections (Cambodia, Malaysia and Singapore) to coalitions around shared interests (Indonesia, the Philippines and East Timor) to transitional situations (Myanmar and Thailand).

> *"After the end of the Cold War, the region saw gradual progress towards democracy in the absence of any pre-existing liberal political tradition."*

Experts might continue to debate the link between economic development and a desire for democracy, but this transition has been accompanied - and supported - by a growth rate of over 5 percent from 2003 to 2016. Growth encourages the rise of a middle-class and calls for a multi-party system, as long, says Sri Mulyani Indrawati, the director general of the World Bank, "as one ensures that growth is inclusive". These calls for democracy include demands for stable institutions and the rule of law, not just performance and efficiency. The first meeting of the Myanmar Parliament on 31 January 2011 was seen as ushering in a new era. Elections prove the legitimacy of institutions.

> *"It is obvious that the countries are taking a range of political paths. A typology of the forms of States and governance in Southeast Asia lists four monarchies, six republics and one federation."*

6.2 AIPA MEMBER PARLIAMENTS: FRAMEWORKS, COMPOSITIONS AND PROCEDURES

These sections rely extensively on two excellent and comprehensive AIPA publications - One ASEAN, Many Systems: Legislative Procedures of AIPA Member Parliaments, by Dr. Stephen Sherlock, September 2015. AIPA publication, Information Fact Sheets on Political and Parliamentary Systems of AIPA Member Parliaments, By Jan Seifert, PhD, September 2015.http://www.aipasecretariat.org/webassets/pdf/08.pdf /http://www.aipasecretariat.org/webassets/pdf/11.pdf

Map 7: Negara Brunei Darussalam



The Member Parliaments of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) reflect the diversity of the historical, constitutional and political backgrounds of the nations that make up ASEAN. The balance between the respective roles of the legislative and executive branches in the legislative process varies greatly across the spectrum of constitutions in ASEAN. Therefore, the procedures for reviewing and passing laws in AIPA member Parliaments are inevitably very different. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to identify certain patterns within the diversity of legislative procedures. Each Parliament represents its own particular mix of a number of common variables, combined with special local interpretations and applications of those variables. These variables derive from traditions of political, constitutional and legal thinking that have been both inherited from colonial and global practice and from local institutions and traditions. These features are not unique to the ASEAN region, because they are found across the parliamentary world, but they are applied in their own special way in the AIPA Parliaments.

CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: PRESIDENTIAL OR PARLIAMENTARY

Broadly speaking, constitutions across the world are conventionally classified as either presidential or parliamentary, or as having features of both systems (usually called "semi-presidential" systems). Political scholars have for decades recognized the different combinations of these two variables. The AIPA Member Parliaments are presented according to their parliamentary or presidential character in Table 1 below.

TABLE 1. AIPA Member Parliaments: Parliamentary and Presidential Constitutions

Parliamentary	Brunei Cambodia Lao PDR Malaysia Singapore Thailand Vietnam
Presidential	Indonesia Myanmar Philippines

The key difference between the presidential and parliamentary systems is the method for selecting the head of government and whether or not the cabinet is responsible to the Parliament. Systems where there are two separate elections for the head of government (called the president) and the Parliament, and a clear separation of powers between the two branches of government, are classified as "presidential". Systems where there is one election for the Parliament, and the Parliament then elects a head of government (usually known as a prime minister or chancellor), who is answerable to the Parliament, are classified as "parliamentary".

These different arrangements are major determinants of the role of the Parliament in law-making. It has been observed that the focus of Parliaments' work in parliamentary systems is on the review of legislation proposed by executive government, whereas Parliaments in presidential systems both review government legislation and initiate their own legislation. Paradoxically, Parliaments within a parliamentary system are generally relatively weak in law-making terms compared with legislatures in a presidential system.

Map 8: Kingdom of Cambodia



Legend

- Capital City
- Main City with population more than 1 million
- Main City with population more than 0.3 million
- Main City within the country
- International airport
- Hydropower dams (above 100 megawatt)
- Seaport
- Special Economic Zone
- Major urban areas within the country with population in millions
- Existing railway
- Main road
- Provincial boundary
- International boundary
- Planned expressway Phnom Penh-Preah Sihanouk
- Historical and demographical centre of the territory
- First periphery: coastal areas and old pioneer fronts
- Area under 100 meters
- Urban area
- Economic land concession



Map 9: Republic of Indonesia

Legend

- Capital City
- Main city with population more than 1 million
- Main city with population more than 0.3 million
- Other main city
- Seaport
- International airport
- Existing railway
- Main road
- Provincial boundary
- International boundary
- Urban area
- Major urban areas within the country with population in millions

Plantation

- Oil palm plantation
- Mixed oil palm plantation with other crops
- Rubber plantation
- Mixed rubber plantation with other crops

Other planned project

- Planned Semi built train

Oil and Gas pipeline

- Gas pipeline
- Oil pipeline

Map 10: Lao People's Democratic Republic

Legend

- Capital City
- Main City with population more than 1 million
- Main City with population more than 0.3 million
- Other main city
- International airport
- Commissioned hydropower dams
- Planned dams on Mekong River
- Main road
- Provincial boundary
- International boundary
- Major urban areas within the country and in the immediate vicinity (population in millions)

Population density in 2015 (persons per km²)

- < 15
- [15 - 30]
- [30 - 100]
- > 100
- Urban area
- **Proposed high speed rail:** Kunming-Yuxi-Mohan-Luang Phrabang-Vientiane-Nong Khai-Bankgok-Kuala Lumpur-Singapore

In the case of ASEAN, there is a group of seven countries that can be classified as "parliamentary". This is most clearly seen in the examples of Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei, where the influence of the British colonial experience led to the formation of Westminster-style Parliaments at the time of independence or, in the case of Brunei, sometime after independence. Parliamentary systems of various kinds have also been constituted in more recent times in the ASEAN Member States of Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam and Lao PDR. The other group of three AIPA Member Parliaments operate within a presidential system: the Philippines, Indonesia and Myanmar.

In the first group of ASEAN Member States, the Parliament is clearly less influential in the drafting, review and passage of legislation than it is in the second. In the parliamentary systems of, for example, Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia or Cambodia, the great majority of laws are drafted by the executive and are passed with relatively limited input from the Parliament. This is a characteristic of parliamentary systems, especially those in the Westminster tradition, including the UK, Australia, and so on. Conversely, in systems headed by an executive president there is a legislature with its own popular mandate and keen to make an independent mark on the content of laws. This is clearly seen in the assertive Parliaments of Indonesia and the Philippines, where the legislature and executive often have opposing views on legislation and where a large proportion of bills are drafted within the Parliament rather than in government ministries.

Of course, the parliamentary-presidential spectrum is only one of the variables than can determine a Parliament's powers. A second key variable is how the Parliament is elected and long-term patterns in the elections. These factors are discussed in the following section.

COMPOSITION OF THE PARLIAMENT: ONE-PARTY, MULTIPARTY OR ONE-DOMINANT PARTY

The second variable within AIPA Parliaments, and which has a great effect on the character of Parliament's role in the legislative procedure, is the rules for selecting the members of the Parliament. In ASEAN, this includes: competitive elections in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand (before 2014), the Philippines, Myanmar (since 2010) and Cambodia; one-party elections in Vietnam and Lao PDR; and appointment by the monarch in Brunei.

A Parliament within a one-party system or under a ruling monarch is less likely to have a major role in the legislative process because the ruling party or the monarch will always control both the legislative and executive branches of government. In these circumstances, it should be expected that most, if not all, legislation will be drafted within executive government and that members of Parliament will not oppose government legislation on issues of fundamental principle and will never vote against legislation. In systems such as these - for example, in Vietnam and Lao PDR - Parliaments are institutions that provide advice to the government on the content and wording of legislation, whereas in multiparty Parliaments, such as in Thailand before 2014, much more political debate and critique of government legislation can be anticipated. Another way to illustrate this contrast would be to emphasize that input from Parliaments in one-party systems/monarchies tends

Map 11: Malaysia



to be technical and apolitical, whereas in multi-party systems the input is more likely to be political and/or ideological, as well as technical.

Multiparty elections have a big impact on the kind of legislative debate that takes place in Parliaments. But scholars of politics have observed that some multiparty elections produce Parliaments with a wide range of competing parties, while others seem to be permanently dominated by one party. In AIPA, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand (before 2014) have highly competitive Parliaments, whereas Singapore has had the same ruling party since independence, Malaysia just ended 61 years under the Barisan National (National Front) and Cambodia's Parliament has been dominated by one party over many elections. The term "one-dominant party system" (Satori 1976) is often used to describe these systems. The term was first used by the French political scientist, Maurice Duverger (1951), and was commonly applied to India until the mid-1970s where, up until that time, the Congress Party had formed the government after every election from independence in 1947 (Kothari 1964). This concept can be used to refine our analysis of the party composition of Parliaments.

In terms of the legislative process in Parliament, a legislature with one longstanding dominant party has some of the characteristics of a one-party Parliament. In these countries, the Parliament's input into law-making tends to focus on giving technical advice on the content and wording of government bills, and is less involved in partisan political debate and critique of government policies. Naturally, opinions differ on whether this is desirable: one argument is that such Parliaments do not waste time on political "point-scoring" and produce laws with better technical quality, while the counter argument is that politicized debate produces laws that are a better reflection of the range of ideas and interests in the nation.

But setting these arguments aside, the fact is that there are a substantial variety of multiparty Parliaments in ASEAN, and understanding this fact helps us to understand why different AIPA Parliaments have different types of involvement in the legislative process. There is a spectrum within the range of one-dominant party Parliaments. This ranges from Singapore, where the great majority of seats in Parliament have been occupied by one ruling party since independence, through to Malaysia, where, until 2018, one party had held a clear majority since independence, but where opposition parties have often been powerful and frequently criticize and challenge the policies of the government. In both countries, the Parliament rarely initiates legislation (partly because they both have parliamentary systems), and the traditional dominance of one party limits the ability of non-government parties to amend bills or influence government policies. But in Singapore the overwhelming dominance of the ruling party means that most discussion on legislation is quite technical and downplays partisan argument, while strong oppositions in the Malaysian Parliament has ensured that political debate is usually robust.

Cambodia's Parliament is sometimes seen as showing signs of being dominated by one party. In the case of Myanmar, the elections of 2010 produced a Parliament dominated by one party and military representatives, but it is still too early to draw clear conclusions about how the Myanmar Parliament will operate in relation to the drafting, review and passage of legislation.

Map 12: Republic of the Union of Myanmar



The range of AIPA Parliaments on the spectrum from one-party through one-dominant party to multiparty is shown in Table 2 below.

Table 3 places the two variables of (1) parliamentary versus presidential systems and (2) party composition together.

Table 4 takes five features of possible parliamentary involvement in the legislative process (policy review of government bills; advice and technical input on bills; critique and debate of government bills; development of policy alternatives; and initiation and drafting of bills) and identifies in which of the AIPA Member Parliaments these activities are, or are not, likely to take place. The Parliaments are classified according to a combination of the two key characteristics of Parliaments that are detailed above: their constitutional identity as presidential or parliamentary; together with their method of composition, whether they are one party/monarchy, one-dominant party or multiparty.

THE ROLE OF COMMITTEES

A third major variable in the involvement of AIPA Member Parliaments in the legislative process is the role of committees. Committees are a way for Parliaments to divide the hugely complex work of Parliament into manageable chunks. Committees enable members of Parliament to concentrate on policy areas where they have expertise and to develop their specialist skills and knowledge. It should be noted at the

TABLE 2. AIPA Member Parliaments: One-party, One-dominant party & Multiparty composition

One Party/Ruling Monarch	One Dominant Party	Multiparty
Brunei Vietnam Lao PDR	Cambodia Malaysia* Myanmar (since 2010) Singapore	Indonesia Philippines Thailand (before 2014)

* After the May 2018 elections, the Pakatan Harapan (Alliance for Hope) of former PM Mahathir Mohamad ended 61 years of dominance by the Barisan National (National Front).

TABLE 3. AIPA Member Parliaments: Constitution Frameworks & Party Composition

	One Party/Ruling Monarch	One Dominant Party	Multiparty
Parliamentary	Brunei Vietnam Lao PDR	Cambodia Malaysia* Singapore	Thailand (before 2014)
Presidential		Myanmar (since 2010)	Indonesia Philippines

* After the May 2018 elections, the Pakatan Harapan (Alliance for Hope) of former PM Mahathir Mohamad ended 61 years of dominance by the Barisan National (National Front).

Map 13: Republic of the Philippines



TABLE 4. AIPA Member Parliaments: Features of parliamentary involvement in the legislative process by Constitutional frameworks & party composition

	One party/ ruling monarch Brunei Vietnam Lao PDR	One dominant party Parliamentary Cambodia Malaysia Singapore	One dominant party Presidential Myanmar (since 2010)	Multiparty Parliamentary Thailand (before 2014)	Multiparty Presidential Indonesia Philippines
Policy review of government bills	Rarely	Only if opposition parties have sufficient representation	Occasionally	Mostly by opposition parties	Often
Advice & technical input	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Critique & debate of government bills	Rarely	Only if opposition parties have sufficient representation	Occasionally	Mostly by opposition parties	Often
Development of policy alternatives	No	Only if opposition parties have sufficient representation	Occasionally	Mostly by opposition parties	Often
Initiation & drafting of bills	No	Rarely	Yes	No	Yes

outset that parliamentary committees are not only involved in legislative processes, but also play an important part in the parliamentary function of oversight of executive government policies and their allocation of public funds. In fact, in Parliaments where committees are not greatly involved in law-making, the main work of committees usually relates to scrutiny of the government and investigating and reporting on policy issues. But in this chapter, which is focused on legislative procedures, only the law-making role of committees is discussed.

Table 4 above shows that the Parliaments with the most prominent role in the legislative process in AIPA are those with multiparty presidential systems, namely Indonesia and the Philippines. These Parliaments not only initiate and draft bills, they also frequently propose amendments to government bills. Since drafting bills and amendments is difficult to achieve in a large plenary session, it is usually delegated to committees. Therefore, legislative committees of Parliaments in presidential systems are usually very powerful organs that can determine the fate of draft legislation,



Map 14: Republic of Singapore

both in terms of its content and whether it is passed at all.

Conversely, the role of committees in drafting and amending legislation in Parliaments in a parliamentary system, especially in the one-party or one-dominant party examples, is more limited. Usually, the legislative procedures in such Parliaments formally provide for a committee stage in the law-making process, but the basic policy content and wording of the clauses of bills rarely change in the committee stage. The committee stage can provide an opportunity for public consultation on bills but if, as is usually the case, the bill has been drafted within a government ministry, most consultation will have been completed during the ministry's own drafting process.

There is, of course, some variation in the legislative role of committees among the ASEAN countries that have a parliamentary system. In the case of Vietnam, parliamentary committees are involved in the development of the legislative program before draft bills are submitted to the Parliament. In Thailand before 2014, committee meetings were a place where a lot of substantive debate took place between government and non-government parties. In Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei, the committee stage on bills frequently takes place in the form of a Committee of the Whole House which is effectively the same as a plenary session because it involves all members and takes place in the main chamber. In these Parliaments there are no standing legislative committees on particular areas of policy and "select" or ad hoc committees are rarely constituted. In Cambodia, the Permanent Standing Committee has a deciding role over the legislative input of the sectoral standing Commissions.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Legislative procedures in AIPA Member Parliaments are as diverse as the States that make up ASEAN. The countries of ASEAN include constitutional monarchies, Westminster-based parliamentary systems, a variety of parliamentary systems in one-party socialist republics and one-party dominant states, as well as republics with a presidential system. Various constitutional arrangements, political and historical legacies and electoral systems give rise to Parliaments that have very different relationships with executive government and very different types of involvement in the law-making process. Some AIPA Parliaments initiate and draft laws, while others are more involved in a process of review of government-initiated legislation. On the one hand, there are AIPA Member Parliaments whose input into legislation is in the nature of advice to the government, in which case it tends to focus on technical issues and refinements to the details of policy. On the other hand, the input into many AIPA Parliaments is much more politicized in character and may involve the drafting of amendments that challenge the whole approach being advocated by the executive government.

This variety is one of the outstanding features of ASEAN, but it is also a challenge for the development of a common stance on policy issues and to the strengthening of procedures for the implementation of ASEAN agreements. This includes matters related to the legislative branch of government and the affairs of AIPA as the counterpart to executive institutions in ASEAN. When proposing recommendations for the further development of ASEAN and AIPA systems, the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Member Countries and consensus-based decision-making prescribes that recommendations must not run counter to what is acceptable and achievable within Member States and Parliaments.

Map 15: Kingdom of Thailand

Map 16: Socialist Republic of Vietnam



Legend

- Capital City
- Main city with population >1 million
- Main city with population >0.3 million
- Other main city
- International airport
- Hydropower dams (above 100 megawatt)
- Seaport
- Existing railway
- Main road
- Provincial boundary
- International boundary

Population density (person/km2) in 2016

Average population density is 280/km²

- > 4000
- 2000 - 2500
- 1000 - 1500
- 500 - 1000
- 280 - 500
- 150 - 280
- 100 - 150
- < 100
- Urban Area

Urban Population in 2016 (million)

Major urban areas within the country with population in millions

7
3
1
0.5
0.25

Other planned project

- Thermal power plant project
- Planned airport
- Key economic zone
- Kunming-Singapore high speed rail project

Oil and gas field

- Oil field
- Gas field

> *This variety is one of the outstanding features of ASEAN, but it is also a challenge for the development of a common stance on policy issues*

The following recommendations are therefore ones that can be initiated by Parliaments themselves and that involve the evolution of a renewed spirit for the strengthening of AIPA, as much as the creation of new systems.

1. Enhance the existing role of the Speaker/President in each AIPA Parliament in facilitating the ratification, implementation and monitoring of ASEAN agreements and AIPA resolutions. ASEAN and AIPA instruments are much more likely to achieve an appropriate status and profile if they are sponsored and actively supported by the leadership of the chamber.

2. Encourage the establishment of a dedicated committee for ASEAN affairs in each AIPA Member Parliament. This will send out a strong message about the importance to be accorded to ASEAN affairs, alongside existing organs with responsibility for international affairs, treaties and inter-parliamentary relations.

3. Support a renewed emphasis on the role of the AIPA Caucus as a mechanism through which action on ASEAN and AIPA instruments can be strengthened.

4. Provide for the allocation of staff resources in each AIPA Parliament dedicated to working in support of the implementation of ASEAN and AIPA instruments.

5. Support the development of networks of staff that are already emerging across the AIPA Member Parliaments.

6. Develop standard operating procedures (SOP) in each AIPA Parliament for the drafting of resolutions for AIPA forums in order to enhance their common appeal and usefulness to Member Parliaments. Such procedures will produce drafts with a greater chance of finding common agreement.

7. Strengthen communication between AIPA and ASEAN institutions.

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CHAPTER

07

PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATIONS AND ASEAN

Contributors: Michel FOUCHER, Kunthea KONG, Antoine PERRILLAT-CHARLAZ,

7.1 PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND NEW TRENDS

> *It is important to recall that parliamentary diplomacy is direct diplomacy. Parliamentarians are the representatives of the peoples.*
>
> *Parliamentary diplomacy is the diplomacy of the peoples.*
>
> *As a result, it has the legitimacy of each and every one of them.*
>
> *Ricardo Lagos, former president of Chile*
> *IPU president, 108th plenary session, 2003*

How to define parliamentary diplomacy? It is an emerging and recent concept [A] [1] that has come to the fore with the rise of inter-parliamentary cooperation.

Traditionally, diplomacy is the privilege of the executive and not a core parliamentary activity. Negotiating is the work of one person; deliberating is the work of several. One should not confuse the two exercises.

Parliamentary diplomacy refers to the diplomatic activities of parliamentary assemblies as a whole or by some of their members in the realm of international relations. It is complementary to sovereign or executive diplomacy and an integral part of foreign policy [B].

A restrictive definition singles out diplomatic activities within the major international organizations taking place in arenas that resemble parliamentary assemblies (United Nations, UNESCO). It describes the diplomatic actions of parliamentary figures or of small parliamentary bodies such as friendship groups.

A wider definition combines the means of action of parliamentary assemblies and international relations when a state's diplomatic activity involves parliamentary procedure and can be supplemented by more specific actions. In many countries, the minister of foreign affairs or the minister of defense may be called to appear before ad hoc parliamentary committees; parliamentary delegations to other countries may submit reports to the executive. These instruments (hearings, delegations) are a link between domestic politics (the main field of parliamentary activities) and foreign policy.

A distinction should be drawn between formal and informal processes.

Formal processes include the ratification of international treaties and specific procedures. An assembly has sometimes refused to ratify a treaty (e.g. as the U.S. Congress did in 1919 regarding the Treaty of Versailles). National constitutions determine the scope of parliamentary

ratification, which can be more or less extensive and include peace treaties and agreements relating to international order.

Parliamentary procedures range from a request to adjourn the examination of a legal text to the verification of its compliance with the national constitution. Specific procedures may be required for negotiations within the regional framework of ASEAN. General legal procedures include budgetary debates, amendments to the constitution, parliamentary oversight procedures and parliamentary resolutions.

Informal processes of parliamentary diplomacy vary from country to country. The most familiar are friendship groups, facilitating invitations and meetings between members of Parliaments and among parliamentary diplomacy associations (AIPA, IPU, APPF, etc.).

Friendship groups are parliamentary groups that have been established to forge or strengthen ties of friendship with other Parliaments. French and British veterans initiated the first such organizations after World War I. Their activities include visits, conferences and maintaining a network of influence and dialogue between these groups and public figures.

Globalization and the growing number of forums have led to an increased number of invitations and meetings. Parliamentary diplomacy is embodied in the chairs and general secretaries of the assemblies.

Inter-parliamentary diplomacy is essential in areas of the world which are in the process of integration such as the European Union and ASEAN (AIPA).

The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and the Assemblée parlementaire de la francophonie (APF) are sui generis inter-parliamentary organizations.

The IPU is the global organization of sovereign national parliaments. It is the oldest international political organization [C][2], having been founded in 1889, and has grown from nine countries in 1889 to 177 today. The IPU's motto is "For democracy. For everyone" and "Better parliaments, stronger democracies" [3].

The Assemblée parlementaire de la francophonie (established as an association in 1967, became an assembly in 1989) brings together 87 Parliaments. Its committees focus on rights and freedoms, capacity building for Parliaments, cultural diversity and inter-cultural dialogue.

In the face of increasingly urgent global issues (climate, gender, international trade, security, sustainable development), we observe a form of parliamentary "globalization" going hand in hand with economic, technological and cultural globalization.

Finally, although it is hard to assess the performance of parliamentary diplomacy, there is no doubt that it serves to project a country's image abroad and to forge closer links and trust between neighboring countries with the same values and interests.

Building on the legitimacy of Parliaments, parliamentary diplomacy endeavors to reduce the democratic deficit in international relations and brings a welcome dose of reality to the new globalized world [3].

7.2 AIPA MEMBER PARLIAMENTS INVOLVED IN PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY ASSOCIATIONS

Association	Purpose	Year Founded	Member Parliaments	AIPA Parliaments Involved	Links for Further Information
ASEAN Inter-parliamentary Assembly (AIPA)	Encourage understanding, cooperation, and close relations among Member Parliaments as well as Observer Member Parliaments and other parliamentary organizations. Plays an instrumental role in familiarizing the peoples of Southeast Asia with policies.	1977	10	All	http://www.aipasecretariat.org/
Asia Pacific Parliamentary Forum (APPF)	Dialogue platform gathering parliamentary officials from the Asia-Pacific region who wish to discuss matters that affect their region with their government counterparts around the world.	1993 – Adoption of the Tokyo Declaration	27	Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam	http://www.appf27.org.kh/
Asian Forum for Parliamentarians on Population and Development (AFPPD)	Strengthen the regional network of parliamentarians committed to implementing the population and development agenda, particularly the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD PoA) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).	1981	29 National Committees of Parliamentarians (countries from Central Asia, East Pacific, Pacific, South Asia and Southeast Asia)	Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam	https://www.afppd.org/

Association	Purpose	Year Founded	Member Parliaments	AIPA Parliaments Involved	Links for Further Information
Asian Parliamentary Assembly (APA)	Promote unity toward the single purpose of peace and a concrete framework for regional cooperation to strengthen human rights protection and democracy.	2006	42 Member Parliaments and 16 observers	Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam	http://www.asianparliament.org/
Parliamentary Assembly of la Francophonie (PAF)	Political dialogue platform for francophone Parliaments fostering mutual interests, the Rule of Law, cooperation, solidarity, democracy and the promotion of international role of Parliamentarians.	1967	78 Parliaments or parliamentary organizations	Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam	http://apf.francophonie.org/
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA)	Connects, develops, promotes and supports Parliamentarians and their staff to identify benchmarks of good governance and the implementation of the enduring values of the Commonwealth.	1911	66 legislatures (excluding the sub-legislatures)	Malaysia and Singapore	http://www.cpahq.org
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)	Protect and build global democracy through political dialogue and concrete action.	1889	178 Member Parliaments and 12 Associate Members	All except Brunei	https://www.ipu.org/

7.3 MEETINGS

7.3.1 MEETINGS IN 2019

No	Association	Meetings in 2019
1	AIPA	• Thailand hosted the 40th AIPA General Assembly from the 25th to the 30th of August 2019 in Bangkok.
2	APPF	• Cambodia hosted the 27th APPF Annual Meeting from the 14th to the 17th of January 2019 in Siam Reap.
3	AFPPD	• No events in 2019.
4	APA	• Meeting of APA Standing Committee on Social and Cultural Affairs 2019 on 12-15 February 2019 in Bangkok. • APA Coordination Meeting on the sideline of the 140th IPU Assembly the 6 April 2019 in Doha. • Standing Committee on Economic and Sustainable Development meeting on 18-21 April 2019 in Naryan-Mar (Russia). • Standing Committee on Political Affairs meeting on 25-28 June 2019 in Isfahan (Iran) • Standing Committee on Budget and Planning on 3-5 September 2019 in Bagdad. • 1st Executive Council meeting on 25-28 October 2019 in Rize (Turkey). • The 12th APA Plenary Session on 13-18 December 2019 in Antalya (Turkey).
5	PAF	• Women Parliamentarians Network Meeting, 24 to 28 February, 2019, Vietnam • Education, Communication and Cultural Commission Meeting, 24-28 February, Vietnam • Political Commission Meeting, 5-6 March 2019, Djibouti • Parliamentarian Affairs Commission Meeting, 26-28 April 2019, Canada • Cooperation and Development Commission Meeting, 3-4 May of 2018, Phnom Penh
6	CPA	• 48th CPA British Islands and Mediterranean Regional Conference, St Peter Port, Guernsey, 19-22 May 2019 • 44th Annual Conference of the Caribbean, Americas and Atlantic Region of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 12-19 July 2019 • 64th Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference (CPC), Kampala, Uganda – September 2019 (dates TBC) • 10th Commonwealth Youth Parliament, New Delhi, 24 to 28 November 2019

No	Association	Meetings in 2019
7	IPU	• 158th session of the Committee on the Human Rights of Parliamentarians, 29 Jan - 8 Feb 2019, Geneva, Switzerland • First meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Fifth World Conference of Speakers of Parliament, 8-9 Feb 2019, Geneva, Switzerland • Annual Parliamentary Hearing at the United Nations, 21 - 22 Feb 2019, New York, United States of America • 44th session of the Steering Committee of the Parliamentary Conference on the WTO, Feb - Mar 2019, Brussels, Belgium • Parliamentary Meeting on the occasion of the 63rd session of the Commission on the Status of Women, 13 Mar 2019, New York, United States of America • 140th Assembly and related meetings, 6 - 10 Apr 2019, Doha, Qatar • Parliamentary side event at the High-Level Political Forum for sustainable development (HLPF), Jul 2019, New York, United States of America • 141st Assembly and related meetings, 13-17 Oct 2019, Belgrade, Serbia • 141st Assembly and related meetings 13/10/2019 - 17/10/2019, Belgrade, Serbia • Second meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Fifth World Conference of Speakers of Parliaments, 18 – 19 November 2019, Geneva Switzerland • Parliamentary meeting on the occasion of the 25th UN Climate Change Conference (COP25), 10/12/2019, Madrid Spain

Acknowledging the important role of PIC in supporting the capacity building of parliamentary staff of AIPA Member Parliaments, a resolution on the Renewal of the Memorandum of Understanding between AIPA and the Parliamentary Institute of Cambodia (PIC) on "Capacity Development Program for Staff of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly Member Parliaments" was adopted during the second plenary session of the AIPA General Assembly in Bangkok, Thailand on 29 August 2019.

Encouraged by the continued trust shown by AIPA Member Parliaments, PIC remains committed to becoming the leading center of parliamentary development in the region, supporting and enhancing the capacity of parliamentary staff and promoting knowledge and experience sharing to help improve parliamentary performance, particularly among the Parliaments of Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar.

7.3.2 MEETINGS IN 2020

In 2020, the world has been faced with the unprecedented challenge of COVID-19, a crisis that has turned the things we used to know and do upside-down. This monumental shift has obliged us to adapt, to reinvent, and to imagine new ways of living and working.

Parliaments, with so central a role in responding to and combatting the pandemic, have also needed to make significant adjustments to their working methods and their planned activities. At the time of printing, a number of the parliamentary diplomacy meetings shown below have happened, while some have been delayed, and others reimagined as events taking place at a distance using technology such as teleconferencing.

No	Association	Meetings in 2020
1	AIPA	Vietnam will host the 41st General Assembly of AIPA in late August and early September 2020 in Ha Long City, Quang Ninh province.
2	APPF	The Australian Parliament will host the 28th Asia Pacific Parliamentary Forum on 13-16 January 2020 and welcome delegates, observers and colleagues to Parliament House in Canberra, the capital city of Australia.
3	AFPPD	The Asian Forum of Parliamentarians on Population and Development (AFPPD) is a regional non-governmental organization based in Bangkok, Thailand. As of the date of this writing, there are currently no events planned for 2020.
4	APA	Asian Parliamentary Assembly's Working Group on Statutory Documents 8-11 February in Kuwait
		The 12th APA Plenary Session 13-18 December in Antalya, Turkey
5	ASEP	Cambodia will host the 11th Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership Meeting. Representatives from 52 member Parliaments will meet on 25-28 October 2020 in Phnom Penh.
6	NATO PA	The Spring Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly will be held in Kyiv, Ukraine, 22-25 May 2020
7	PAF	Parliamentarian assembly of French speaking countries Meeting of the Commission for Cooperation and development in Bucharest (Romania), 5-6 March of 2020
8	CPA	The Commonwealth Parliamentary Association exists to develop, promote and support Parliamentarians and their staff in Commonwealth nations. CPA Small Branches Sustainable Economic Development Workshop, Valetta, Malta, 29 to 31 January 2020 International Women's Day, Sunday 8 March 2020
9	IPU	The 142nd Assembly of the IPU will take place in Geneva, Switzerland, on 16-20 April 2020 143rd Assembly and related meetings will take place in Kigali, Rwanda, on 11-15 October 2020

ASSOCIATION PROFILE

AIPA

ASEAN
INTER-PARLIAMENTARY
ASSEMBLY

Originally formed on September 2, 1977 as the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization (AIPO) by the leaders of the parliamentary delegations of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand attending the Third ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Conference in Manila, Philippines [4].

AIPA aims to encourage understanding, cooperation, and close relations among Member Parliaments as well as Observer Member Parliaments and other parliamentary organizations.

AIPA also plays an instrumental role in familiarizing the peoples of Southeast Asia with policies aimed at accelerating the realization of an ASEAN Community.

FOOTNOTES

A. The term was coined during an inaugural conference organized in France in 2001 by the French National Assembly and Senate. It was only in 2011 that Foreign Policy Journal featured the term for the first time in English, and it took until 2017 for the first detailed study to be published (see bibliography).

B. Livre blanc sur la politique étrangère et européenne, Paris 2008.

C. Founded by two Nobel Prize winners, the Frenchman Frédéric Passy and the Englishman William Randal Cremer.

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2. Stavridis, S. and Jancic, D. (2017). Parliamentary Diplomacy in European and Global Governance, ed. Leiden.

3. Péjo, P. (2018). La diplomatie parlementaire, actrice émergente de communications diplomatiques démocratisées. Hermès, La Revue, 81(2), p.81.

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Railroad crossing in Sindang Jaya, Indonesia, outside Jakarta.
Tom Fisk

CHAPTER

08

AN OVERVIEW OF TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES IN THE REGION

8.1 WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION IN ASEAN PARLIAMENTS

OVERVIEW

Despite the fact that women comprise half of the global population, and the increasing recognition of the critical role that women play in leadership positions in both the public and private sectors, they continue to be underrepresented in both areas at the global, regional and national levels [1]. Parliaments, in particular, are intended to represent all sectors of society, but most of the world's Parliaments are ruled by men [2, p. 38]. In the past 20 years, the proportion of women in Parliaments has nearly doubled – yet this translates to women comprising only 24.5 percent of the representatives in Parliaments worldwide as of October 2019, up from the just 11.3 percent in 1995 [3]. In the world today, there are still 27 States in which women consist of less than 10 percent of parliamentarians in single or lower houses, including three chambers with no women at all[4].

In ASEAN, representation of women in political life has always been a challenging issue. In the region's Parliaments, the participation of women averages just 20 percent, lagging behind the global average[3]. The shortage of women's representation in the legislative branches is echoed across ASEAN Member Countries, with the exception of the Philippines, Vietnam and Lao PDR, where women's representation in Parliament is over 27 percent in each country [3]. ASEAN has been classified as having insufficient representation of women in Parliaments if compared to the Americas, Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa, though rates are still higher than in Pacific and Arab States [3].

Among the 10 countries of ASEAN, the Philippines has shown greater progress in the inclusion of women in politics with 29.5 percent, the highest level of any member country [3]. Thailand, Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar and Malaysia have the lowest percentages with around 4, 9, 10 and 13 percent, respectively. The latest data for Cambodia sets its women's representation at around 20 percent, slightly lower than Indonesia's 21 percent [3]. Despite the low rates of female representation in the Parliaments of Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, and Malaysia, these nations have earned a very high ranking in the Gender Inequality Index (GII) and Human Development Index (HDI) [5]. This is because these countries have made significant progress in closing the gender inequality gap in three essential aspects of human development - reproductive health[A], empowerment[B], and economic status[C] of both women and men.

> *"Women in positions of political leadership encourage the integration of women into the labor market, which promotes economic and development growth."*

Despite most ASEAN Member Countries having made progress on the inclusion of women in politics, more remains to be done. Women remaining inadequately represented in Parliaments shows that women still have a long way to go in order to achieve equality in politics [6]. Increases in the number of women in Parliament improves policy outcomes and promotes the inclusion of minority groups in public spheres, which tends to curb corruption. Moreover, as defined by

a recent study on the Effect of Women's Representation in Parliament, "Women in positions of political leadership encourage the integration of women into the labor market, which promotes economic and development growth" [7, p.2].

There is no society that can develop to its full potential – economically, politically, or socially – when half its population is marginalized, and so we must leave no one behind [7]. Women's participation in Parliament is critical to ensure the translation of international commitments and frameworks for action into accessible and reliable tools for civil society mobilization and policy design [8]. Women tend to have a greater focus on social issues and the well-being and welfare of their communities, and factor these into the decision-making process. They promote policies and activities that strengthen communities and encourage stakeholder participation while emphasizing the importance and the practice of good communication with the community. Women participants are dedicated, responsible, practice what they preach, and they stimulate and encourage other women to be part of development [9].

Therefore, women's participation in politics is essential to fostering decision-making that is representative, inclusive, and effective. There is growing evidence that women's leadership improves political decision-making processes. Women demonstrate political leadership by working across party lines through parliamentary women's caucuses - even in the most politically complex environments - and by championing issues of gender equality, such as the elimination of gender-based violence, parental leave and childcare, pensions, gender-equality laws and electoral reform [10].

Moreover, government women's machinery [D] and women's organizations and networks are powerful forces to mobilize and elevate women's voices in politics and in societies – yet they are underfunded. Voices of young women and men are also especially powerful in mobilizing constituencies for change and galvanizing women's political participation.

CHALLENGES OF INADEQUATE FEMALE REPRESENTATION IN ASEAN PARLIAMENTS

Increasing women's participation in politics faces challenges on a number of fronts across the region. An Asia Development Bank analysis indicates that the region has made some progress towards achieving equality over the last two decades, but the change has been slow [10]. Therefore, it is crucial to identify the challenges and opportunities as perceived by countries in the region, as each has unique issues to address. In the case of ASEAN Member Countries, these include social norms and values, and institutional obstacles [11].

Social norms and values are traditionally associated with gender norms, work-life balance (family work and time obstacles), socio-economic obstacles, lack of confidence and support from society and their family members, education levels, and lack of information [12]. Institutional obstacles refer to the masculine model of politics [E], the lack of party support including financial support for women candidates, limit representative participation associated with the type of electoral system, and how women's representation is outlined in a country's or political party's constitution or legal framework, limited political networks, and the more stringent standards and qualifications applied to women [7].

ACHIEVEMENT IN PROMOTING WOMEN REPRESENTATIVES IN ASEAN PARLIAMENTS

Despite the slow progress in increasing the number of women represented in ASEAN Parliaments, the ASEAN community has accomplished some significant achievements in enhancing gender equality at the national level. The ASEAN community has prioritized the promotion of gender equality, the empowerment of women and girls and has set a high-level political commitment to advancing the rights and welfare of women and girls through ASEAN's regional cooperation, and in national policies and programs [13].

ASEAN has adopted its own Human Rights Declaration with General Principles, which states that the rights of women, among others, are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of human rights and fundamental freedoms [13]. Moreover, the ASEAN community adopted the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 at the 27th ASEAN Summit in November 2015, which envisions "an inclusive community that promotes high quality of life, equitable access to opportunities for all and promotes and protects human rights of women…", among others. At the same time, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) Blueprint 2025 which identified strategic measures that seek to reduce barriers faced by women and girls, promote and protect human rights, and ensure equitable access for all [14].

THE WAY FORWARD

Moving ahead, ASEAN Member States must make efforts to promote greater gender-responsiveness of decision makers and institutions to enhance participation of women in Parliaments. The inclusion of women contributes to national level support by leading efforts to approve government budgets that fund gender initiatives, and also helps to maintain committees to monitor implementation of relevant ASEAN community SDGs. Promoting gender equality is central to achieving the ASEAN Community Vision 2025; every Member State must ensure that every woman and girl counts. Therefore, the key step is to strengthen accountability for gender equality commitments at all levels.

In legislative and executive bodies, gender balance is to be achieved through specific affirmative measures that support the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Target 5.5.1 [F], with the aim of achieving gender parity by 2030, and the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 goal of realizing a politically cohesive, economically integrated, socially responsible, and truly people-centered community that promotes equal access to opportunities and protects the rights of women. Male and female legislators and government decision makers need to gain new knowledge and skills to advance the gender equality agenda. It is also key to bring together women leaders from across the political spectrum at country level to jointly lobby for common gender-related priorities. To encourage participation, adoption of work-life balance and women-friendly policies in national and sub-national Parliaments need to be promoted, including those that address gender equitable parental leave policies, childcare, safe motherhood and official hours for voting and negotiations.

Last but not least, political parties must be encouraged to provide sufficient financial support for women candidates. Nations should work to improve their electoral systems and how women's representation is constructed in nation and party constitutions and laws in order

to promote women's representative participation and address the unequal standards and qualifications applied to women in politics.

CONCLUSION

The ASEAN community has increased opportunity for women and girls to gain access to representation in political and economic decision making processes. However, the progress in increasing the number of women represented in ASEAN Parliaments remains slow, as gender norms are still a grassroots issue in the ASEAN community that hinders the opportunity for women candidates to get elected and fulfill their roles and responsibilities in political life. Educational opportunities and lack of awareness are additional obstacles to be overcome.

In order to secure their full rights and empower all women in the ASEAN community, a strong commitment is needed among ASEAN Member Countries in implementing the regional strategic direction that ASEAN is taking towards awareness-raising and the empowerment of women and girls. Policies are required in relevant sectors focusing on women's representation and participation in decision-making and in national-level positions, and to address gender norm practices identified above as a barrier to women's political participation.

Therefore, there is much more that needs to be done by the ASEAN community. ASEAN needs to work harder together to represent women and girls, challenge the feminization of poverty, improve human security, increase job opportunities, and eliminate discrimination and violence against women.

The Cambodian Women Parliamentarians Caucus (CWPC) hosted an event in 2019 as part of the Girl2Leader initiative aimed at encouraging girls in Cambodia to become more involved in politics.

Map 17: Women in ASEAN Parliaments



Women in parliament

Rank	Country	Lower or Single house		Upper house or Senate	
		%Women	Women/Seats	%Women	Women/Seats
51	Philippines	29.5	86/292	25	6/24
59	Laos	27.5	41/149	-	-/-
64	Viet Nam	26.7	132/494	-	-/-
81	Singapore	23	23/100	-	-/-
103	Cambodia	20	25/125	17.7	11/62
114	Indonesia	18.2	102/560	-	-/-
141	Malaysia	14.4	32/222	19.4	13/67
159	Myanmar	11.3	49/433	12.1	27/224
170	Brunei Darussalam	9.1	3/33	-	-/-
182	Thailand	5.4	13/240	-	-/-

8.2 CLIMATE LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN ASEAN

SETTING THE CONTEXT FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA

> *"[F]our of the world's ten countries most affected by climate change are located in Southeast Asia: Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam."*

Climate change is a global concern and of special relevance to Southeast Asia, a region that is among the world's most vulnerable to the effects of climate change and is also rapidly increasing its emission of greenhouse gases. From 1990 to 2010, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in Southeast Asia have grown more rapidly than in any other region of the world [15].

According to the Global Climate Risk Index, four of the world's ten countries most affected by climate change are located in Southeast Asia: Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. Meanwhile five countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, currently represent 90 percent of the total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the Southeast Asian region.

Most research conducted on climate change in Southeast Asia focuses on the vulnerabilities of the region and the immediate and mid-term impacts, but there has been little attention paid to climate policies and laws developed in the region. "A study by Salamanca and Nguyen (2016: 1) classifies ASEAN countries according to three categories of adaptation policies: adaptation pioneers (Philippines and Vietnam), emerging champions (Cambodia, Indonesia, and Myanmar), and wait-and-see countries (Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand)" [16, p.4]. This section aims at providing an overview of climate legislation dynamics in the region.

CLIMATE LEGISLATION

"Although scientific knowledge about the greenhouse effect dates back well over 100 years, climate change became an issue of wider policy concern only in the 1990s, after the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change had issued its first assessment report and countries started to negotiate what would become the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Few countries followed up their (soft) commitments under the 1992 UNFCCC with domestic legislation" [17, p.8]. The situation is quite different

> *"[C]limate change became an issue of wider policy concern only in the 1990s, after the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change had issued its first assessment report and countries started to negotiate what would become the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change."*

> *There are now over 1,200 climate change or climate change- relevant laws worldwide, a twentyfold increase over 20 years*

today, where "There are now over 1,200 climate change or climate change-relevant laws worldwide, a twentyfold increase over 20 years: in 1997 there were about 60 climate laws in place" [18].

From 2010 to 2018, in ASEAN's five most vulnerable countries, also early ratifiers of the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, namely Vietnam, the Philippines, Cambodia, Indonesia and Thailand, 67 national laws and policies were passed.

This legislation came in a wide variety of forms, including regulations, laws, action plans, directives, roadmaps, resolutions, policies, programs and the ratification of regional and international accords.

Table 1: The five most vulnerable countries in ASEAN

	Cambodia	Indonesia	Philippines	Thailand	Vietnam
Countries by Income Group (World Bank)	Lower Middle Income	Lower Middle Income	Lower Middle Income	Upper Middle Income	Lower Middle Income
Average Annual Loss from Natural Disasters as a Percent of GDP	1.927%	0.248%	4.61%	0.691%	1.77%
GHG Emissions (MtCO2e, including LULUCG),2013	51.66	2160.64	111.29	384.37	239.09
World Rank as Emitter	Below Top 50	Top 5	Below Top 50	21-50	21-50
Paris Agreement Ratification Status	Ratified (06/02/2017)	Ratified (31/10/2016)	Ratified (23/03/2017)	Ratified (21/09/2016)	Ratified (03/11/2016)
Number of Climate Laws	1	4	6	2	3
Number of Climate Policies	5	17	9	8	12

Map 18: Physical Geography and Natural Hazards



Legend

- Active volcano
- Major faults
- Course of major hurricanes
- 0 - 200 m
- 200 - 1,000 m
- > 1,000 m
- Dense forest

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF THE LEGISLATION ANALYSIS

The preliminary findings cover over 30 national laws and policies[A] directly related to climate change adaptation and mitigation in the five countries.

Most of the climate legislation reviewed has a direct link to sustainable development frameworks such as;

- Food Security and Safety
- Agriculture/ Agriculture Competitiveness
- Energy/ Energy Transition
- Natural Resources and Ecosystem Management
- Forestry
- Disaster Risk Reduction

Looking at policies and laws passed since 2010 in the selected countries, this initial analysis indicates that there is an increase in the number of policies, especially after the Paris Agreement (2015).

> *"[T]here is an increase of the number policies, especially after the Paris Agreement"*

It needs to be noted that most of these policies were developed by the executive branches of those countries, mainly ministries focusing on both adaptation and mitigation measures. The executive branch has been the engine of climate legislation in these five countries, with 76 percent of the legislation developed and passed by executive bodies, while Parliaments still play more of a supporting role.

Although a robust legislative framework is a key indicator by which to measure the level of institutional commitment at the national level towards encouraging programs and investments, further research needs to be done in order to determine actual budget and investment allocation towards climate change adaption and mitigation in each country and the type of projects implemented.

> *"The executive branch has been the engine of climate legislation in these five countries, with 76 percent of the legislation developed and passed by executive bodies, while Parliaments still play more of a supporting role."*

Map 19: Climate Legislation



8.3 MIGRATION

Southeast Asia is historically a region of migratory mobility, inward and outward. According to the International Organization for Migration (based in Geneva), more than 28.5 million people from the region are living outside their country of birth (2016) [22].

> *[M]ore than 28.5 million people from the region are living outside their country of birth*

Internal migrations represent a quarter of this total and relate two main countries of destination, Malaysia and Thailand. Malaysia attracts people from Indonesia (1.6 million), Myanmar (0.3 million), the Philippines (0.1 million) and Vietnam (0.089 million). Thailand receives migrants from Myanmar (1.8 million), Lao PDR (1.3 million), and Cambodia (0.7 million). Singapore takes in workers from Indonesia and the Philippines. Around 16 percent of the population of Lao PDR are living abroad. Migrant workers represent 39 percent of the workforce in Singapore, 17 percent in Malaysia and 8 percent in Thailand [22]. Present migrations from China are not well documented, but they reflect the rising influence of this country.

Three quarters of people who migrate from the region go to former colonial powers (France, Britain, the Netherlands and the USA) and countries of refuge (the same plus Germany and Australia) and also to the Arab Peninsula (2 million Indonesians and the same number from the Philippines), following the flows of globalization, in common with their counterparts from South Asia.

Vietnam and the Philippines have very diversified diasporas, from Japan and South Korea to Australia, the USA, Canada, Europe, and the Gulf States.

Evaluations by the World Bank (based on International Monetary Fund (IMF) analysis) show that remittances to Southeast Asia were worth USD 73 billion in 2018, 11 percent of the world total and more than those directed to China (USD 64 billion): the Philippines (USD 38 billion); Vietnam (USD 16 billion); Indonesia (USD 11.5 billion); Thailand (USD 7.4 billion); Myanmar (USD 2.7 billion); Malaysia (USD 1.8 billion); Cambodia (USD 0.414 billion); and Lao PDR (USD 0.149 billion) [23].

> *Migrant workers represent 39 percent of the workforce in Singapore, 17 percent in Malaysia and 8 percent in Thailand.*





	Top 5 of outward migration in 2017					Top 5 of inward migration in 2017				
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th
Brunei	India	Malaysia	UK	Canada	Australia	Malaysia	Thailand	Philippines	Indonesia	India
Cambodia	Thailand	USA	France	Australia	Canada	Vietnam	Thailand	China	France	Laos
Indonesia	Saudi Arabia	Malaysia	United Arab Emirates	Singapore	Bangladesh	China	Korea	UK	Thailand	Singapore
Laos	Thailand	USA	Bangladesh	France	Canada	Vietnam	China	Cambodia	Thailand	Myanmar
Malaysia	Singapore	Bangladesh	Australia	USA	UK	Indonesia	Bangladesh	Myanmar	India	Philippines
Myanmar	Thailand	Malaysia	Saudi Arabia	Bangladesh	USA	China	India	Bangladesh		
Philippines	USA	Saudi Arabia	United Arab Emirates	Canada	Japan	China	USA	Japan	India	Korea
Singapore	Malaysia	Australia	UK	USA	Indonesia	Malaysia	China	Indonesia	India	Bangladesh
Thailand	USA	Germany	Australia	Japan	UK	Myanmar	Laos	Cambodia	China	India
Vietnam	USA	Australia	Canada	France	Korea	Thailand	Myanmar	Bangladesh	Indonesia	Laos

8.4 EDUCATION IN ASEAN AT THE DAWN OF THE 4TH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

The Thai ASEAN Presidency in 2019 set for itself the objective of "advancing the partnership for sustainability". One of the issues that the Thai Presidency believes requires urgent attention is the impact of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) to enable ASEAN to keep pace with global innovations and to make use of them in a way that contributes to sustainable development [24].

The 10 ASEAN States are aware that the challenges of the 4IR require an education strategy adapted to the new generation. The Ministers of Education jointly declared at the end of a formal meeting on 31 October 2018 in Nay Pyi Taw (Myanmar) that "We must be visionary in our approach and consider new and innovative ways in which we provide education. To this end, we commit to ensuring inclusive education in ASEAN as well as inculcating lifelong learning through further education reforms" [25].

> *"We must be visionary in our approach and consider new and innovative ways in which we provide education."*

Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have been included in some indicators of sustainable development goals (SDGs) [26]. The integration of ICT into education has become an essential mechanism that can improve the quality of teaching and learning while addressing issues of inclusion, equality and quality [27]. The Qingdao Declaration on ICT in Education, adopted at the World Education Forum in Incheon in 2015, stated that ICTs offer, *inter alia,* various ways of accessing educational opportunities and providing learning resources [27]. Promoting the quality of learning requires a sustained commitment, and governments play a key role in integrating basic ICT skills and information literacy into educational programs, starting in primary school.

At a time of the 4IR, made possible by the application of big data in the economy (digitalization, artificial intelligence, blockchain), the key subjects on which the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) ranking is based, namely reading, mathematics and science, are particularly relevant to those who wish to look at the state of education in the countries of the world in relation to their preparation for this Revolution.

In the latest Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) PISA survey published in 2015 [28], Singapore surpasses the rest of the world, outperforming Japan, Estonia, Finland and Canada. Although in the early years of its independence Singapore was only a poor and underdeveloped island, its human resources have always been its most valuable asset. Today, Singapore is a dynamic global center of trade, finance and transport, with a harmonious community of citizens of different ethnicities and religions. Its transformation from "third world to first world" in a generation is a major success story in Asia [29].

The other ASEAN countries in the latest PISA ranking are Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam. It is worth mentioning that China, which ranks 10th, and Vietnam, 22nd, are both ahead of the other permanent

members of the United Nations Security Council, the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom, and Russia, which are respectively 31st, 25th, 23rd and 28th. While Vietnamese students performed better than the OECD's average in science and mathematics, the trends of PISA results suggest that the mathematical, scientific and reading skills of most 15-year-old Thai students who were graduating from compulsory education (Grade 9) were still below average in terms of international standards.

Basic national education in Thailand has been reorganized to transform the skills of the country's population to reflect global economic trends and social changes with a focus on STIM subjects (science, technology, engineering and mathematics), considered vital for the twenty-first century along with English language proficiency. Despite this, reports of the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) place Thailand at the bottom of the list in terms of quality of primary education, competitiveness of technological, scientific and mathematical skills and mastery of English. The budget allocation for national education, which has increased and is one of the highest in ASEAN [30], has not, however, improved the quality of small schools in rural areas to the level of those in large cities, even though primary and secondary enrolment increased between 2012 and 2015.

Although Indonesia is 62nd in the PISA ranking compared to 56th for Thailand, its current trajectory points to a promising development. The OECD states that: "[I]f Indonesia can keep up that pace of improvement, its children born today have a realistic chance to match the science performance of their peers in the industrialised world by 2030, the year for which the United Nation's Sustainable Development Goals expect every student to benefit from quality education" [31].

> *"[I]f Indonesia can keep up that pace of improvement, its children born today have a realistic chance to match the science performance of their peers in the industrialised world by 2030."*

Other ASEAN countries did not participate in the 2015 survey but deserve special attention, such as Malaysia, which took the initiative in the early 1990s to introduce the use of ICTs in primary and secondary education. In 1999, the Smart School Flagship program was introduced. The Smart School Roadmap and the ICT in Education Policy 2010 have enabled the development of a basic ICT infrastructure and the integration of ICT into the teaching and learning process [31]. The implementation of the Smart School Flagship program was consolidated in 2010 by enabling 10,000 schools to become smart schools by providing them with ICT facilities, equipment and skills and by deploying enabling technologies in these schools. In 2016, Malaysia achieved a 100 percent electrification rate thanks to its substantial success in rural development. The Malaysian government has spent RM36 billion (USD 8.58 billion) to develop smart schools and basic education to strengthen the entire education system and develop its functioning [32].

Malaysian government spending on primary and secondary education, expressed as a percentage of GDP, has been the highest in East Asia since 1980. In 2011, the amount spent (3.8 percent of GDP or 16 percent of total public expenditure) was comparable to that

of the most lauded systems such as Singapore, Japan and Korea [33].

Despite levels of government spending on education, enrolment, infrastructure development and curriculum improvement equivalent to those of the region's developed economies, and even though Malaysian students are performing better than their Indonesian peers according to the 2012 PISA test results, Malaysian students were significantly behind low-income countries like Vietnam, which now has the highest rate of expenditure on education expressed as a percentage of GDP in ASEAN.

The press questions the disparities within ASEAN and wonders about the objective of the Thai ASEAN Presidency: "[w]hile meticulous efforts and investments will be required to reach Thailand 4.0, what impact will this have on all poor migrant workers in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar who depend on Thailand for their employment?" [34].

> *"[W]hat impact will this have on all poor migrant workers in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar who depend on Thailand for their employment?"*

Map 21: Education in ASEAN



8.5 ECONOMY AND TRADE

With a total GDP of USD 2.7 trillion in 2017, ASEAN is the fifth largest world economic grouping, after the European Union, the USA, China and Japan. The levels of development are rather heterogeneous, with a regional average of USD 4,000 per person, from USD 1,100 per person in Cambodia to USD 52,000 per person in Singapore. With open economies, the bloc is worth 8 percent of world trade. Incoming investments totaled USD 134 billion at the end of 2017, close to the Chinese figures. ASEAN is well integrated into transnational value chains (cars, electronics, computers and data processing). Average annual growth has reached 5.1 percent since 2011, and the IMF predicted 5.2 percent for 2019 [35].

The region has strong foundations for growth: it has a young population (50 percent are 28 years old or below), a concentration of populations in urban areas (90 million people will migrate to cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants in the next decade) and connectivity is good (the penetration of mobile phones is 133 percent). Accordingly, the need for improved infrastructure is huge, estimated by the Asian Development Bank to be USD 210 billion between 2016 and 2030 [36].

Economic growth has two advantages, first for domestic development, and second to assert the geopolitical importance of the region. ASEAN integration is an advantage. The "Moving Beyond 2015" scoreboard wonders if ASEAN should move towards a customs union with free movement of labor and capital. A report by the ASEAN secretariat shows progress on tariffs (0 percent for the six advanced countries, and a maximum of 5 percent for the Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) group, but intra-regional trade is currently stuck at less than 25 percent of the members' total trade [37]. Limited liberalization has been restricted to only five sectors, and regional and sub-regional connectivity is still low. There is a noticeable disconnect between the economy and institutions, but regional institutions do offer funding for integration projects. It remains to be seen how the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) will coordinate its financing provided by the Asian Development Bank (with headquarters in Manila and significant Japanese influence) and the World Bank in Washington.

Regional integration is less the effect of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) than of the insertion of the ASEAN countries into the global value chains animated by transnational companies in key sectors from electronics and the car industry to textiles. Japan and South Korea constitute the reference points to follow for long-lasting growth. Major countries are able to conduct necessary transformations to benefit from globalization - agricultural development as a basis for income, provision of public services in education and health, stability to facilitate investments and growth, and opening to international markets which offers opportunities, despite the shocks.

As only 25 percent of trade is intra-regional, growth is not based on regional demand but upon major markets in the USA, Europe, Japan and, increasingly, China. ASEAN will not escape the impact of the trade conflicts between Washington and Beijing, which could curb intra-regional relations and lead to a kind of division between continental

Southeast Asia under Chinese influence and peninsular Southeast Asia linked to Singapore and Indonesia [35].

ASEAN countries joined the global economy before they were properly integrated into the regional economy. External initiatives (several countries are negotiating free trade agreements with the United States, Japan and China) have often come before internal plans. The ASEAN Economic Community is, therefore, just one piece in a larger puzzle of competing projects such as ASEAN+6 for Japan, the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement for the United States (approved in 2015, and cancelled in 2017) and a free-trade zone for China. The EU, the region's third-largest trade partner, is also in negotiations (2018).

Map 22: GDP and GNP by Country

Legend

GDP per Capita ($, 2016)

- > 50,000
- 25,000 - 30,000
- 15,000 - 20,000
- 10,000 - 15,000
- < 10,000

4.4 Growth Rate (%, 2016)

GNP ($ billions, 2016)



COUNTRY	GNP in 2016
SOUTH EAST ASIA	2554
Brunei	13
Cambodia	20
Indonesia	943
Laos	14
Malaysia	297
Myanmar	68
Philippines	303
Singapore	295
Thailand	396
Vietnam	205

Sources: IMF ; Asian Development Outlook.

8.6 INFRASTRUCTURE

> *[I]f all of these infrastructure mega-projects are completed in the coming decade, the Southeast Asia we know could be transformed into a bloc of developed nations. Even with the massive infrastructure projects planned for the region, infrastructure demand is still expected to rise.*

As suggested by The ASEAN Post: "In Southeast Asia of late, the spotlight has been on the many ambitious infrastructure projects happening across the region. In the Philippines, President Duterte's "Build!, Build!, Build!" infrastructure plan is underway with 75 different projects estimated to cost the country USD 180 billion. In Indonesia, a high-speed rail system covering a distance of 140 kilometers connecting Jakarta to Bandung is also currently underway. Malaysia and Singapore are working on a high-speed rail project that would reduce commute times between the two nations. Consequently, if all of these infrastructure mega-projects are completed in the coming decade, the Southeast Asia we know could be transformed into a bloc of developed nations. Even with the massive infrastructure projects planned for the region, infrastructure demand is still expected to rise" [38].

According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), developing Asia will need to invest USD 26 trillion over the 15 years from 2016 to 2030, or USD 1.7 trillion per year [39], if the region is to maintain its growth momentum, eradicate poverty, and respond to climate change (climate-adjusted estimate). Without climate change mitigation and adaptation costs, USD 22.6 trillion will be needed, or USD 1.5 trillion per year (baseline estimate).

Of the total climate-adjusted investment needs in the period from 2016 to 2030, USD 14.7 trillion will be needed for power and USD 8.4 trillion for transport. Investment in telecommunications will reach USD 2.3 trillion, with water and sanitation costs at USD 800 billion over the same period.

- East Asia will account for 61 percent of climate-adjusted investment needs through to 2030. As a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), however, the Pacific leads all other sub-regions, requiring investments valued at 9.1 percent of GDP. This is followed by South Asia at 8.8 percent, Central Asia at 7.8 percent, Southeast Asia at 5.7 percent, and East Asia at 5.2 percent of GDP.

- Currently, the region invests an estimated USD 881 billion annually in infrastructure (for 25 economies with adequate data, comprising 96 percent of the region's population). The infrastructure investment gap—the difference between investment needs and current investment levels—equals 2.4 percent of projected GDP for the 5-year period from 2016 to 2020 when incorporating climate mitigation and adaptation costs.

- Without the People's Republic of China (PRC), the gap for the remaining economies rises to a much higher 5 percent of their projected GDP. Fiscal

reforms could generate additional revenues equivalent to 2 percent of GDP to bridge around 40 percent of the gap for these economies. For the private sector to fill the remaining 60 percent of the gap, or 3 percent of GDP, it would have to increase investments from the current sum of USD 63 billion today to as high as USD 250 billion a year over the period 2016 to 2020.

The Chinese government is increasing its emphasis on global connectivity in an effort to bolster trade, as exemplified by the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Given the growing importance of Southeast Asia in the global arena and its close proximity to China, a large part of Chinese investment funds have been focused on this region [g]. The Chinese strategy towards Southeast Asia aims to reduce its dependency on the Malacca Straits and to secure direct access to the Indian Ocean via Myanmar (a new harbor is under construction at Kyaukpyu, after the 2017 completion of the pipeline to Yunnan). The Chinese tactics demonstrate the complementarity between the BRI and the Greater Mekong Sub-Region projects. The priority is the China-Southeast Asia Economic Corridor [40].

Thailand is a key country in respect of enhancing connectivity in continental Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam), notably through the ambitious Eastern Economic Corridor and the AMECS Initiative (Ayeyawady - Chao Pharaya - Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy), which started in 2003, to support development in the Mekong region [41].

China has begun a USD 23 billion investment in a network of railways including the Singapore-Kunming Rail Link (SKRL). The initial investment extends the existing high-speed rail network within China through Lao PDR to Vientiane. This would then link up with the Bangkok-Nong Khai line, which is separately being developed at a government-to-government level between Thailand and China [42].

In parallel, the Singapore and Malaysian governments have started the procurement process for the Kuala Lumpur-Singapore High Speed Rail Link. This megaproject will not only enhance connectivity between ASEAN and China, it will also fuel economic growth, train skilled workers and create jobs [43].

In 2016, regional leaders of ASEAN adopted a new master plan of connectivity in the region. It aims to create the mechanisms for the development of sustainable infrastructure, the strengthening of digital innovation, the creation of seamless logistics, the adoption of new standards and further enabling the mobility of people. And since the BRI shares the same objectives, ASEAN countries are trying to leverage the potential opportunities it presents. One such example is the BRI Connect Platform launched by the Singapore Business Federation (SBF) and Chinese Enterprises Association in August 2017. This platform aims to facilitate connectivity between companies in Singapore looking to provide expertise and professional services, and companies taking on B&R (Belt and Road) projects [44]. Another program developed by ASEAN is that of the “single window” which involves the development of the electronic exchange of trade-related documents among ASEAN Members. Launched in 2018, this program is used by five states (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam) and Thailand joined in 2019 [45]. Furthermore, in 2018, thanks to some funding from the Asian Development Bank, a railway line connecting Thailand to Cambodia was rebuilt; regular services started in July 2019. However, a question relates to how far the BRI, focused on North-South corridors, is in competition with regional programs, which give priority to West-East connections to promote regional integration.

Map 23: Infrastructure - Regional Connections

8.7 PEACE AND SECURITY

There is no collective security mechanism in the northeast or the southeast of the vast Asia-Pacific region. Nonetheless, the existing forums for dialogue, even the informal ones, are extremely useful. These include: the 1994 ASEAN Regional Forum, which includes partners such as the EU; the meeting of ASEAN defense ministers; the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore; and various formats for regional dialogue (ASEAN +1 and +3).

ASEAN - as more a process (a place for debate, informal track II and III diplomacy) than a goal - is regarded as a force for peace and stability. It was set up at a time of tensions (the 1963 Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation; Singapore's secession in 1965; and Manila's claims to Sabah), and was wise enough to open its ranks to countries it had originally been created to oppose (Vietnam). It can play a federating role in a region anxious about the rise of China. There is an on-going debate within ASEAN about the possibilities and means of creating a security architecture to counter traditional and unconventional threats, many of them transnational.

There are recurring tensions over maritime borders in the South China Sea between China (and Taiwan) on one side, and Vietnam and the Philippines on the other. These borders straddle some of the world's busiest seaways. Since China is expanding its influence, some ASEAN countries are seeking security agreements with the United States and developing their own defense capabilities. Southeast Asia is a pivotal region, and what happens here has a wider global impact due to the conflicting interests of major powers from outside the region. That is why ASEAN has a key role and is an attractive partner for outside countries.

The idea of a security community was first raised in Bali in 2002. There has been an intensification of security relations within the region, exemplified by an annual conference of chiefs of defense staff, ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meetings (ADMM) since 2006, ASEAN Defense Senior Officials' Meetings (ADSOM) since 2009, and the ASEAN Maritime Forum and Information Fusion Centre. These have the general aim of encouraging ASEAN Member States to promote balanced diplomacy in order to avoid being caught between the two great powers.

CONTENTIOUS TERRITORIAL AND BORDER ISSUES

The principle of intangibility of borders inherited from colonial times has been respected in Southeast Asia. But some contentious issues remain relating to a precise drawing of several segments of the international borders (Vietnam and Cambodia, Cambodia and Lao PDR, Lao PDR and Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, and Timor Leste and Indonesia). One such example, the Preah Vihear issue, was definitively closed by the International Court of Justice in November 2013.

There are no lack of territorial disputes on land and at sea. However, various joint development zones have been successfully established in areas where interests determine that disputes should be set aside. One such example followed the signing of an agreement in 1979 by the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority (MTJA - updated in 1990) to manage an area of 7250 square kilometers for joint oil and gas extraction by Hess Oil, the PTT Exploration and Production Public Company Limited, and Petronas.

Contentious maritime issues are a diplomatic headache [46] due to the geographical configurations (two archipelagic states, one divided into two parts, several straits of major interest), economic stakes (oil and gas, and fisheries) and the strategic assertiveness shown by China that wants access and sometimes disregards the Law of the Sea. There are a number of islands and reefs claimed by a dozen riverine states. Furthermore, 50 percent of world maritime transit goes through the South China Sea and the straits, and the traffic has increased eight times in 30 years. No way out is yet in sight.

The region is located in a pivotal area of Asia that is changing rapidly under the influence of established powers and rising economies. In this respect, the nascent Chinese "One Belt One Road" project offers fresh prospects. The background picture is the emergence of a bipolar world – either real or supposed – dominated by China and the United States. This incidentally offers new room to maneuver for the countries of Southeast Asia, as it allows them to play the two powers off against each other. 'This rivalry between China and the US has become a structuring factor in the strategic landscape of Southeast Asia, since States in the region see this stand-off as an opportunity to diversify their partnerships, in line with a diplomatic tradition that is deeply embedded in the region's varying strategies, and play the competitors off against each other to keep their freedom of movement" [47].

Map 24: ASEAN Land Border Issues



Sources: For a complete list of sources see page 224

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Map 25: South China Sea Issue



Sources: I Made Andi Arsana, Department of Geodetic Engineering, Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia

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Map 26: Gulf of Thailand Issue



Sources: J.R.V. Prescott, The Gulf of Thailand: maritime limits to conflict and cooperation, MIMA, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 1998, p. 9-11

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8.8 OTHER ISSUES

8.8.1 ASEAN MOVING TOWARDS A DIGITAL AND GREEN ECONOMY

GROWTH POTENTIAL

ASEAN, with a population of more than 657 million people in 2019, has achieved a robust economic growth, averaging 5.3 percent since 2000, and generating a total GDP of USD 2.8 trillion in 2017 (Table 1), becoming the world's fifth largest and Asia's third largest economy [48]. This growth has lifted hundreds of millions of people from poverty, and has coincided with rapid urbanization across the region. The IMF projects this growth will continue and stabilize at around five percent over the next half decade, which is a bit slower than its regional peers including China (5.7 percent) and India (7.3 percent). The growth in the region has been and will be led by ASEAN 5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam) which accounted for 84 percent of the total ASEAN GDP in 2017 and about 86 percent in 2024, compared to the CLM countries' (Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar) share of about 3.6 percent and 3.9 percent for the same years.

TABLE 1: CURRENT AND PROJECTED GDP AND REAL GROWTH BY ASEAN MEMBER STATES, 2017 - 2024

	GDP in Billions (Current prices in USD)		GDP per Capita (Current price in USD)		Real GDP growth (Annual percent change)			
	2017	2024	2017	2024	2017	2018	2019	Av. 2020-24
China	12,062	20,979	8,677	14,812	6.8	6.6	6.1	5.7
India	2,652	4,632	2,014	3,210	7.2	6.8	6.1	7.3
ASEAN	2,777	4,375	4,323	6,342	5.3	5.2	4.6	5.1
ASEAN 5	**2,324**	**3,744**	**5,184**	**7,804**	**5.7**	**5.5**	**4.9**	**5.3**
1. Indonesia	1,015	1,596	3,885	5,667	5.1	5.2	5	5.2
2. Malaysia	319	505	9,960	14,468	5.7	4.7	4.5	4.8
3 Philippines	314	548	2,989	4,674	6.7	6.2	5.7	6.4
4. Thailand	455	700	6,731	10,257	4	4.1	2.9	3.5
5. Vietnam	220	395	2,353	3,952	6.8	7.1	6.5	6.5
Brunei & Singapore	**351**	**455**	**44,267**	**53,023**	**2.5**	**1.6**	**1.2**	**2.6**
6. Brunei	12	14	28,237	30,414	1.3	0.1	1.8	3.3
7. Singapore	338	441	60,297	75,632	3.7	3.1	0.5	1.9
CLM Countries	**101**	**172**	**1,669**	**2,664**	**6.7**	**6.9**	**6.5**	**6.5**
8. Cambodia	22	40	1,386	2,260	7	7.5	7	6.6
9. Laos PDR	17	30	2,455	3,856	6.8	6.3	6.4	6.7
10. Myanmar	61	102	1,166	1,875	6.3	6.8	6.2	6.2

Source: International Monetary Fund (October 2019) available https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/datasets

> *This will require establishing a conducive regulatory environment and promoting technological advancement to enable inclusive growth*

ASEAN Member States (AMS) have been working together to respond to the AEC Blueprint 2025 and the ASEAN Competition Action Plan (ACAP) 2016-2025 for attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and increasing trading partnerships regionally and globally. Collective efforts of AMS have been able to increase the flow of FDI from 2000 to 2017 remarkably, despite a drop of almost 50 percent during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 - 2009. Notably, FDI reached USD 27 billion from intra-ASEAN and USD 108.6 billion from extra-ASEAN sources over this period (Table 2). Evidence of this success can also be seen in the positive trade balance of USD 1,322 billion in exports and 1,252 billion in imports in 2017, up from just USD 425 billion in exports and USD 365 billion in imports in 2000 [49].

TABLE 2: ASEAN TRADING PARTNERS, 2017

	US$ Billion	Percentage Share
Intra-ASEAN	310.8	24%
Trade Partners	1,011.4	76%
China	186.5	14%
EU-28	158.0	12%
USA	142.7	11%
Japan	105.8	8%
Korea	55.0	4%
India	45.3	3%
Australia	34.6	3%
Canada	7.8	1%
Russia	5.9	0%
New Zealand	5.5	0%
Other	264.4	20%

Source: ASEAN year Book 2018 [48,p.43]

Relative export growth in AMS is uneven, depending how much each country participates in global production networks and the extent to which each benefits from the certainty and opportunities afforded by a rules-based trading system. GDP growth rates of most AMS slowed down in 2018 and remained sluggish in 2019 (Table 1), affected by uncertainties ranging from increasing trade tensions, effects of climate change, political uncertainty and overdependence on external trade [50]. Despite having all of these headwinds, several AMS remained resilient as a result of strong domestic demand coinciding with rapid urbanization and a growing middle class, which also helps to attract FDI [51].

ASEAN continues to lure global investors due to the regions' dynamism and commitment to broadening economic integration. This potential is bolstered by a growing workforce in the region. Over 100 million people are estimated to have joined ASEAN's workforce over the past 20 years, and another 59 million are expected to be added by 2030[57]; which will make this region the third largest labor force in the world, behind China and India [51].

ASEAN is home to young, literate and increasingly urbanized and aspirational populations. Domestic demand is expected to maintain momentum, especially household spending, as labor markets are expected to remain vibrant [58]. To build on their success stories, AMS realize that steps must be taken to help eradicate poverty, reduce social inequality, create more decent jobs, speed up infrastructure development, improve workforce productivity, and strengthen national institutions for long-term growth [59]. AMS together

have committed to create a conducive regulatory environment and promote technological advancement that will enable inclusive growth and enhance the capability of the region's growing workforce. Despite a mixed level of economic development, ASEAN is moving forward to utilize advanced technology and digital tools in order to sustain growth in the region [47, 50, 51]. The political leaders of AMS have also committed to boost electronic commerce and the digital economy, with the region looking outward through a deepening of intra-ASEAN cooperation and the broadening of ASEAN's external relations by signing several agreement on digital transformation towards Industry 4.0 [60].

DIGITAL ECONOMY

Southeast Asia is in the process of adopting various aspects of the digital economy including the use of internet and social media; e-commerce; digital financial services; and cross-border services trade [61]. The World Bank and the MFI have credited the region with laying the foundations to become a digitized economy and society over the next decade; and this transition should also stimulate greater regional and global economic integration [62]. With the prospect of becoming the fourth largest economy in the world by 2030, this region is characterized by a demographic shift towards a younger population, with a modernization of lifestyles and a rapid adoption of digital technologies, which should help to support the growth of the region's economy. As seen in the spread of many mobile-first markets in the region, ASEAN has seen a rapid increase in internet access and use of technologies (Annex 1) that will continue to boost the growth of its digital economy by more than seven times, from USD 31 billion in 2015 [63] to an expected USD 240 billion in 2025 (Figure 1) [64].

In 2016, the digital economy was estimated at about 7 percent of ASEAN GDP compared to 35 percent in the United States and 16 percent in China from all forms of those economic processes, transactions, interactions and activities that function using the internet of things (IoT). Although it still lags behind its global peers, the ASEAN digital economy generates revenues of USD 150 billion per year [53, p25], which if fully tapped, can contribute an additional USD 1 trillion to its economy by 2025 [62, p25].

More than 450 million people in ASEAN, who account for 10 percent of global internet users, now have access to the internet in 2019 (Annex 1), a rapid increase from the 127 million in 2011 [62, p42]. Disparities of internet access persist across countries in the region while the average proportion of internet users in eight ASEAN countries is well above the global average of 57 percent. A few countries including Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar, though behind their regional peers, have recently seen expanded connectivity and access to online services.

Notably, AMS have experienced rising investment in their digital economies, including e-commerce, financial technology, the development of data centers and ICT infrastructure. This growth is evidenced across a range of industries and commercial sectors, including financial services, consumer goods, medical services and equipment, telecom and transportation, and in a few countries, automation [61].

Strengthening the investment climate is a perquisite for supporting the impetus of digitalized economy toward inclusive economic integration among AMS according to the global ranking of the ease of doing business by the World Bank in late 2019 [65]. Except Singapore, ranked as an advanced digital nation followed by Malaysia, the successful adoption of the

digital economy in other AMS will depend on their respective ability to responsed to and evolve, including connectivity, skills, payments, logistics and cross-cutting policies and regulations, to realize their growth potentials shown in figure 1.

The digital transformation is under the umbrellas of several agreements on digital transformation towards the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Industry 4.0) already signed by the leaders of AMS. Notably, the first e-commerce agreement, reached in November 2018, realizing the region's potential growth of digital economy, has fueled a transformation of the region into a competitive global digital hub, intensifying cooperation to enhance the competitiveness of ICT industries, the development of e-business and the facilitation of digital connectivity [58].

Ecommerce spending in the region passed USD 50 billion in 2018, with an annual increase of more than 20 percent. The internet economy is expected to reach 8 percent of Southeast Asia' GDP by 2025, up from approximately 3 percent in 2018 [65].

AMS are taking steps at the national level to encourage this transformation. For example, Singapore has implemented its own Smart City initiative while Thailand has plans to develop digital capacities in all economic sectors. Vietnam approved a project of national digital transformation in November 2019 aiming to position the country as a leading digital economy of ASEAN by 2030. Malaysia established the world's first Digital Free Trade Zone in 2017 while Indonesia is positioning itself to become Southeast Asia's largest digital economy over the next few years[66].

Digital technologies have been increasingly adopted by financial service providers across ASEAN countries to improve efficiency, which has benefited both individuals (Annex 1) and SME sectors. Further facilitating digital integration by small and medium enterprises (SME) has the potential to boost ASEAN's combined economy by USD 1 trillion before 2025 [55]. SMEs currently represent approximately 97 percent of enterprises, account for nearly 50 percent of ASEAN's GDP and employ more than 80 percent of the region's workforce.

However, SMEs contribute just 20 percent of their countrys' export values. Only 16 percent of SMEs utilize digital tools, while 75 percent see opportunity for digital integration in their business. SMEs can follow the lead of the export sector, where adoption of digital tools is more prevalent [55].

Encouraging digital skills training for workforces and vocational training of SMEs while securing access to reliable and affordable energy are keys to the successful growth of the digital economy, society and smart cities in ASEAN.

FIGURE 1: VALUE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA'S ONLINE ECONOMY IN USD BILLIONS, 2019 - 2025 [56]



TABLE 3: MAIN FEATURES OF DIGITAL GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES, 2018

	Level			Most Common Policy Areas						Main Funding Sources			
	Central	Regional	Local	General public services	Education	Economic	Health	Recreation, culture and religion	Social protection	Ministry charged with coordinating the strategy	The ministries and authorities covered by the strategy	Separate earmarked central government fund	Varying sources depending on the specific ICT projects in the strategy
Brunei Darussalam	●	○	○	●	●	○	●	●	●	○	●	●	○
Cambodia	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○
Indonesia	●	○	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	●	●	○	●
Lao PDR	●	●	○	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	●	●
Malaysia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○
Myanmar	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	●	●	●	○
Philippines	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○
Singapore	●	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○
Thailand	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Viet Nam	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○
SEA Total	**10**	**6**	**7**	**10**	**8**	**7**	**7**	**7**	**7**	**7**	**8**	**5**	**3**
Australia	●	○	○	●	●	●	○	●	●	○	●	○	○
Japan	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	○
Korea	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	○	○
New Zealand	○	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●
OECD Total	**25**	**12**	**10**	**25**	**16**	**15**	**13**	**9**	**14**	**14**	**19**	**4**	**8**

Note: This Table is reproduced from OECD/ADB (2019), p. 91 Yes = ●, No = ○

All AMS have recently developed a national strategy for e-government at the central level (Table 3). Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam have implemented these digital strategies at the sub-national level, while Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam are implementing them at the local level [67].

Integrating and adopting these digital technologies varies widely across sectors of public service, and there is uneven progress and a need for effective coordination to harmonize digital strategy within and across AMS. This commitment is a promising sign, an example of regional cooperation and integration facilitated by digital connection within and across ASEAN Member States to develop a more digital society and economy.

However, about 10 percent of the population still lacked access to electricity in 2017; and around 20 percent of the population in Southeast Asia was without stable electricity [68]. To achieve universal access to electricity via a secured energy supply by 2040, and to accommodate an estimated six percent per year increase in demand for electricity in Southeast Asia[69], there is a need for about USD 104 billion in investment towards expanding the supply capacity of fuel and electricity across the region[70]. In the context of environment sustainability, AMS need to find ways to increase the energy supply in a sustainable manner, working to minimize pollution of all species: air pollution, greenhouse gases, fresh water, groundwater and land. Within ASEAN, the risks posed by coal incineration

and the use of biofuels are particularly prominent.

GREEN ECONOMY

The green economy refers to carbon neutral economic and development activities which help reduce emission of greenhouse gas (CO2), or technological innovations which are supported by clean and renewable sources of energy. It requires investing in natural capital, decarbonizing the economy, and creating green jobs. A true green economy needs to involve a wide range of activities and environments, including agriculture, cities, forests, renewable energy, transport, water, buildings, fisheries, industry, tourism, and waste management. Technological innovations encompass the use of digital technologies, digital infrastructure, information and communication technologies (ICT), digital content creation and the building of digital skills.

The integration of the digital and green economy into a synergetic engine for sustainable development has become a global priority of policy action in response to the Rio-20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012 [54]. For its part, the success of the green economy will largely depend on a speedy transformation towards renewable and clean energy for supporting economic and development activities (Annex 2), particularly the digital and advanced technological economy. Opportunities exist to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by transitioning from traditional carbon based fuels to low carbon based sources of energy consumption for heating and production.

In ASEAN, the commitment to boost renewable energy (RE) deployment, and energy efficiency and conservation (EE&C) measures are highlighted in the ASEAN Plan of APAEC 2016-2025 "Enhancing Energy Connectivity and Market Integration in ASEAN to Achieve Energy Security, Accessibility, Affordability and Sustainability for All". For the green economy, the ASEAN target is to achieve 23 percent of renewable energy use by 2025, which currently accounts for around 15 percent, excluding the traditional use of solid biomass [70]. The key initiatives in Phase 1 1996 - 2020 are: (1) embark on multilateral electricity trading to accelerate the realization of the ASEAN Power Grid, (2) enhance gas connectivity by expanding the focus of the Trans-ASEAN gas pipeline to include liquefied natural gas regasification terminals, and (3) promote clean coal technologies. The APAEC also wishes to achieve higher aspirational targets to improve energy efficiency and to increase the transition to renewable energy sources in addition to building civilian nuclear energy capacities [55].

Steps are being taken to modernize financing regulations, including in the transportation sector to streamline electric vehicle utilization. AMS have also embarked on an energy deregulation journey, reducing energy intensity (the amount of energy used to produce each dollar of GDP) and using market-based pricing to encourage more efficient and greener alternatives in order to generate power in a socially, economically, and environmentally sustainable manner.

In the future, the expanding green and digital economies are likely to increase their convergence; IoT economic activities are emerging as a path towards a green economy and as a way to more efficiently use energy and also reduce CO2 emissions when paired with clean electricity, which increasingly can be sourced at the lowest cost from renewable energy [52]. This green IoT economy offers a chance to not only significantly reduce environmental hazards, but also to improve people's well-being and equality along with addressing ecological scarcities [53].

ANNEX 1: OVERVIEW OF DIGITALIZED ECONOMY IN ASEAN IN 2019/2020

	Population in Millions[56]	Percentage of the Population Living in Urban Areas[56]	Global Digital Index 2018 (Out of 183 Countries)*	Internet Users[8]		Speed of Internet Connection[8]				Financial Inclusion[8]				Ease of Doing Business (190 Countries[58]	
				Internet users as proportion of population	Change of internet users between 2018-2019	Average Speed of Mobile Internet Connection (MBPS)	Year-On-Year Change in Average Speed of Mobile Internet Connection	Average Speed of Fixed Internet Connection (MBPS)	Year-On-Year Change in Average Speed of Fixed Internet Connection	Bank account	Credit Card	Mobile Money Account	Makes online purchase and/or pays bills online	Raking from small is the best to largest number is the worse	Index Score (Maximum of 100, the best)
World	7,676	55%	N/A	57%	10.0%										
Southeast Asia	662	49%	N/A	63%	n/a										
ASEAN	657.7	53%	N/A	69%	12%										
Singapore	5.8	100%	8	84%	1.9%	61	13%	190.9	18%	98%	49%	10%	57%	2	86
Malaysia	32.3	76%	41	80%	3.0%	19.9	25%	63.5	187%	85%	21%	11%	39%	12	82
Brunei	0.4	78%	58	94%	0.2%	15	13%	14.9	8%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	66	70
Thailand	69.2	50%	61	82%	0.0%	17.6	29%	57.6	48%	82%	10%	8%	19%	21	80
Vietnam	97	36%	91	66%	0.0%	21.6	6.1%	27.2	10%	31%	4%	4%	21%	70	70
Philippines	107.3	47%	101	71%	13.0%	15.1	12%	19	25%	34%	2%	5%	10%	95	63
Indonesia	268.2	55%	109	56%	13.0%	10.5	7.2%	15.5	13%	49%	2%	3%	11%	73	70
Cambodia	16.4	23%	123	76%	56.0%	14.3	-14%	15.9	27%	22%	1%	6%	4%	144	54
Laos PDR	7	35%	159	39%	13.0%	22.8	76%	20.5	107%	29%	1%	N/A	7%	154	51
Myanmar	54.1	31%	160	39%	17.0%	24.2	60%	11.1	50%	26%	0%	1%	4%	165	47

Source: * The ASEAN Post Team. (2019).

ANNEX 2: ASEAN ECONOMY IN THE CONTEXT OF DIGITAL AND GREEN ECONOMY BY AMS

	Energy Source of Electricity Production 2015*		% of pop access to Electricity**		Access to Clean Fuels and Technology for Cooking (% of Pop.)**		Quality of electricity supply (1=low; 7=high)**		Greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents per GDP)**		Energy transition index 2019: Scale from 0-100% (Out of 115 Countries)***				2019 ENERGY TRILEMMA INDEX RANKING (128 Countries)****				
	% production of oil, gas and coal	% of electricity from Hydropower	2019	Change 2014-2019	2019	Change 2014-2019	Value 2019	Change 2014-2019	Value 2019	Change 2014-2019*	Rank (1 is the best)	ETI Score	System Performance	Transition Readiness	Trilemma scor (Scale 0 to 100)	Index Rank (1 is the Best)	Energy Security Rank	Energy Equity Rank	Environmental sustainability rank
Singapore	96.9%	0.0%	100	0%	100	0%	6.85	3%	199.0	+41%	13	67%	68%	65%	71.2	43	123	10	37
Brunei	100.0%	0.0%	100	0%	100	0%	5.41	4%	585.9	+23%	39	59%	67%	52%	67.7	56	92	44	66
Malaysia	90.0%	9.3%	100	-0.3%	96.3	-0.3%	5.88	2%	463.1	-10%	31	61%	68%	55%	68.5	51	41	52	87
Thailand	91.5%	2.7%	100	2.2%	74.4	2.2%	5.18	-1%	420.8	-7%	51	57%	63%	51%	64.6	68	76	71	79
Indonesia	89.3%	5.9%	98.14	32.9%	58.4	32.9%	4.43	4%	239.8	-32%	63	55%	64%	46%	64.1	69	34	88	85
Philippines	74.6%	10.5%	93	3%	43.2	3%	4.21	5%	281.0	-13%	59	55%	62%	49%	58.6	94	48	102	68
Laos PDR	n/a	n/a	93.6	12%	5.6	12%	4.8	-8%	328.9	-19%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Vietnam	63.3%	36.6%	100	33%	66.9	33%	4.34	10%	648.5	-7%	56	55%	62%	49%	58.9	91	21	97	110
Cambodia	53.6%	45.5%	89.07	47%	17.7	47%	3.47	9%	636.7	-26%	100	45%	46%	44%	51.6	105	77	110	92
Myanmar	41.1%	58.9%	69.81	52%	18.4	52%	2.72	-7%	449.1	-16%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	51.9	104	42	111	62

Sources: *World Bank Statistics

** World Energy Trilemma Index - Country Rankings available at https://knoema.com/ETI2017/world-energy-trilemma-index-country-rankings

***World Economic Forum (2019). Fostering Effective Energy Transition 2019 edition. [online] Avaiable at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Fostering_Effective_Energy_Transition_2019.pdf (Accessed on 19 December 2019)

Note: The Energy Transition Index benchmarks countries on the performance of their energy system, as well as their readiness for transition to a secure, sustainable, a ordable, and reliable energy future. ETI 2019 score on a scale from 0 to 100%.

**** World Energy Council.(2019). World Energy Trilemma Index 2019. [online]. Available at https://www.worldenergy.org/assets/downloads/WETrilemma_2019_Full_Report_v4_pages.pdf (Accessed on 20 December 2019)

Map 27: Growth, Digital Technology and the Green Economy



8.8.2 ASEAN SMEs

OVERVIEW

Small and medium sized enterprises, or SMEs, play a crucial role in the ASEAN economy. They account for more than 97 percent of businesses across all member countries (except Myanmar) and are responsible for a share of total employment ranging from 52 percent in Vietnam to 97 percent in Indonesia [71, 72].

Despite their prevalence in ASEAN economies, SMEs remain mostly in labor-intensive and low value-added sectors, principally retail and agriculture [73]. Accordingly, they account for less than 50 percent of GDP across Member Countries and contribute only a small share of exports, ranging from 10 percent to 30 percent [71]. Creating higher-skill and higher value-added SMEs is increasingly a priority across Member States as they seek to broaden their economic base while ensuring inclusive growth.

ASEAN Member States are at different stages of implementing policy support for SMEs, as reflected in the average score of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's SME policy index for each country [73, 75]. SMEs in countries at the lower end of the index face more difficulties obtaining technology, have weaker credit support, and face greater regulatory and administrative burdens compared to larger companies [73, 74]. The ranking suggests that Singapore and Malaysia have outperformed other members in their policy support of SMEs, while Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar lag behind their counterparts and remain focused on early stages of enhancing SME market access.

A PLAN TO MOVE FORWARD

The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) has developed the Strategic Action Plan for SME Development with the vision of promoting "globally competitive and innovative SMEs." [76]

The action plan has five strategic goals for 2016 to 2025:

1. Promote productivity, technology and innovation. Actions include promoting capital investment, fostering industrial clustering, and encouraging business-academia collaboration.

2. Increase access to finance. Actions include strengthening export financing facilities and improving traditional financing infrastructure.

3. Enhance market access and internationalization. Actions include promoting partnerships with large multinational companies and enhancing e-commerce.

4. Enhance policy and regulation environment. Actions include streamlining permits and registration to enable less costly and faster business formation.

5. Promote entrepreneurship and human capital development. Actions include promoting entrepreneurial education and enhancing management and technical skills of women and youth entering the workforce.

Key performance indicators have been identified for each goal to help Member States assess their own SME policies and prioritize areas for more action. While progress has been made, challenges remain.

Map 28: Small and Medium Enterprises



8.8.3 NEW BUSINESS MODELS AND DRIVING FORCES FOR ASEAN COUNTRIES

OVERVIEW

The Fourth Industrial Revolution promises to fundamentally transform economies and the way people work with digital technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, and 3D printing [77].

These technologies could offer immense benefits to the ASEAN business community. For example, mobile phone apps can democratize finance, put idle capital to better use, and empower micro business owners with the tools to build their businesses. Other smart technologies can ease administrative burdens and improve logistics to vastly expand market opportunities for ASEAN businesses.

But there are potential downsides. The skills required to effectively employ digital technologies could lead to growing income inequality unless matched by strategic investment in education [78]. This impact on inequality could be compounded if the shift to digital technologies crowds out investment in low-skilled manufacturing, where the largest growth in the ASEAN labor force is forecast over the next 15 years. According to the United Nations International Labour Organization, 56 percent of jobs in Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam are at high risk of being supplanted by automation [79]. Of particular concern, most of these jobs are held by women.

> *"According to the United Nations International Labour Organization, 56 percent of jobs in Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam are at high risk of being supplanted by automation."*

Digital technologies may also reshape global trade flows. For example, new manufacturing technologies such as 3D printing could lead to the reshoring of production in developed markets [80]. Other technologies such as AI chat bots and voice assistants are already threatening call center industries in low-cost countries [81].

Digital companies currently account for only 7 percent of ASEAN GDP and generate about USD 150 billion in revenues annually. It is expected that with a successful Fourth Industrial Revolution adoption strategy these companies could add another USD 1 trillion to the economy if fully tapped by 2025 [82].

> *"It is expected that with a successful Fourth Industrial Revolution adoption strategy these companies could add another USD 1 trillion to the economy if fully tapped by 2025."*

THE STATE OF READINESS

The Global Entrepreneurship Index assesses a country's readiness for the future of production, shown in the tables on Map 29: New Business Models and Driving Forces [83]. It measures a country's structure of production, which is its current baseline of production complexity (the mix and uniqueness of its products) and scale (the volume and value-added of its manufacturing output).

> *Malaysia and Singapore stand at a high-level of readiness, while Cambodia, Indonesia and Vietnam require significant investment and policy reform to prepare for the future.*

It also considers a country's drivers of production, which are the key enablers that will allow the country to benefit from the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Key enablers include its information and communications infrastructure, educational institutions, and whether its natural resources are sustainable. Countries in the top right quadrant are currently well positioned for the Fourth Industrial Revolution, while countries in the lower left quadrant are at significant risk of being unprepared for the future of production.

Among ASEAN countries, Malaysia and Singapore stand at a high-level of readiness, while Cambodia, Indonesia and Vietnam require significant investment and policy reform to prepare for the future.

THE WAY FORWARD

In its guide for innovation policy for developing countries, the World Bank likens government to a gardener that provides the conditions for technology-based growth to flourish [84]. Its analogy draws four points of action:

1. **Prepare the ground** by investing in human resources
2. **Fertilize the soil** by boosting research and development
3. **Water the plants** by providing financial support for innovation
4. **Remove weeds** by streamlining regulation, tax policy, and other competitive obstacles

But in addition to encouraging technology-based growth, governments must also prepare for technological disruption by investing in social safety nets like job-loss benefits and public pensions, as well as inequality-reducing measures such as health care and progressive tax reform [85].

When designing strategies for the Fourth Industrial Revolution, governments and private firms alike must keep in mind the challenges of navigating ASEAN's vastly different cultures, languages, religions, and economic circumstances. For example, language and cultural barriers can prevent labor mobility, leaving skills shortages unfilled, or result in product launch failures if a clever name for a mobile app in one country is an offensive term in another [85].

But diversity can also create opportunities. By tailoring a service to the language and culture of a particular ASEAN community, a firm can build a loyal customer base and capture market share from overseas competitors [86].

While there is great policy uncertainty about the future, what is clear is that a universal strategy for encouraging digital technology-based businesses in ASEAN is untenable. Policy strategies must be customized for each country's particular circumstances, with inclusive growth and the public interest foremost in mind [87].

> *[G]overnments and private firms alike must keep in mind the challenges of navigating ASEAN's vastly different cultures, languages, religions, and economic circumstances.*

Map 29: New Business Models and Driving Forces



8.8.4 SKILLS TRAINING, BUSINESS START-UPS AND INNOVATIONS

ASEAN STARTUP BACKGROUND

> *"There are over 350 million internet users in Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam alone."*

The economy in ASEAN is not only sizeable, the third largest in Asia, [88, 89] but it is also likely to be dynamic for years to come owing to the Association's young population. Of the 630 million people in ASEAN, 70 percent are under the age of 40 [36]. Combining this with the rapid economic growth, it is perhaps not surprising that it is the fastest growing internet region. There are over 350 million internet users in Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam alone. The internet usage is mainly driven by the ubiquity of smartphones, as these are the primary way to connect to the internet for 90 percent of ASEAN internet users [90]. There is another demographic shift in the ASEAN start-up and labor market: the increasing participation of women. ASEAN has over 61 million women entrepreneurs [91] and ASEAN countries scored high on gender equality in entrepreneurship in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (see the "measuring startups and innovation" section below) [92, 93]. This might have a cascading effect on the labor market as research in the region suggests that women entrepreneurs are more likely to hire female employees [94].

In short, ASEAN's young population, increasing internet connectivity, relatively high rankings on gender equality, and growing economy make it appealing for startups. However, there are potential obstacles to startups. Internet infrastructure (needed for high speeds) is not evenly distributed, and talent and investment capital are hard to come by [36]. In particular, the uneven education levels throughout ASEAN Member States is seen as an obstacle that needs attention [88]. An additional problem is that the majority of the ASEAN population is largely without access to credit or even a bank account [95].

It is this last challenge (i.e. the lack of formal banking) that also provides opportunities to startups; most new startups in ASEAN are in the areas of e-commerce, fintech, and on-demand services [36]. The "internet economy" grew 37 percent between 2017 and 2018 to reach USD 72 billion in gross merchandise value (GMV) in 2018 [90].

> *"It is estimated that there are 7,000 startups in ASEAN."*

It is estimated that there are 7,000 startups in ASEAN [90]. Most entrepreneurs have small businesses; between 90 and 99 percent of enterprises in each ASEAN Member States are SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprise) [88, 96, 97]. An exact comparison is hard to make as the definition of SMEs is not unified across ASEAN Member States [97]. However, the five founding members of ASEAN and Brunei do have a common SME definition for policy formulation [89].

> *"Internet infrastructure (needed for high speeds) is not evenly distributed, and talent and investment capital are hard to come by."*

Table 1: ASEAN Policy Framwork for Business Start-Up

Period	2015			2017			2018
Actors	ASEAN	ASEAN	ASEAN	ASEAN	ILO + ASEAN	ASEAN	Chair of ASEAN
Framework	AEC Blueprint (2025)	ASEAN Strategic Action Plan for SME Development (2016-2025)	APASTI (2016-2025)	Declaration on Innovation	ILO Know about Business	AMEN	Theme: Resilience and Innovation
Purpose	Economic integration	Integrated Community		Creative, innovative and competitive industries	Community-based Entrepreneurship Development	Entrepreneurs Network	Resilient and innovative Community
Elaboration	Innovative and dynamic community	Globally competitive, resilient, innovative and inclusive development		STI policies for econmic growth, job creation, well-being, science-innovation system; STEM education, fiscal policies, IPR frameworks for for R&D	Piloted countries: Cambodia and Lao PDR	Scale up entrepreneurs via 3Ms	Singapore

AEC: ASEAN Economic Community
AMEN: ASEAN Mentorship for Entrepreneurs Network
APASTI: ASEAN Plan of Action on Science, Technology and Innovation
IPR: Intellectual Property Rights
3Ms: Mentors, Money and Markets
R&D: Research and Development
SME: Small & Medium Enterprises
STEM: Science, mathematics, engineering, and technology
STI: Science, Technology and Innovation

MEASURING STARTUPS AND INNOVATION

There are four lenses through which we can look at the startup landscape. In brief, they are:

- **Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM)** is a quantitative measure of entrepreneurship activity in a country. It is used in 120 different countries [92].
- **Startup Genome** looks at startup and divides them into four stages of their "lifecycle" [99].
- **Global Entrepreneurship Index (GEI)** is not used in as many countries as the GEM, but looks at startups more in depth by looking at 14 indicators per country [100].
- **ASEAN SME Policy Index** was developed by The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) but adapted for ASEAN. It mainly looks at policy related to startups.

Looking at the results of the GEI for ASEAN, it becomes noticeable that Singapore leads in every area except in product innovation (number 10) and startup skills (number 2), where the Philippines does slightly better. It is also worth noting that none of the ASEAN countries score high on either 'opportunity perception' (number 1), startup skills (number 2), or networking (number 4). The first two (opportunity perception and startup skills) are measured by how people rank their own opportunities and startup skills, while the latter (networking) is a combination of whether entrepreneurs know each other and the geographic concentration of entrepreneurs [100].

LOOKING FORWARD

> *"Fundraising for the internet economy is rising; in 2015 more than USD 1 billion was raised for the first time, and that number has grown rapidly"*

While ASEAN has a growing economy, and a great deal of entrepreneurial activity is taking place, the rates of innovation within that entrepreneurial activity are relatively low [36, 92, 93]. The earlier mentioned ASEAN SME Policy Index, which ranks indicators on a 1-6 scale, rates the levels of promotion of innovation particularly low in Brunei, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Malaysia, which suggests that innovation is perhaps correlated with economic development.

As mentioned earlier, obtaining venture capital has long been an issue in ASEAN countries. However, it is slowly becoming a strength [90]. Fundraising for the internet economy is rising; in 2015 more than USD 1 billion was raised for the first time, and that number has grown rapidly; in four years (2015, 2016, 2017, 2018) over USD 24 billion was raised for the internet economy. Of that USD 24 billion, USD 16 billion went to Southeast Asia's nine internet unicorns, privately held startups worth over USD 1 billion (Bukalapak, Go-jek, Grab, Lazada, Razer, Sea Group, Traveloka, Tokopedia, and VNG) [90].

> *"The biggest remaining challenge for the ASEAN Member States is to give their populations the tools to make use of the technology, growing market, and dynamic population."*

Map 30: Training, Startups and Innovations



Meanwhile, fintech is ASEAN's most dynamic sector in internet investment; it received 500 million USD in the first half of 2018, which went to more than 300 startups [90]. Also telling is that Singapore's FinTech Festival drew in 45,000 participants in November 2018 [80]. During the festival, keynote speakers observed that the popularity of fintech might be related to the high number of unbanked (i.e. those without a bank account) in ASEAN and to the opportunities provided by having startups that operate across national borders but within the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) [95].

The biggest remaining challenge for the ASEAN Member States is to give their population the tools to make use of the technology, growing market, and dynamic population. That means investing in education and working towards an integrated education system within ASEAN [88] and focusing on vocational training that gives people the entrepreneurial skills needed to found or work in a startup [89].

8.8.5 SMART INFRASTRUCTURE AND CITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

> *"Urban poverty has dropped, but inequality has risen."*

Southeast Asia is diverse in culture, ethnicity, language, demographics, and political and economic systems. All these have determined the different phases of country development [101]. ASEAN is among the world's fastest growing regions when it comes to population and urban growth[102]. The rapid economic expansion in the region coincides with this rapid urbanization. ASEAN's cities contribute about two thirds of the regional GDP [101]. Driven by economic development and demographic change, the urban population has increased by 3.6 percent annually [103]. Now more than half of the ASEAN population resides in urban areas in 2019; the figure will reach 90 million by 2030 [104, 105]. Metropolises such as Jakarta, Manila, Bangkok, and Kuala Lumpur are home to more than 20 percent of their country's respective populations [101]. The average urbanization rate in Lao PDR and Indonesia are 4.9 and 2 percent per year respectively, while the urban population in Vietnam increased by almost 14 percent between 1990 and 2015 [103, 105].

ASEAN urbanization has been too fast for urban planning to keep pace with [101] as cities continue to change along with increasing globalization and transnationalism [102]. Most of the city expansions are market-led, and long-term public planning has failed to effectively respond to rapid urban growth [103]. The consequence of this is the mismatch between the provision of the supporting infrastructure and services to the soaring city populations [103]. Almost all of ASEAN's major cities suffer from congestion, air and water pollution, unreliable energy, unaffordable housing and security concerns [101, 103, 104]. Urban poverty has dropped, but

> *"Metropolises such as Jakarta, Manila, Bangkok, and Kuala Lumpur are home to more than 20 percent of their country's respective populations."*

> *ASEAN's cities are under pressure to scale up their social and physical infrastructure to keep place with city growth. This necessitates the adoption of the Smart City Initiative for sustainable urban development.*

inequality has risen [88]. Half of urban populations do not have access to safe-drinking water with another 20 percent lacking access to improved sanitation facilities [103]. Informal settlements are seen in many major ASEAN cities where the living conditions are poor and access to social service is severely deficient [106].

Inefficient public transport systems force city commuters to use their own transport, causing congestion [107]. Jakarta and Bangkok both rank among the three cities in the world with the worst traffic [101]. In 2015, Jakarta alone lost approximately USD 4.48 billion, or 3.3 percent of the city GDP, due to congestion [107]. Under building pressure, ASEAN's cities face an immense challenge to scale up their social and physical infrastructure to keep place with city growth[102]. The questions concentrate on how to come up with the planning needed to cope with future growth and development of each city [102]. The situation necessitates the adoption of the Smart City Initiative for sustainable urban development [89]. However, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates the cost for improving cities' infrastructures in the region could reach around USD 60 billion per year [88]. This mean that many metropolises will find it difficult to adequately address the challenges of rapid urbanization [106].

Smart cities, by definition, require the application of smart technologies and technical solutions to help address urban issues, aiming to boost efficiency, sustainability and livability [104, 105, 108, 109]. ASEAN adopted the Smart City Framework (ASCF) for city development in 2018 following the establishment of the ASEAN Smart Cities Network (ASCN). As shown in map 31, the ASCF has been implemented in 26 different cities across the region covering transportation, water treatment, energy, healthcare, education, public services and ICT [104, 107]. Each Member State is responsible for the development of city master plans and proposed key priority projects [104, 109]. The ASCF focuses on six areas: (1) civic and social, (2) health and well-being, (3) safety and security, (4) quality environment, (5) build infrastructure, and (6) industry and innovation [107, 109].

Efforts are underway to enhance social harmony in many ASEAN cities. Singapore is leading in Smart City Development with the application of Artificial Intelligence (AI) across the government sector, including city planning [110, 111]. The city, along with Indonesia's Makassar, has introduced automated government services to improve efficiency and reduce cost. Singapore has also introduced Grab hailing services for smart mobility, and that initiative has since been

> *ASEAN cities have embraced smart technologies to help accelerate socioeconomic development.*

Map 31: Smart Cities



Sources: Adapted from Center for Livable Cities, (2018). ASEAN smart cities network. Ministry of Foreign Affair, Singapore

implemented in various countries in the region [110]. Jakarta has deployed the application called "Qlue" that allows citizens to report problems related to city management and governance instantly for quick interventions. Battambang is making the city more livable with the allocation of more public spaces. Yangon and Bandar Seri Begawan are putting a focus on the preservation of city cultural sites [107]. Telemedicine, digital health records and mobile health services are among technologies now embedded in Manila's and Makassar's healthcare systems. E-learning is being practiced in some parts of Banuwangi, Manila and Nay Pyi Taw. Apart from their affordable housing projects, Yangon and Nay Pyi Taw have installed smart-traffic devices and safety monitoring systems to help smooth city traffic flows [107]. More CCTV units have been deployed in a number of cities such as Hanoi, Danang, Davao and Cebu, not only to improve traffic but also to strengthen security [107].

The work related to environmental quality is seen noticeably in the areas of water treatment and distribution and in the improvement of city drainage systems in smaller cities such as Bandar Seri Begawan, Vientiane, Danang, Siem Reap, Laung Prabang and Johor Bahru [107]. Smart technologies aided the design and planning of the public transportation system, cyclist roads and footpaths for pedestrians in Kuala Lumpur. Other cities such as Siem Reap, Battambang, Kuching, Mandalay, and Kota Kinabalu are keeping clean through sustainable waste management. Phnom Penh has recently introduced e-payment methods for its public transportation [107]. Coastal cities such as Da Nang of Vietnam, Cebu of the Philippines and Surabaya in Indonesia are making efforts to improve city environments by adopting the green urban development vision [112]. Reducing Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions is now part of city development, for example in Jakarta and Danang. The effort is being aided by improving urban energy use efficiency via various technical means [112]. Bangkok, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh have found ways to reduce GHG and traffic congestion by implementing modern Mass-Transit systems [106].

ASEAN cities have embraced smart technologies to help accelerate socioeconomic development. In Jakarta, a smart city initiative aims to create 200,000 jobs by having research institutions develop business ideas for the companies that need it. Siem Reap has put tourist management systems in place to manage the growing number of visitors, while similar approaches have been implemented in Phuket [107].

Creating smart cities is no easy task. It requires balancing economic growth with inclusive urban development planning while preserving the quality of the environment. This development involves the concrete analysis of politico-economic factors, socio-cultural characteristics, along with demographic and geographic considerations [103]. Most importantly, urban development needs to involve the people affected in every step of the process, ensuring that negative impacts are minimized and the benefits of the program are inclusive [102].

MAP 24 SOURCES

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FOOTNOTES

A. Productive health measured by maternal mortality ratio and adolescent birth rates

B. Empowerment measured by proportion of parliamentary seats occupied by females and proportion of adult females and males aged 25 years and older with at least some secondary education.

C. Economic status expressed as labor market participation and measured by labor force participation rate of female and male populations aged 15 years and older.

D. State-based institutions that advocate for gender equality

E. Political life is organized according to male norms and values, and in some cases even male lifestyles.

F. End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere

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ASIA-EUROPE PARLIAMENTARY PARTNERSHIP MEETING (ASEP-11)

The Kingdom of Cambodia has been selected to host the 11th Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership Meeting (ASEP-11). The theme selected by the host country is "Strengthening Parliamentary Partnership for Peace and Sustainable Development". Originally scheduled for October 2020, it has since been postponed until 2021 in response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

ASEP meetings generally take place every two years before the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit, alternating between Asia and Europe. ASEP meetings are an important element of the Asia-Europe partnership process and help foster exchanges and diplomacy between parliaments, foster mutual understanding between the peoples and countries of Asia and Europe, and offer ideas and proposals to the ASEM meetings that follow.

(**Source:** aseminfoboard.org)

THE PIC REGIONAL FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM OF PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY

In 2019 the Parliamentary Institute of Cambodia (PIC) expanded its National Fellowship Program on Parliamentary Diplomacy into a regional one. During the first training intake, participants from five AIPA Member States acquired knowledge and skills to help better prepare their Parliaments engage in the increasingly important work of Parliamentary diplomacy.

> *We were trained to develop critical thinking, to think not only as a country, but also as a region and as a world.*
>
> *We may be different in terms of language, nationality and religion, but actually we want the same thing, we want to achieve the same goal.*
>
> **Zulfa Amirah binti Jubri, Malaysia**

> *I have gained both knowledge and skills...to fully support my principals in the pursuit of... reconciling differences and building partnerships within the region and the world.*
>
> *Four key words highlight my diplomacy experience - context, perspective, negotiation and consensus.*
>
> **Aline Ruth Vidal-Villaluz, Philippines**

The six month training culminated in a simulation modeled on the 11th Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership Meeting (ASEP 11). During the week long exercise, participants representing countries from Asia and Europe reached a consensus on a number of issues, including those shown below.

Simulation training exercise
Jeffrey Cole

Certificate ceremony for PIC Regional Fellowship Program of Parliamentary Diplomacy
Vanna Leng

A SAMPLE OF THE SIMULATION MOCK FINAL DECLARATION

Parliamentarians recognize the critical importance of food, water and energy for development, and are uniquely positioned to provide the political will to promote renewable energy development by shaping enabling policies. These include long-term fiscal incentives and transparent regulatory frameworks, as well as adequate and stable budget allocations needed to ensure the necessary investment.

All participating countries reaffirm their shared commitment, and therefore, ASEP calls for the United States to return to the Paris Agreement. ASEP should share and transfer technology among member countries as well as providing expertise, training, funding and R&D to any countries that require assistance. All member Parliaments commit to curb greenhouse gases by aiming for "zero net" emissions by 2050.

ASEP will organize an exploratory committee on Asia-Europe Strategic Autonomy composed of ten (10) Members from both Asian and European countries, who will undertake to research, study, gather data and connect with experts on the possibility of this partnership, specifically on economic and trade relations. This group will give a report to the ASEP plenary in its 12th Meeting in 2022.

With the Regional Fellowship Program on Parliamentary Diplomacy, PIC and its partners hope not only to increase the capacity of participants to support their MPs, but to give those participants the tools necessary to become future builders of peace and cooperation, in the ASEAN region and beyond.

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

4IR	Fourth Industrial Revolution
ACAP	ASEAN Competition Action Plan
ADB	Asia Development Bank
ADMM	ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting
ADSOM	ASEAN Defense Senior Officials' Meetings
AFPPD	Asian Forum for Parliamentarians on Population and Development
AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Area
AI	artificial intelligence
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AIPA	ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly
AIPO	ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization
ALDE	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
AMECS	Ayeyawady - Chao Pharaya Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy
AMS	ASEAN Member States
APA	Asian Parliamentary Assembly
APF	Asia Pacific Forum
APPF	Asia Pacific Parliamentary Forum
APSC	ASEAN Political-Security Community
APF	Assemblée Parlementaire de la Francophonie
APT	ASEAN Plus Three
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASCC	ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
ASCF	ASEAN Smart City Framework
ASCN	ASEAN Smart Cities Network
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
ASEP	Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership Meeting
AVI	Asian Vision Institute
AWGNCB	ASEAN Working Group on Nature Conservation and Biodiversity
AWGWRM	ASEAN Working Group on Water Resources Management
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India and China
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CLM	Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar

CLMV	Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COP	code of practice
COP	Conference of the Parties (UN Climate Change Conference)
CPA	Commonwealth Parliamentary Association
CPC	Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference
CPTPP	Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
CWPC	Cambodian Women Parliamentarians Caucus
DDA	Doha Development Agenda
DSS	World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System
EAS	East Asia Summit
EBA	Everything but Arms
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EE&C	energy efficiency and conservation
EEC	European Economic Community
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EGD	European Green Deal
EU	European Union
EP	European Parliament
EPBD	Energy Performance in Buildings Directive
EWG	Expert Working Group
FACT	PIC Fiscal Analysis Capacity Training
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
FDI	foreign direct investment
FTA	free trade agreement
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	gross domestic product
GEI	Global Entrepreneurship Index
GEM	Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
GHG	greenhouse gas
GIEC	Groupe d'experts intergouvernemental sur l'évolution du climat
GII	Gender Equality Index
GMV	gross merchandise value
GSP	General System of Preferences
HLPF	High Level Political Forum for Sustainable Development
HDI	Human Development Index

ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICPD PoA	Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development
ICT	information and communications technology
IoT	Internet of Things
IMD	International Institute for Management Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IORA	Indian Ocean Rim Association
IPCC	International Panel on Climate Change
IPU	Inter-Parliamentary Union
IRASEC	Institute for Research on Contemporary Southeast Asia
ITTO	International Tropical Timber Organization
KIT	Kirirom Institute of Technology
MBps	megabytes per second
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MEP	marine environmental protection
MERCOSUR	Southern Common Market, a South American trade bloc with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay as full members
MEWR	Singapore Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources
MFF	Multiannual Financial Framework
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MoWA	Cambodian Ministry of Women's Affairs
MPAC	Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity
MTJA	Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority
NAFTA/USMCA	North American Free Trade Agreement / United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement
NCOP	Thailand National Council for Peace and Order
NECP	National Energy and Climate Plan
NEEAP	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAF	Parliamentary Assembly of la Francophonie
PAP	Pan-African Parliament
PCAsia	Parliamentary Centre of Asia
PIC	Parliamentary Institute of Cambodia
PISA	Programme for International Student Assessment
RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

RE	renewable energy
PRC	People's Republic of China
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SBF	Singapore Business Federation
SCW	Save Cambodia's Wildlife
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SDGs	United Nations Sustainable Development Goals
SFA	Singapore Food Agency
SFM	Sustainable Forest Management
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SKRL	Singapore-Kunming Rail Link
SME	small and medium enterprise
SOP	standard operating procedures
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea
UNDRR	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSDGs	United Nations Sustainable Development Goals
VNR	voluntary national review
WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union
WEF	World Economic Forum
WPFSD	World Parliamentary Forum on Sustainable Development
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

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ATLAS OF

PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY

PART 1: PROACTIVE PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY

PART 2: PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY IN THE ASEAN CONTEXT

Parliamentary diplomacy is a "new frontier" for Parliaments. It refers to the diplomatic activities of parliamentary assemblies as a whole or by some of their members in the realm of international relations. It is complementary to sovereign diplomacy and is increasing an integral part of foreign policy. Multilateral activities are at the core of parliamentary diplomacy. Building on the legitimacy of Parliaments, parliamentary diplomacy endeavors to reduce the democratic deficit in international relations, and brings a welcome dose of reality to the new globalized world.

This Atlas is a unique tool for understanding the concrete regional, transnational and global issues that national Parliaments have to overcome together in order to increase mutual understanding between countries so they can face shared challenges. Part One presents a variety of individual perspectives from experts and citizens from both Asia and Europe on the common issues affecting the people and Parliaments on both continents. Readers can reflect upon these perspectives when discussing legislation and government action intended to address today's most pressing issues. Part Two takes a closer look at the developing role, mechanisms and issues affecting Parliaments and interparliamentary associations in Southeast Asia, especially those among AIPA Member States.

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